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The development of the ability to comprehend and reason with class and 
conditional logic statements was examined in the light of Piaget's 
claim that prior to the age of 11-12 years children are limited to 
reasoning in terms of classes and relations but from the age of 11-12 
years reasoning in terms of propositions becomes possible. Subjects 
from 5 years to 17.5 years were presented with several different 
comprehension and inference tasks with class and conditional logic 
statements. Evidence of differences in the ability of subjects under 
12 years to verify class and conditional logic statements was 
consistent with Piaget's claim that the logical classification 
operations of the concrete subject enable him to interpret class 
inclusion statements but that the conditional interpretation of 
empirical information requires formal operational thinking. No 
distinction in performance between class and conditional statements 
was found on tasks which required an understanding of the logical 
consequences of the inclusion relation with subjects younger than 
first year secondary performing poorly on both class and conditional 
versions of an evaluation task and a syllogistic reasoning task. 
Significant changes in patterns of response at adolescence on the 
conditional verification task, the evaluation task and the syllogistic 
reasoning task supported Piaget's contention that there are 
qualitative changes in reasoning at adolescence although, as in other 
studies, errors in reasoning by adolesecents indicated that Piaget 
overestimated the logical abilities of the formal subject and 
suggested that Piaget's logical model of cognition should be regarded 
as a model of logical competence. 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS AND DECLARATION 
This research was carried out while the author held a Social Science 
Research Council Studentship. 
My thanks go to members of the Departments of Psychology and 
Epistemics in Edinburgh University for discussing various problems 
which occurred during the conceptualization, execution, analysis and 
interpretation of the work in this thesis and particularly to my 
supervisors Dr. T. F. Myers and Dr. E. B. Richards. 
I am grateful to Lothian Region Education Department for granting 
permission for access to Blackhall and Davidsons Mains Primary Schools 
and Broughton High School and The Royal High School in Edinburgh where 
the research was carried out and also to the teachers and pupils 
involved for their co-operation. 
My thanks are also due to friends and relations, particularly Mrs. 
Cathie Boyle and Mrs. Caroline Harvey, who have helped to amuse my son 
Richard while I have been working on the thesis and without whom I 
could not have completed it. Special thanks are due to my husband Jim 
for his love, support and encouragement throughout. 
I declare that I have composed this thesis myself and that all the 
work reported in the thesis is my own. 




This thesis is concerned with the acquisition of deductive reasoning 
ability and the role of logic in explanations of deductive'reasonin; 
ability. !lore specifically it is an investigation of the abilities of 
children and adolescents from 5 years to 18 years to comprehend and 
reason with universally quantified statements of the type "All A are 
B." and the logically equivalent generalized conditional statements of 
the type: "If x is an A, then x is a R. ". The development of the 
ability to reason with these class and conditional statements is of 
interest in the light of Piaget's claim that prior to the age of 11 -12 
years children are limited to reasoning in terms of concrete classes 
and relations whereas children from I1 -12 years onwards can reason in 
terms of propositions. This claim has been interpreted (Roberge and 
Paulus, 1971; Ennis, 1975, 1976; Osherson, 1975) as entailing that 
subjects should be able to reason correctly with arguments stated in 
the language of class logic before they are able to reason with 
conditional, or more generally propositional, logic arguments. 
Propositionally based theories of reasoning would make no such 
prediction about the relative difficulty of class and conditional 
logic problems. On the contrary propositional theories of reasoning 
propose that the difficulty of a problem is a function of its 
propositional structure. Since universally quantified inclusion 
statements like that above are logically equivalent to conditional 
statements at the level of analysis proposed in propositional 
theories, these theories would predict that performance on class logic 
problems should not differ from that on conditional logic problems and 
the ability to reason with such problems would be predicted to develop 
synchronously. 
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Chapter 1, the introduction, is divided into two parts. In part 1 
current theories of reasoning are reviewed within the context of 
recent work of logicians, linguists and psycholinguists and cognitive 
psychologists who have all been concerned with trying to elucidate 
different aspects of the complex relationships between logic, language 
and thinking. The influence of recent research in psycholinguistics 
and work in formal semantics on the development of theories of 
reasoning is reviewed. Little consensus of opinion is found concerning 
the nature of deductive reasoning ability with some theorists 
advocating a mental logic, the view that reasoning processes accord 
with logical rules of inference, and others maintaining that 
psychological aspects of reasoning performance have been neglected by 
those who concentrate on the logical structure of reasoning problems. 
Currently the most popular position vis a vis the relationship between 
logic and thinking is probably the view that logic prescribes a 
logical competence but that a complete theory of reasoning requires an 
account of factors which influence performance on reasoning tasks. 
Part 2 examines how the ability to make deductive inferences is 
acquired. Since Piaget's theory has dominated the literature on the 
development of logical thinking his account of the acquisition of 
logical thinking and particularly his account of the transition from 
concrete to formal operational thinking is described in detail. The 
implications of Piaget's theory with respect to the ability to reason 
with self- contained linguistic premises is reviewed. Different 
researchers have interpreted experimental evidence from inference 
tasks in conflicting ways, as either compatible with or 
counterevidence to Piaget's theory and some researchers have suggested 
that Piaget's theory is not relevant to explaining the acquisition of 
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logical reasoning ability with self- contained verbal premises (Ennis, 
1975, 1976; Eason, 1977; flr.aine, 1978; Falmagne, 1975, 1980). I.t is 
argued, however, that Piaget did intend his theory to deal with 
linguistic reasoning although his concentration on the lor;ical 
structure of problems and failure to consider the plethora of 
linguistic and task specific factors which influence performance on 
reasoning tasks make his account of linguistic reasoning incomplete. 
The experimental chapters in this thesis examine the evidence for the 
qualitative changes in reasoning ability at adolescence which Piaget 
would predict and attempt to identify some of the linguistic and task 
specific factors which influence response on comprehension and 
inference tasks involving class and conditional logic statements. The 
experiments in Chapters 2, 3 and 4 are concerned with the verification 
of universally quantified and general conditional statements. Chapter 
5 discusses the evaluation task, a task requiring the evaluation of 
exemplars as compatible or incompatible with a general rule while 
Chapters 6 and 7 are concerned with syllogistic reasoning with class 
and conditional premises. 
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CHAPTER 1 
PART 1: TIIEORIES OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING: BACKGROUND AND CONTEXT 
The Historical Context of the Relationship between Logic and 
Thinking 
The nature of the relationship between logic and thinking has been a 
philosophical issue since the days of Plato and Aristotle. Until the 
late 19th. century most philosophers were of the opinion that the 
principles of logic were the laws of thought. When Aristotle 
formulated the principles of traditional formal logic - the rules 
determining the validity of categorical syllogisms - he believed that 
the rules he had proposed represented the forms of thought. 
Implicit in the title of George Boole's (1854) treatise on the algebra 
that bears his name (Boolean algebra), "An investigation of the laws 
of thought." is his view of the nature of the symbolic system he had 
developed. The laws of logic were, for Boole, the laws of the 
operation of the human intellect. Had the human intellect operated 
differently, so too the principles of logic would have been different. 
Kant (1885) saw no reason to challenge the traditional view of logic 
as the science of the necessary laws of thought and Mill (1874) 
endorsed Archbishop Whateley's definition of logic as the science as 
well as the art of reasoning. By the science of reasoning he meant 
"the analysis of mental processes which takes place whenever we 
reason" (rill, 1965, p. 2). By the art of reasoning he meant "the 
rules, grounded on that analysis for conducting the process correctly" 
(op. cit). In modern terms this definition of reasoning would 
constitute the proposal that both the competence (the art of 
s- 
reasoning) and performance (the ecience of reesoning) components of a 
reasonine model are loeically based, 
A radical change in the climate of opinion about the relationship 
between logical principlee and thinking wes brought about by Frege 
(Haack, 1978) who claimed that logic an mental processes are 
unrelated and that logic would exist even if the hunan mind did not 
since logical relations are independent of our experience of then. The 
main objection that Frege had to psychologise - the view that the laws 
of logic are a function of human cognition - was that mental processes 
are subjective while logic is objective. For Frege it was not possible 
that logic was rooted in cognition since no general principles could 
be derived iron something that is subjective. Frege, along with other 
advocates of antipsychologism including Russell and 4ittgenstein, 
argued that the laws of logic are not the laws of thought but rather 
that the laws of logic are the laws of necessary relationships between 
propositions where a proposition is true if it is an accurate 
representation of external reality. 
Another view of the nature of the laws of logic is that the laws of 
logic are the most general laws aL language. One version of this 
theory is the "linguistic-conventionalist" theory (Mitchell, 1962) 
such as that of Strawson (1952), which holds that the laws of logic 
arise outIthe general laws governing the conventions of language use. 
Thus the law of non-contradiction for example would he based on the 
meaning of the linguistic sign used for negation. The logical 
positivists also proposed that logic is a language and should be 
related to a general syntax and semantics; they distinguished between 
analytic truths, which can be proved only by means of logical laws, 
and synthetic truths which are established empirically. There are many 
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problems with this view of the nature of logic, particularly in 
distinguishing analytic from synthetic truths. The logical positiviste 
however were instrumental in the development of formal semantics. 
A deeper understanding of the relationships between logic, language 
and reality has been achieved in recent years due to advances made by 
logicians and linguists in the study of the semantic analysis of 
formal systems and the role of formal systems in the analysis of 
natural language and also because of the revolution in the study of 
linguistic structure inspired by Chomsky. Proposals like that of the 
Generative Semanticists that the semantic base of language can be 
characterised in terms of its logical form obviously imply a closer 
relationship between logic and cognition than the strong 
anti-psychologism of Frege a/though the relevance of much of the 
logico-linguistic research to psychological questions is still rather 
unclear. 
For psychologists one of the most interesting areas of research in the 
study of the complex interrelationships between logic, language, 
thinking and reality has been in explaining how human beings make 
deductive logical inferences and how they come to acquire this 
ability. Psychologists have tended to approach the problems 
surrounding the nature of logical knowledge and the relationship 
between logic and thinking in a different way from logicians and 
philosophers. Rather than being concerned with the origins of and 
nature of formal logic, psychologists have been more concerned with 
asking whether or not reasoning is logical i.e. whether reasoning is 
carried out in accordance with the logical principles prescribed by 
logicians. More recently psychologists have started to appreciate the 
philosophical problems surrounding the origins and nature of logical 
-7 
systems and consequently nave been forced to examine the nature of 
logical knowledge at a deeper level. 
The basic philosophical positions vis \a. vis the relationship between 
logic and thinking also have adherents within the literature on the 
psychology of deductive reasoning. Some psychologists, including 
advocates of Venlo's (1962, 1978) "rationalist" school still adopt the 
view that tho laws of logic describe the way ve think. Piaget is also 
an advocate of tLr view that formal logic provides a model of logical 
thinking although Piaget proposes that 
constructed by t...(1 interiorization of and 
subject's actions rather than proposing that 
principles is innate. Others (Evans, 
logical knowledge is 
abstraction from the 
knowledge of logical 
1982; Pollard, 1982; 
Johnson-Laird, 1982) have argued that the laws of logic are irrelevant 
to the way that we think and that concentrating on the logical 
structure of problems rather than more fundamental aspects of the 
cognitive processes carried out in solving deductive reasoning 
problems has obscured rather than clarified the nature of deductive 
reasoning abilities. However, probably the most acceptable position 
currently is the view that logic is normative with respect to 
reasoning i.e. that the validity of an inference can be assessed with 
respect to formal logic but the mental processes carried out in making 
the inference do not necessarily correspond to the logical rules of 
inference (Falmagne, 1980; Cohen, 1981). This could be called a "weak 
rationalist" position advocated by those who argue that formal logic 
prescribes a subject's logical competence Out that a complete theory 
of deductive reasoning requires a specification of performance factors 
affecting the actual conclusions drawn in making deductive inferences. 
The following areas of research concerning logic, language and 
reasoning have been of most obvious relevance in determining the 
development of theories of reasoning in recent years. 
a) Henle's (1962) paper was influential in promoting the rationalist 
view of the relationship between logic and reasoning. According to 
this view the reasoning process is logical i.e. the actual mental 
operations carried out in making an inference can be identified with 
the rules of logic. This position has inspired much debate in recent 
years. Critics of the rationalist position have raised several 
objections to it, notably the problems of errors in reasoning, the 
effects of content on response and the problem of how a mental logic 
is acquieed. 
b) The psycholinguistic research inspired by Chomsky's revolutionary 
approach to linguistics was a major influence in the development of 
theories of deductive reasoning with linguistic premises. The aim of 
the psycholinguistic enterprise was to characterise a) the nature of 
the cognitive structures and processes underlying the comprehension 
and production of natural language sentences and b) the relationship 
between these cognitive structures and operations and grammatical 
structures and rules. Psychologists interested in reasoning began to 
draw parallels between the objectives of the psycholinguists and their 
own objectives in characterising the nature of the representations and 
structures used in reasoning and the relationship between the 
representations and operations proposed in psychological theories of 
reasoning and logical systems. 
c) Psychologists (Johnson-Laird, 1983) have recently become 
increasingly interested in developments in the application of formal 
systems to the analysis of meaning and inference in natural language - 
model theoretic semantics. It is important to psychologists to 
determine wehr the formal characterisation of meaning provided by 
model theoretic semantics is relevant to providing a psychologically 
realistic theory of meaning and inference. Johnson-Laird (1982, 1983) 
has recently rejected a simple account of the relationship between 
formal and psychological semantics but he bee obviously been heavily 
influenced by model theoretic mantic in providing his mental model 
theory of meaning, representation and inference. 
d) The major influence over the past twenty-five years on explanetions 
of the acquisition of logical reasoning ability has been the work of 
Piaget. In the course of his extensive writings Piaget provided a 
complex framework describing different stares in the child's 
acquisition of knowledge from birth to adolescence. Of particular 
Interest in this thesis is Piaget's account of the concrete and formal 
operational stages of development and the transition from the former 
to the latter, particulary in the light, of Piaget's claim that for the 
formal operational thinker "reasoning is nothing more than the 
propositional calculus itself" (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p.305). 
In the remainder of Part 1 the research mentioned in (a), (h) and (c) 
above will be discuesede In Part 2 the acquisition of deductive 
reasoning ability will be discussed with particular reference to 
Piaget's account of developmental stages in. logical thinking. 
Henle and the ationalist Appa251110 -Aeasonin 
An article by Henle in 1962 entitled. "On the relation between logic 
and thinking" did much to renew the interest of psychologists in 
reasoning. Up until. then the prevailing climate of opinion amongst 
psychologists had been that logical principles were not relevant to 
reasoning. Support for this opinion came from studies such as that of 
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Bruner, Goodnow and Austin (1956), Lefford (1946) and Morgan and 
Morton (1944), who found that subjects in reasoning experiments tend 
to accept conclusions which are empirically reaeonable and which 
accord with their own knowledge, beliefs, experience etc, rather than 
conclusions which follow validly fron the premises. In other words 
subjects tend to make inferences which are pragmatic or 
psychologically acceptable rather than logically valid. 
The fact that subjects make errors in reasoning was regarded by some, 
Cohen (1944) and Nagel (1956), as irrefutable evidence that the laws 
of logic cannot he the laws according to which we think. Henle however 
pointed out that the existence of errors in reasoning was noted by the 
traditional philosophers but was not regarded as evidence that 
reasoning is not logical, 'Boole (1S54), for instance, considered that 
the existence of fallacies in reasonine was due to interference of 
other lays with the laws of inference, but did not regard this as 
evidence that rules of inference did not exist in the subject's mind. 
Mill (1874) stated "It is scarcely ever possible to affirm that any 
argument involves a bad syllogism" (Mill, 1874, p. 560). Hanle claims 
that the change from the psychologism of the traditional philosophers 
to the antipsychologism of the more modern philosophers was due to "an 
altered intellectual climate rather than any fundamental discoveries 
about the nature of reasoning" (Henle, 1962, p.94). The change was 
principally due to the influence of Frege upon ideas about the nature 
and origins of logic, 
Henle reintroduced a rationalist viewpoint - the idea that reasoning 
is carried out in accordance with the principles of logic - as a 
respectable position to take vis a vis the relationship between logic 
and reasoning. Henle claimed that support for this position came from 
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a study of the errors subjects :nacre, in evaluating the validity of 
inferences. Henle identified four different typos of error: the first 
type of error was an error of non -acceptance of the logical task, 
similar to the type of responses reported by Pxorgan and i°orton, 
(1944), Brener of al (1956): responses of this type were based upon 
personn.l beliefs, opinion, etc. rather than upon purely logical 
considerations. Tillery the subject did accept the logical task Honl.e 
identified three different typos of error based on the subjects' 
misinterpretation of the premises: subjects added in extra premises, 
they omitted to consider premises and they interpreted the premises in 
idiosyncratic ways thereby changing the intended meaning of the 
premises. Fienle concluded that her subjects' inferences were always 
logically valid if the validity of an inference was judged with 
respect to the subjects' interpretation of the premises within the 
context of the problem as a whole, rather than being judged with 
respect to the interpretation intended by the experimenter. This 
rationalist hypothesis, that reasoning is carried out by means of 
logical inference on misinterpreted premises, has inspired much 
research on reasoning in the past twenty years. As recently as 1970, 
in the introduction to fevlln and Mayer's "Human Reasoning" Iienle 
reaffirmed her commitment to the rationalist position: "I have never 
found errors which could unambiguously be attributed to faulty 
reasoning". 
One reason for the popularity of Henle's rationalist hypothesis is 
that it gets out of the problem which faces any empirical 
investigation of reasoning of the circular relationship between 
logicality and understanding. The problem, which was described by 
Smedslun1 (1970), is that in order to say whether a subject is 
responding logically in a reasoning task one must assume that he has 
r2_ 
understood the task instructions and premises. On the other hand if 
one wants to assess a subject's understanding o a statement one must 
assume that the subject is responding logically. SmedslUnd originally 
described the problem as a problem for Piagetian psychology in which 
assessment of the child's logical operational level is based upon the 
assumption that the child has understood terms and instructions in the 
task.; however the problem is a general one and exists for any 
psychological explanation of responses on reasoning tasks. 
Tlith the growth of interest in psycholinguistics in the late 1960s and 
early 19705 new naradiams were being sought for investigating how 
children and adults understand sentences. It was realized that the 
rationalist hypothesis offered a way of studying sentence 
comprehension. Since errors in reasoning were attributable to 
misinterprets of the premises, subject responses on reasoning 
tasks would reflect their understanding of the premises. Although this 
solution seems attractive to the psycholinguist interested in sentence 
comprehension, it would leave the researcher in reasoning in the 
paradoxical position of investigating a subject's logical ability but 
presupposing that he behaves logically! 
It seems that much of the confusion surrounding this debate about 
logicality and understanding occurs due to the misuse of the term 
'logical'. Smedelund (1977) describes how, following his recognition 
of the circular relation between logicality and understanding, he 
realised that the subject must always be regarded as rational given 
hIs interpretation of the situation. Smedsluud claims that "it is 
possible and intuitively obvious to presuppose logicality whereas it 
is clearly absurd to presuppose understanding". It is not clear what 
SmedslUnd means by 'locicality' but if he means that we should regard 
reasoning processes as following valid logical principles it is by no 
means obvious that we should assume logicality. It is possible that be 
means something weaker than this that the subject should be regarded 
as generating responses which can be seen to accord with the responses 
that logic would prescribe given his interpretation of the premises. 
It seems that Smedslttrld is in fact saying something even weaker than 
this - that the subject should be presumed to behave logically given 
his understanding of the problem end given his level of logical 
development, where 'logically' seems to mean 'sensibly and in 
accordance with a limited system of rule governed behaviour. 
One of the major problems with the rationalist theory is its 
untestability. If the subject is presumed to make logical inferences 
based upon his own personal understanding of the premises we would 
have to lalow I,ow the subject understood the premises in order to 
affirm that his reasoning was logical. The subject's comprehension of 
the premises would have to be determined independently of the 
inferences he makes; however the subject's comprehension of the 
premises is inferred from the inferences he makes, and the logical 
nature of the inferences is presupposed. Locking at this in another 
way it is always possible to infer some interpretation of the premises 
which would logically imply any given conclusion. There would be no 
point in simply asking the subject how he interpreted the premises 
because introspections of this type are notoriously unreliable (Evans, 
1980, 1982). 
Criticisms of Rationalism 
One of the most svere critics of the rationalist :position Is Evans 
(197S, 19F0, 19P2). !yens (1980) argues that' if subjects do use 
4,f 
loeical rules of inference in reasonine, they should show a consistent 
pattern of reasoning both within and between tasks. A subject who 
interprets a conditional statement as a biconditional in one task 
should also interpret it in this way on other tasks. Evans (1978) 
found however that subjects who interpret the conditiona/ as an 
implication (conditional) on an evaluation task, such as that 
described by Johnson-Laird and Tagart (1969), apparently interpret it 
as an equivalence (biconditional) on a conditional syllogism task. In 
addition to this, responses on Fasonts selection task reflect neither 
a conditional nor a biconditional interpretation. The rationalists 
would, not accept this difference in interpretation between tasks as 
evidence that reasoning is not logical; they would argue that 
reasoning is logical but task specific factors influence the 
interpretation of the conditional. Between task differences in 
response can be explained if it is assumed that reasoning is logical 
given the different interpretations of the premises in the different 
tasks. The non-rationalist would object that it is incumbent upon the 
rationalist to specify how the task specific factors determine the 
interpretation of the conditional. 
A further problem which Evans poses for the rationalist hypothesis is 
the existence of non-logical response biases in reasoning which in 
many cases provide better explanations of errors than the Henle 
hypothesis. One of the earliest examples of a non-logical theory was 
the atmosphere hypothesis of Woodworth and Sells (1935). Evans calls 
the theory non-logical because response was explained not in terms of 
the logical form of the premises but in terms of a global impression 
of the "atmosphere" of the premises. The atmosphere hypothesis 
predicts that whenever premises contain negative or existential 
premises so too the most frequently drawn conclusions will contain 
15- 
negative or existential premises. 
Further examples of non-logical response biases which Evans 
investigated include 1) negative conclusion bias and 2) matching 
response bias. Evans reported these biases on a variety of reasoning 
tasks incl7iding categorical and conditional syllogisms (Evans, 1977), 
Wason's selection task (Evans and Lynch, 1973) and a. task in which 
subjects were required to provide verifying and falsifying instances 
of a conditional rule (Evans, 1972). 
The rationalist mo,,,e1 of reasonin holds that inferences are carried 
out in terms of logical rules of inference and that these rules of 
inference operate on problems with the same logical stucture 
regardless of the content of the problem. There are however many 
studies in the literature which demonstrate that the content of the 
problem has a significant effect on the conclusions drawn. One of the 
most impressive and well-researched examples of this occurs in Wason's 
selection task. 
In the selection task the subject is presented with four cards showing 
'A', '1)', '4' and '7' and he is told that each card has a letter on 
one side a number on the other. Ile is then given a rule about the four 
cards in. front of him e.g. 
"If a card has a vowel on one side, it has an oven number on the other 
side." 
Pis tea; is to say which of the cards he would need to turn over in 
order to find out whether the rule is true or false. Vason and 
Johnson-Laird regarded the task as very similar to the formal 
operational hypothesis testing tasks described by Infielder and riaget 
(1958) and consequently they expected that adults should be able to 
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solve it. POver only 5 out of 12S adult subjects in four studicu 
reported by Tlason and Johnson-Laird gave tî :1 correct response on the 
task, which in the cxmplo above was 'A' and '7'. Most subjects chose 
'A' alone or 'A' and '4'. In other words most subjects fail to 
appreciate the importance of choosing '7' as a possible falsifying 
instance of the general rule. Vason and Johnson-Laird argued that this 
result raised considerable problems for Piaget's account of formal 
operational thin%ing since, according to ?inset, the formal 
operational subjct tests different hypotheses by actively looking for 
falsifying exemplars to particular hypotheses. 
rven more difficult to explain was the dramatic improverent in 
performance on the selection task when the problem was presented with 
realistic content. Wason and Shapiro (1971) presented their subjects 
with the rule: 
"Every time I go to Manchester I travel by train." 
and cards showing 'car' 'train"i.lanchester"Sbeffield'. 10 out of 16 
subjects identified the cards 'Manchester' and 'car' as the correct 
cards to turn over in this study compared with only 2 out of 16 in the 
abstract version of the problem. In a further study by Johnson-Laird, 
Legrenzt and Legrenzi (1972) with realistic content, 20/24 subjects 
correctly identified sealed letters and letters with 40 lire stanps 
(not 50 lire stamps) as the letters to turn over in order to say 
whether or not it was truA thate 
"If a letter is sealed it has a 50 lire stamp OP fs 
However correct response on this realistic problem did not transfer to 
the abstrat problen. Much research has been devoted to trying to 
establish the origin of this so-called 'thematic materials' effect 
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with the selection tas'c, with Ci.7.hooly and Falconer. (1974) attributing 
the effect to the concrete /abstract nature of the premises and 
Dracew 11 and Hid! (1974) arguing that the relation between the terms 
was a more important determiner of performance. Van Dyne (1974, 1976) 
found that both factors contributed to the thematic materials effect. 
The superior performance found or this and other reasoning problems 
with realistic content and the failure to transfer to problems with 
abstract content is difficult to reconcile with a rationalist model 
although again the rationalist would argue that different types of 
content influence the interpretation of the premises (Staud n ayer, 
1975). Cohen (1981) argued that the selection task is a cognitive 
illusion evoked by the strange task requirements. He regarded the 
results of the various manipulations of the selection task as 
providing important data concerning the relationship between the 
underlying logical competence and performance on the task. 
Fin.cechiero (1980) has recently argued that the facilitative effect of 
concrete content In the selection task can be given a formal 
exnlanat:ion. Fe argues that in treating the rules in their selection 
task as propositional conditionals Wason and Johnson-Laird provide an 
oversimplistic analysis since the rules are in fact universal 
generalizations of conditionals involving quantifiers. Furthermore, 
under Finocchiaro's analysis, the abstract rules are much more 
logically complex than the concrete rules and, since logical 
complexity presumably correlates with problem difficulty, problems 
involving abstract rules would be predicted to be more difficult than 
problems involving concrete rules. Finocc.?ïaro argues that the 
predicate logic representation of the concrete rule: "Every time I 
+-ravel to f'r.Inckxester I go by train." 5e: 
V(x)(oe-pqx) where !Am x is a journey to Manchester. 
Tx: x is a journey by train. 
whereas 07* formalization of the abstract rule: "If a card has a vowel 
on one side it has an even number on the other side." is: 
(x)(y)(z)(Cx & Pxy & Syx & yitz Szx Qxz) 
where: 
Cx: x is a card 
Pxyt x has a vowel on side y 
Syxs y is a side of card x 
Qx7,1 x as an even number on side z 
Although Finocchiaro indicatee that it ie possible to give a formal 
explanation of the facilitative effects of concrete centent he argues 
that the reasoning processes which would te required to solve the task 
formally would be so complex that the formal explanation is 
It recent attempt has been made by Pollard (1982) to provide a more 
coherent, integrated explanation of non-logical response biases and 
the facilitative effect of concrete content in. terms, of Tversky and 
Eahneman's availability heuristic. The marked facilitative effect that 
concrete content has on a variety of responses in reasoning problems 
and the apparent inbtltty of subjects to ignore the truth value and 
content of a conclusion, even when explicitly asked to do so, 
illustrates, according to Pollard, that subjects are more concerned in 
real life with making correct decisions than they are in making 
inferences that are logically valid. The knowledge that a conclusion 
i3 a true statemeat is generally more useful to a subject than tne 
knowledge that it is a logically valid conclusion. Subjects base their 
responses to reasaniag problems on "available CIA(18" i.e. the 
information relevant to the content of 'a problem that can be retrieved 
from memory. 
Non-logical response biases and content effects do not pose such a 
problem for the more recent versions of the rationalist hypothesis as 
they did for the older, more extreme versions of the hypothesis. 
According to the more recent versions of the rationalist hypothesis 
the subject may have an underlying logical competence which 
constitutes hi s knowledge of logical principles but In using and 
understanding logical arguments "performance factor*" would have to be 
considered. Non,-logical response biases would he regarded as a class 
of performance factor, Although a subject may possess a logical 
competence ho may fail to apply logical rules in reasonint=, for a 
variety of reasons e,g, the content of the problem may influence his 
response; he may decide that ari argument is acceptable even although 
it is not deductively valid; he may realize that he should apply 
certain inference rules but lack the motivation to apply then. Urrors 
in performance on a logical task would Lot necessarily indicate that 
the subject could not, in other Circumstances, understand the logical 
principle involved but would indicate instead. "some valfunction of an 
information processing mechanism" as Cohen (Cohen, 1981 p.317) puts 
it. Instead of regarding content effects as evidence that inference is 
not logical th competence/performance rAadels allow that the 
individual has an underlying competence and that the psychologist's 
task is to identify the factors which determine how the subject 
interprets the task. 
2c) 
The distinction between competence and performance will be recognised 
as similar to that which. Chomsky (1965) introduced into linguistics. 
juet a$ the speaker's knowledge of languaee constitutes, his lirgelstle 
competence so the reasoner's knowledge of logical prineiples 
constitutes his logical competence, and just as linguistic performance 
is concerned with the principles governIe language understanding and 
production so logical performance is concerned with the principles 
which eovern the production and comprehension of logical argueents. 
Tb e oder rationalist hypothesiv c n be compered with an integral 
model of grammar, where tlea locical (spermatic:el) rules form an 
inteerel part of a. theory of performance (Steinberg, 1982). The more 
modern ersions of the rationalist theory propose that competence and 
performance are two separate components of a theory of reasoning end 
are more like eomponeutial models of grammar: logical rules constitute 
a componeet of the theory of reasoeing which interact with othcr 
component& to determine performance on. reasoning tasks. 
One of the major problems with competeree torte, as rvans (1980) 
points out, lies in their unteetability. The competence component is 
frequently inferted from inferences which subjects have made or which 
they find acceptable. The competence component is, in other words, 
inferred from subjects' perfoxemnce on reasoning problems. However if 
both competence and performance components are to be specified in a 
model of reasoning they should be characterised independently. The 
competence component is frequently given an independent 
characterisation as some formal logical system. This approach is also 
problematic however in that it is not clear which logical systen 
should be used as a competence model. The unsuitability of standard 
propositional logic as a model of competence In reasoning with natural 
language premises has been stressed by Vason and Johnson-Laird (1972), 
johneon-Leird (1975), Osherson (1975). Zraine (1978). Formal logic 
incorporate s paradoxes unich reaeonere would find unacceptable, 
including the paradoxes of material implication and disjunction. 
Different inferences will be valid in different 1otca1 systems and so 
whether a particular inference is judged ae valid or as invalid 
depende upon the logical system adopted as a competence model. 
Another problem with formal logic as a model of reasoning ia that 
logical systems are usually formalized axiomaeically 1.e. as a set of 
axioms with, a small nunber of rules ox Inference. This type of 
formalization seems inappropriate as a model of human Inference since 
human beings are not normally concerned with provin6 logical erutha 
but rather they are concerned with establishing e4aningful/pragmatic 
connectiona between statements. Genezan proposed a eystem of natural 
deduction, the explicit aim of which was to "set up a formalism that 
reflects ae accurately as possible the actual reasoni g involved in 
mathematical proofs" (Gentzen, 1964, p. 291). The system was e 
formalization of staadaed logic which diapensed with axioms and 
consisted only of inference rule schemata. An inference rule achema 
defines rules of inference by specifying their form and a rule of 
inference consists of an instruction or warranty for concluding y 
given x, e.g. an inference rule achenta ior conjunction would be: 
p 
p.q. 
The relevance of the natural deduction system as a possible model of 
'euman inference was discussed by Johnson-Laird (1975), Oeherson 
(1)75), Braine (1978). Inference rule achemata have the advantage as 
psychological models that they do not incorporate the paradoxes of 
L2:2_ 
standard propositional logic since they have an inherent 
dire 
Osherson (1974, 1975) attempted to correlate the difficulty 
experienced by both adults and children in attempting to solve certain 
logical problems, assessed in terms of both latency of solution and 
error rates, with the difficulty of the problems in terms of the 
number of steps involved in different algorithmic proof procedures in 
propositional logic: these proof procedures included the truth table 
method, reduction to disjunctive or conjunctive normal form, and 
methods for establishing falsifying truth value assignments. Osherson 
found no correlation between formula difficulty and any of these proof 
procedures. Osherson then looked at the correlation between the 
experienced difficulty and the number of inference rules in a natural 
deduction procedure. Osherson found a correlation of 0.6 between 
experienced difficulty of a problem and the number of inference rules 
proposed for a successful solution to the problem. This rose to 0.8 
when appropriate differential weightings were given to operations 
involving disjunctive and conjunctive operations in order to account 
for the difficulty of disjunction compared with conjunction (Bourne 
and Banion, 1971; Neimark and Slotnick, 1970). Despite this success 
Osherson acknowledges the limitations of his natural deduction system 
in that it only deals with a subset of propositional logical truths 
and not at all with predicate logic. 
Johnson-Laird (1975) also proposed a natural deduction system for 
propositional inference as a model of competence in propositional 
reasoning. He argued that it was an empirical problem to determine 
which inference rule schemata are psychologically basic and the matter 
can only be resolved by determining which inferences mature but 
logically naive people find acceptable. 
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The Influence of -cholineuistec Theories on The rice 
Reesoeiee 
The adoption of the ceepetence/performance dietiection by 
psychologiste interested in reasonite, or psycholoeicians as Osherson 
calls them, we; not the only influence of psycholineuistic theories on 
theories of reasoning in the 1960s and 1970s. Many of the iseuns which 
concezned the lineulete and psycbolineulste who were studyine the 
mental representations and proccases underlying the corprehension and 
production of natueal language sentences were also of interest to 
psycholoeista attempting to characterise the mental :structures and 
operations used in makin e Inferences. 
One of the major arguments in linguistic theory follovine the 
publIcation of Chomskyte "Aspects of a Theory of Syntax" in 1965 
concerned the existence of the level of deep structure as defined by 
Chomsky. The standard genetative transformational gTammar propcsed in 
the Aspects mode/ wan a nytactically based grammar. Tbe lareureee was 
forrally characterized in terra of two levels of syntactic etructure, 
the deep structure and the surface structure, and a sequence of 
operations called traeefcrmatione eelating the levels. The deep 
structure level was the Input to the emantic component and all 
mantic information relevaet to the interpretation of a sentence wae 
held to be present in the deep structure (See Figure 
Syntax and semantics th the Aspects model were separate both in the 
sense that syntactic categories were not semantically based and also 
in the sense that the transformational sequence from deep structure to 
surface structure wee syntactically based. In a similar way 
reticnelist models of reasoning proposed that the semantic 
LL( 
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interpretation and logical inference componentn were separate with 
semantic interpretation preceding logical Infrence and Inference 
rules opemting in a trictly form' way upon the w 1 forne,,1 formulae 
specified in the semantic encoding, 
ChonsliT'a description of a gramnar in terns of linguist*c structures 
and rules and his conviction that conclusions about the nature cf the 
human mind could be drawn from generalisations about the nature of 
linguisCx structure led to an intensive effort by psychologists in 
the 1960s and 1970s to establish whether the structures and operations 
ho proposed did correspond to identifiable cognitive structures and 
operations used in language conprehen5ion and production. In their 
rvic,1 or the literature in 1974, Fodor, Bever and Garrett coT.cludcd 
t"cicAt while the evidence supported the viey t:at defp r,urface 
$y,lac,Ic /ovels corresponded to p.:,chclogically real leve2s of 
encoding it did not provide ,$upport for transformations as coitive 
operations carried out during sertence comprehr?nsion. 
Clark (1969) was one of the first to propose t7-at the hinds of rental 
stratotios and processes proposed t theories of language 
comprehension and production can also be applied to theories of 
deductive reasoning. Clark's linguistic nodel of rcesoning pr posed 
that the pren-tises of the reasoning prohlem are encoded using thc sane 
processes used in sentence comprehension. Clark proposed that thp deep 
structure level of a sentence, tbe abstroct structure accesbed in 
interpreting the sentGnce,contains the information relevant to :aking 
deductive irforences vith the sentence, fl' showed that tnrec 
principles which were related to the deep structure rather th,u the 
surface structure of the -entence - the principle of the pri:cy of 





of congruence - were geed predictors of. tUe mean solution 
two and three term series problems. This conception of 
reas .,ng provided the basis for a more Peneral theory of 
reasoning ae closely integrated with langua ge. comprehension 
in contrast with previous accounts of deductive inference which tended 
to be specific to particular reasoning tasks, ewe three terz series 
problems (untori 1957; Donaldson, 1963; Handel, De Soto and London, 
196B; Huttenlocher, 1968) and syllogistic inference (Woodworth and 
Sells, 1936; Chapman and Chapman, 1959). 
Subsequent research, linguistic and psycholinguistic, questioned the 
status of the level of deep structure defined in Aspects as the level 
from which the semantic representation of a sentence is specified* It 
was challenged by the Interpretive semanticists, including Jachendoff 
(1971) and Cbomsky himself (1971), as too deep. They claimed that 
certain aspects pf sentence meaning includin g. stress placement and 
scope and quantification. properties should he defined at the level of 
surface structure. 
The Generative Semanticists including McCawley, Lakoff, Ross, Postal 
(Lakoff, 1971) on the other hand, claimed that the level of deep 
structure specified in Aspects was too shallow and was, in fact, 
identical to the level of semantic representation. They challenged 
both the primacy and autonony of syntax, arguing that syntactic 
categories are semantically motivated and that semantics should play a 
primary or generative role in grarmar. In edditton they argued that 
there is no exclusively syntactic derivational sequence mapping the 
ultimate underlying structures on to the surface structures. Rather 
the grammar would consist of a interacting sequence of syntactic 
(transformational) and semantic (lexical insertion) rules which would 
relate the ultimate underlying structures, the semantic 
representations, to tie surface structures (see Figure 1.2). 
Some Generative Semanticists (Lakoff, 1970, 1971) identified the level 
of semantic representation with the logical form of the sentence 
although others (teuren, 1972) were more cautious arguing that it was 
premature to specify the nature of semantic representations. 
..nú Generative z5emantrcists' identification of deep grammatical 
structure with logical form waa of interest to logicians interested in 
ellaractorizing the logical structure of natural language (irmari, 
1970) Unce it suggested that the concerns of linguists and logicians 
in analysing natural language were more similar than had sometimes 
been supposed. Cresswell (1973) expressed surprise that the Generative 
Semanticists chose first order logic rather than a more complex formai 
language as a base language fer analysing linguistic structure ad 
described much richer formal languages which he feirt were more 
appropriate to the- logical analysis of natural language. 
Inc grammar advocated by th eituivs .Ssmantioists wau ai6so ol 
12.1A:cast to psychologicians since it could be regarded as au integral 
model cf language comprehension or, more accurately. language 
production. flany or the Generative Lemanticiats rsgardeu the grammar 
(:)ce Figure 1.) as a model of psychologically real structures and 
processes carried out in actually understanding and producing 
sentences. The semantic representations which the Generative 
Eamanticists proposed as psychologically real levels of semantic 
representation produced or accessed la producing or comprehending a 
sentence would '..te identical to the logical form of the sentence, the 
level from which valid inferencez could be specified. Tnus the 
semantic representations proposed by the Generative Semanticists were 
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just the representations which psychologicians eanted to characterise. 
The areuments underlyine the Cenerative Semanticists' challenge to the 
primacy and autonomy of syntax in Chomsky's standard they hava 
parallels In the arguments put forward to challenge the independence 
of the s,rnr,ntic interpretation and logical Inference components 
proposed in rationalist models of reasoning. 
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Just as the Aspects' 
-aerial comprising a purely syntactic sequence of rules joining deep and 
surface structures was rejected by the Generative Semanticists, so too 
psycholegicians found evidence that the semantic interpretation of 
prenises in a reasoning problem cannot be separated from the 
inferences that tha subject makes. The results of many studies show 
that the inferences subjects make in reasoning tasks cannot be 
explained in terms of the application of standard logical rules of 
inference upon a formal representation of the premises. Rather 
response depends upon the content and context of the problem, 
presuppositions connected with the premises etc. (Staudenmayer, 1975; 
Revlie, 1975). Falmagne (1975) argues that these results show that the 
subject is aware that different situations have different logical 
properties and that the encoding of the premises incorporates implicit 
logical knowledge. Staudenmayer argues from a rationalist position 
that the context, presuppositions etc. influence the subject's 
interpretation of the premises but that inference is logical, carried 
out on the individual subject's complete interpretation of the 
premises. 
raLtallistal.22.2z2aatitticxl 
Following the recognition of the problems associated. with deep 
structure, much research in linguistics and psycholinguistIcs was 
directed towards characterising psychologically realistic grammars and 
towards more general problems in determining how sentences ana texts 
arP nrelerstood and how linguistic information is represented and 
stored in memory (Kintsch, 1974). It appeared that while the actual 
cords used tn the linenistic expression of the input sentences were 
poorly remembered in recall and recognition tasks the overall meaning, 
or gist, of the sentences or text was remembered well (Sachs, 1967, 
1974; Johnson-Laird et al, 1973; Ratcliff and MeKoon, 1978; Brewer and 
Lichtenstein, 1975; ,Tonaco, 1975). Information from text is apparently 
represented in an abstract form corresponding to the "meanine" of the 
text which psychologists have called a propositional representation. 
The term 'propositional representation' as used by psychologists 
refers to an abstract mental representation of linguistic or 
non-linguistic information. Propositional representation of 
non-linguistic information requires that the information be 
interpreted in terns of a verbal description. As Johnson-Laird (1983, 
p.155) puts it: "A propositional representation is a mental 
representation of a verbally expressible proposition". Propoeitional 
representations use propositions as units of meaning which can 
nevertheless be decomposed into conponent elements which reflect 
intrapropositional structure. A proposition is essentially an abstract 
statement about properties or relations between entities, for example 
"Jim snores" expresses the proposition that the entity named "Jim" has 
the property of "snoring". Similarly "jin rang the bell" expresses the 
proposition that the relationship between "Jim" and "the bell" is one 
of "ringing". Propositional representations as representations of the 
"meaning" of sentences are similar to, but not the same as, the deep 
structure level in the Aspects Model, since the deep structure level 
as the level from which the semantic interpretation of a sentence was 
defined. Since the level of semantic representation defined in 
Generative eemantics is identical to the level of logical form and 
since this is usually a quantificational logical form, the semantic 
representations in nrat1vc Semantics arr what peychologists would 
call propositional representations. 
Different theorist e hove used different notations to express 
propositional representations but in general propositional 
representations are equivalent to predicate calculus formulae. Kintsch 
calls the component elements of the proposition 'word concepts° a tern 
which covers both predicates (properties or relations) and arguments. 
Clark and Chase (1971) also used a linear notation for propositional 
representations while others use semantic network notations with nodes 
and relations (Anderson, 1976, 1978; Norman and Rumelhart, 1975). 
Althoeeh the different notatiors contain the game inforeation, they 
have different psychological commitmente: relationships in the network 
notation, for instance, are more explicit. Another difference between 
the notations is in their commitment to semantic decoeposition. Norman 
and rxrelhart (1975) decomposed words into semantic or conceptual 
priniti.ves while Anderson and Bower (1973) and Kintseh (1974) die not 
break down the representatior into mere primitive meenine components. 
Evidence that subjects use propositional representations in 
comprehending sentences comes not just from studies of memory of 
information from the text but also from chronometric studies. In 
sentence verification studies in which subjects had to decide whether 
or not a simple sentence was an accurate description of a picture 
(Clark and Chase, 1972; Carpenter and Just, 1975) the sentence 
verification time was found to depend upon the extent of propositional 
embeddine in the sentence i.e. the number of constituent operations 
involved in verifying the sentence, including negation and falsity 
operations. The sentence verification task also correlates reasonably 
well with measures of general verbal comprehension. These results were 
understood to indicate either that the information from sentences and 
pictures is encoded into a common representational format - a 
linguistic/propositional format-or that translation from propositional 
to other kinds of mental representation is relatively simple. 
Propositional models of representation emphasise similarities between 
models of comprehension and reasoning since the semantic 
representations which subjects access in comprehending sentences - the 
propositional representations - are identical to the logical forms of 
sentences and the logical form of the sentence is the level from which 
logical inferences can be specified. 
Martin (1981) has recently questioned the adequacy and generality of 
semantic representations of the kind proposed 
propositional representational systems which advocate an underlying 
predicate calculus format. Two of the main hypotheses about semantic 
representations, the complexity hypothesis and the distance 
hypothesis, make predictions about the relative difficulty involved in 
comprehending sentences which are not substantiated, if semantic 
representations are quantificational structures. The complexity 
hypothesis predicts that the more complex the semantic representation 
of a sentence the greater the amount of processing and consequently 
the longer the time required to comprehend a sentence. The distance 
hypothesis predicts that the greater the disparity between the surface 
form and the semantic representation of a sentence the greater the 
difficulty of the sentence as measured by the comprehension time. 
Although predicate calculus representations may be adequate for 
representine the very simple sentences (or pore accurately 
noneeentences) used by Clark and Chase e.e."Star is above plus.", more 
complex sentences involving quantifiers and even deterninere etc. 
prove to be problematic. For example the predecate calculus notation 
for sentences involvine the definite article e.e. "The man is fat" is 
more complex than that for sentences involving the indefinite article 
e.g. "A ran is fat.", the former representation being x(Mx & Fx & 
(My xey)) and the latter x(Mx & Fx). eoth the complexity and 
distance hypotheses would predict that sentences with the definite 
article should be more difficult to comprehend than sentences with the 
indefinite article, a prediction which is not substantiated by the 
data. In attempting to cive a rough quanttative estimate of the 
degree of difficulty predicted by quantficationai models of 
comprehension Martin proposed that the difficulty of a sentence is a 
function of its complexity measured in terns of the number of 
predicates, connectives and quantifiers in the semantic representation 
of the sentence: this would lead to a prediction that, for exanpie, 
sentences li%e "Iteact4 ten glasses are broken." should he around ten 
tines as difficult to understand as "Exactly two claser are broken." 
which Is clearly an leplaneible prediction of eny realistic theory of 
sentence comprehension. Martin clales that this probleî exists for any 
psychological theory of sentence comprehension which proposes thet the 
semantic representatiet of a serterce is like a predicate calculus 
notation. lintsch does not actually treat quantifiers in the standard 
way hut rather regards then ae predicates but this causes problens in 
interpretation of scope and other properties of Quantification. 
Conpreheneion and inference 
Deepite certain limitations, recall and recognition studies in the 
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1970s provided an increasingly detailed picture of the characteristics 
of the semantic representations constructed in the comprehension of 
sentences and texts. It was becoming increasingly obvious that 
Subjects dad not simply construct representations of the information 
explicitly expressed in the text, Evidence accumulated fron both 
memory studies (Johnson, Bransford and Solomon, 1973) and on -line 
reading studies (Haviland and Clark, 1974; Clark, 1977) that in 
constructing a coherent integrated representation of the text, 
subjects are continually making simple inferences. Johnson et al for 
example showed in a sentence recognition study that subjects 
frequently mistakenly identify as sentences that they haw_ eard 
before, sentences which are merely inferrable from the original 
sentences. Similarly Keenan and Kintsch (Kíntsch, 1974) showed that 
subjects could not distinguish after fifteen minutes whether a 
sentence (a) had been explicitly expressed (b) in a sentence or merely 
implied (e): 
a) The ciCarette started e fire. 
b) A carelessly discarded cigarette started a fire. The fire destroyed 
many acres of virgin forest. 
c) A burning cigarette was carelessly discarded. The fire destroyed 
many acres of virgin forest. 
en-line reading studies were important in demonstrating that 
inferences are made at tho stage of comprehension of the text. 
Iaavilanc: and Clam; (197 4) and Clark (1977) for instance showed that, 
in comprehending text, subject: are continually trying to establish 
identity of reference between current entities and antecedent anaphors 
o.g. in attempting to understand: "Ar hur sold Jiia a brand new 
3L 
híl :í,hb a+^i:. T.'+.'.e car i';1.^`4:Ct3 down on its first e7"`:#.k}r" the .41»bjeot will try 
to establish an anaphor for "car". Since there is no prior reference 
to ".a1." the subject will make what UwYJi.;.c:Litl and ::;.Ê:;.7:k called a 
'bridging inference' to infer an anaphor, e?7,iCi1 in this case is 
obviously "l?atc:nba.ci;". This inferential process was shtawn by iïavi1Fsn,.I 
and Clark to take. .a measurable amouni, of time. 
Johnson-Laird and Uason (1977) and Johnson-Laird (1982) distinguish 
between implicit and explicit inferences in reasoning, The former are 
smooth, unconscious and automatic while the latter require conscious, 
deliberate effort. wmpl't.cit inferences ark: inferences redo in 
ct?rïlpre1P.e3ndi,nc text and are raglilat3.c Cr plausible rather than 
deductive. á'11C"? iir»dg`i,n,.' inferences described above are just one 
example of these in:.ccrEr2:ccs. Jü.irksCJ:i~Líi3.rti. }7%vpt)sf5 that 
°) h are necessary q" h 4M T 
4 
text. inferences rZ,.ïÆ: i,.et:w.8á.:j ro.. t,.t+s..pe2aens.CZf of a % X
According ta the extreme rationalist position, deductive inferences 
are made following comprehension of a text (premises). It is tempting 
to suppose that the distinction between implicit and explicit 
inference can be drawn it terrs of whether the inference is necessary 
for comprehension (Johnson-Laïrd's implicit inferences) or dependent 
upon comprehension (Johnson-I,aird's explicit inferences). Harris and 
Monaco (1978) however nade very different claims regarding logical and 
pragrratir. inference where their logical and pragmatic inferencee seer, 
to be roughly comparable to Johnson-I.ai.rd's explicit and implicit 
inferences respectively. Logical implication is that which is 
logically and necessarily implied by an utterance and pragmatic 
implication is that which is strongly suggested by an utterance but 
not directly asserted or logically implied. Harris and Monaco claim 
t.#lFlt:'. "tppl?.1.A logical Implications bowftjE3r pragmatic ímXll cc tic7ns do 
not have to be understood to ':`.:eEl.nl.ïl.gfSllly comprehend a sentence.". 
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Perris and. AfC,?':acf? apparently suggest that the logical imizl icct.tions of 
a sentence (as zti*u1.l as the directly asserted meaning of z: sentence) 
have to be ur.c:cr.útoc^,i for the sentence to be adequately understood 
whereas pragmatic implications do r..crt have to be ur_dcr£to^d for 
rFart§.n.gfu1 comprehensi.or.. but will modify the perceived meaning of the 
; e eá:enec? if they are t.Ynderetood. 
Why do Parris and ! onano claim that logical imalications have to be 
understood to rve:tletet9. comprehend a sentnncyehile rationalist 
models of reasoning argue that the logical inference and semantic 
interpretation stages are separate with logical inference dependent 
upon interpretation? Tt is relevant nt this point to clarify the 
difference between logical inference and logical implication, terms 
which even logicians sometimes use carelessly. Logical implication is 
a relation which holds between two statements (sometimes defined over 
propositions) A and B, such that if A logically implies B, B cannot be 
false when Aa is true. Logical inference is an operation carried nut by 
a, person in deriving new information (a conclusion) from irforration 
already known (the premises). Bradley and Swartz (1979, p, 194) define 
inference as follows: 
"an.. act or ,series of acts of reasoning which persons perform when, 
from the truth of a proposition_ or set of propositions, P, they 
conclude the truth of a proposition or set of propositions, Q." 
Implication thE~n i8 a relation between. statements whereas inference 
corresponds to the mental processes carried out in drawing a: 
conclusion from premises. The sane sort of distinction can be made 
between pragmatic implication as a relation between sentences and 
pragr.!ati,r, inference as mántaaal processes carried out in drawing a 
pragmatic con.clus i oaa. 
Keenan (1978) argues that Harris and ;íonaco make the typical mistake 
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of psychologists who adopt formal systems as psyctological models by 
assuming that the formal operations entail identical cocnitive 
operations, in this case assumin that if a sentence X implies a 
sentence Y then. the subject will Infer Y fro eenan rejects Karris 
and Monaeo's claim that encoding a sentence must involve encofling its 
logical Implications. The inplacs.iblity of this claim is .2vident when 
it is considered that there are an infinite number of valid 
implications which follow from any jvsn proposition, for instance p 
implies p or q, p or q or r, p(q 1> p) etc. Arguing that ir . 
order to understand a sentence p one has to process all possible 
logical implications iv clearly psyc1iolo6ica1ly unrealistic. Ttarris 
and Monaco (1978) subsequently modify this claim to arguing that 
logical implications are necessarily comprehended "insofar as they are 
necessary for an adequate comprehension". 
Farris and Monaco distinguish between logical and pragmatic 
tzplicatiou in terne of sentence structure nnd seem to went to argue 
tliat there are also Ciffcrences in how the two different types of 
inference ary copreher.led in terms of the necssity of the inference 
for adequate comprohensIon. The results or their experiments horJever 
do not support this and they conclude thtt "that which is 
pragmatically implied is at Umes functionally equivalent to that 
whicb ie directly asserted."' Kenner, has argued that all meaning 
whether asserted or implied is derived and that Farris and n:I/aCO'S 
distinction between logical and pragmatic implication and even between 
asserted and implied information is not a psycho/ogically useful 
distinction since subjects wi I differ in the inferences they mahn 
according to their background knowledge. 
In their discussion paper Earris and Nonaco offer a more flexible 
27 
approach to comprehension anu intorence In terms of levels of 
processing. They argue that comprehension of a statement may vary from 
shallow, in which ease only directly asserted information would be 
comprehended, to iAcreasingly deep levels of comprehension i'or which 
increasingly lart, numbers of logical and pragmatic inferences would 
be made. The depth of processing of a sentence would depend very 
largely on the relevant knowledge wl'ich a subject briaga to bear on 
the sentence. As a3 (ntample 1:ecnan's sentence: "Energy is equal to 
mass times the speed of light squared." will be understood at a high 
level by a physicist who will understand many logical and pragmatic 
inplications of the sentence but probably only the directly asserted 
information will bo understood by the layman. 
The point of the preceding discussion has been to bring out the 
uncertainties surrounding the semantic representations proposed in 
accounts of sentence comprehension. Should logical inferences be 
Lncorperated into the semantic representation of a sentence? Is the 
distinction between inferences which are locically valid and those 
which are merely probable a psychologically useful distinction to 
make? Although psychologists acknowledge the need to account for a 
plethora of infereuces in natural language which are not strictly 
logical but 'which human beings find acceptable) zamt accounts of 
inferential ability to date have concentrated on the inferences 
prescribed by standard logical systems. :lost psychologists would 
maintain a distinction between logical and pragmatic inference but 
acknowletge the need for further study of similarities and differences 
between logical and pragmatic inferences. 
Alternative,3 to rvo)wAtional Representation 
Although many cognitive psychologists argue that all information is 
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represented. in the mind . in e propositional format (Pylyshyn, 1981) 
tbia is not the view of all those intereeted in representation. There 
wee many psychological eeperimente which purport to demonstrate that 
uro two different kinde of functional representation of 
Infermation-- propositionel and analogical or imaeinal (8roo1 .,:s, 1968; 
ravio, 1975; Shepherd and 71eetzler, 1971; Ceeeer,1975; (oselyn, 1975; 
YeLeod et el). Whereas information is repeesent ed. propositionall7 in 
an abstract interpreted form as relationships between entities, an 
analogiceliimaginal representation is an accurate image of the 
original stimulus and mirrors properties of objects and relationships 
in the real world. 
Althoueh there is no doubt that ¡mazes actually exist there is 
controversy over the statue of images. Some researchers (Anderson and 
Power, 1075; Pylyshyn, 1973; Kieras, 197) have claimed that inages 
zre net feectieral in representation but are merely a by-predeee of 
representation. They argue that informateen which can be t-e---erted 
imaeinally car equally well be represented propcsitionally, Thee- who 
favour leaees in addition to propesitional representations as a fore 
of mental representation usually argue that analogical representations 
are MOT suitable than propositional representations for certain kinds 
of rental operation. Thee "dual code" theorists have produced 
experimental evidence of selective interference of type of material - 
verbal or visual - (end hence preferred representation) with the 
response required (7eooks, 196e). Cooper (1975), Shepherd (1975) and 
ICossylyn (1975) have also argued that explanations of the abilities of 
subjects to mentally rotate and transform shapes in terms of 
analogical/imaginal representations are more plausible and succint 
than explanations in terms of propositional representations. 
3c1 
Furte r support the dual code hypothesis also comes from tne ,iata 
ot ncLeou et al (1)7p) and :.Mitthaws et al (1979). They found in a 
! 
verification task that the propositionnl verification model which 
proposes that verification tiMe dspends upon tha extent of 
propositional embedding provides a good fit wbea data ata collapsed 
across subjects. When an attempt was mada to fit the 'Iaca of 
individual subjects/s to the verification model the fit for some 
subjects was found to be very good but for others it was very poor. 
McLeod et al explained the difference between the two Groups in terms 
of different verification strategies - linguistic and spatial - used 
by the subjects in the two different groups. 
McLeod et ai devised a task which 6ave a measure of both sentence 
comprehension time and sentence verification time. ihe group of 
subjects who were inferred to use a propositional/linguistic strategy 
spent a comparatively short tine in the comprehension stage (1652 ns.) 
compared with those inferred to use a spatial strategy (2579 ms.) and 
a comparatively long time in the verification stage (121( nz.) 
compared with the spatial group (651 ms.). The different comprehension 
times were understood as showing that the lingtistic group encoded the 
sentence propositionally while the spatial croup encoded the sentence 
imaginally. Thus the verification times for the spatial group (11 
presentation of the picture were considerably shorter than the 
verification times for the linguistic group. Only for subjects 
inferred to use a linguistic strategy vas the mean sentence 
verification time a inaction 3i the number of propositional embeddings 
in the sentence while the verification times of those inferred to ue 
a spatial/imaginal strategy did not change as a function of 
propositional embedding* 
rffPr, - 
Mani and Johnson-Laird (1982) present evidence for two different hinds 
of functional representational system, one of which is more 
appropriate for detoTminate Information and the other for 
indeterminate information. They presented their .subjects with a 
description of a spatial layout of some objects. some descriptions 
were determinate, 1.e* they described a unique spatial layout, while 
others were indeterminate i.e. they were true descriptions of several 
diMrent cpatlal layouts. Mani and Johnson-Laird found that subjects 
tended to rems,mbr ths of determinate descriptions better than 
1A-1(1c:terminate descriptions suggesting that they had been able to 
construct a 'model* of the determinate layout. The fact that siAjects. 
remembered the actual wording of the indeterminate descriptions better; 
than the determinate descriptions suggested that when the subjects 
were unable to construct a. unique model of the layout they tended to 
retain the verbally presented information. but when they could 
construct e model :retention of the verbal description was not so 
Important, 
Mental Models 
Although it has been claimed that the debate about representation is 
not resolval-le (Anderson 1976, 1978), Johnson-Laird (1980, 19;83) has 
recentl:, described the problem in a different light. He argues that at 
one level of description it is undoubtedly true that "everything can 
he reduced to a uniform code in the language of the brain" 
(Johson-Laird, 1983, p. 165) but from a psychological point of view it 
is useful to maintain a higher level distinction between functionally 
different modes of representation. Johnson-Laird considers the analogy 
of different kinds of data structures used in writing computer 
go 
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programs (i.e. different representational formats) which can 
nevertheless be reduced to a unitary language of machine code 
instructions. So too, argues Johnson- Laird, different functional 
representations in the brain can be reduced to a unitary language - 
the language of the brain. The distinction between different types of 
functional representation can and should be maintained at the level of 
psychological explanation. 
Johnson. -Laird claims that there are three different types of mental 
representation: propositional representations, which are strings of 
symbols similar to the surface linguistic forms of sentences 
mental models, which are structural analogues of the world; and 
images, which are perceptual analogues of models. 
Johnson -Laird introduced the notion of mental models into theories of 
meaning and inference in an attempt to overcome some of the problems 
associated with propositionally based theories. Johnson -Laird believes 
that many of the problems with theories of meaning and models of 
reasoning based on propositional representations arise because these 
systems are like uninterpreted predicate calculus formulae and are in 
need of interpretation. Any propositionally based theory of meaning 
and inference is consequently incomplete since uninterpreted logical 
systems are merely systems for manipulating strings of symbols. Among 
the problems which arise for such systems are: 
(a) The problem of how these strings of symbols come to have meaning 
for the subject. 
(b) The related issue of the acquisition of logical rules of 
inference. There is apparently no way of bootstrapping oneself into a 
purely formal system. 
(c) The problem of errors. Since inference is always presumed to be 
logical, errors are assumed to occur at the stage of interpretation. 
(d) The problem of which logic is the logic used in the mind. As we 
have seen psychologists have generally adopted the standard logics - 
propositional logic and predicate logic. However it is widely 
recognised that these logics are inadequate for dealing with many 
natural language inferences which a complete theory of reasoning would 
be required to account for. 
(e) Another problem for logically based theories of reasoning is the 
problem of content. Theories of reasoning which propose that inference 
is carried out by means of logical rules find it very difficult to 
explain why subjects find it much easier to make inferences with 
familiar /concrete content. 
Johnson -Laird argues that mental models provide interpretations for 
propositional representations. It is important for Johnson -Laird that, 
in contrast with the manipulations of meaningless symbols proposed in 
syntactic based rationalist theories, the operations carried out 
during reasoning should be meaningful for the subject since otherwise 
it is not clear how subjects could learn and use these operations to 
make inferences. Johnson -Laird's intention was to provide a theory of 
meaning and inference which obviated the problems associated with 
logically based theories of reasoning but which did not deny that 
human beings can make logical inferences. 
Johnson -Laird accredits Craik (1943) with the original idea that 
thinking can he regarded as the manipulation of internal 
representations or models of the world. The particular mental models 
which Johnson -Laird describes are obviously similar in many ways to 
the models used in formal semantics to provide a semantic 
characterization of a formal language. Before discussing the extent of 
cf3 
the relationship between mental models and model theoretic semantics a 
brief description of model theoretic semantics will he given. 
In characterizing a formal language the logician specifies its syntax, 
the formation rules which determine the well-formed expressions of the 
language, the rules of inference, which allow the derivation of other 
formulae and the semantics, which provides an interpretation of the 
formulae determined by the syntax and inference rules. For the 
logician, unlike the linguist, the syntax is inevitably a basis for 
semantic generalization. In extending the use of formal systems to 
natural language analysis the logician assumes that the syntax of 
natural language will consist of a specification of the well-formed 
expressions or logical forms of the language. 
In model theoretic semantics the well-formed. expressions of a language 
are provided with a semantic interpretation with respect to a model 
structure and an assignent function which maps the well-formed 
expressions defined by the syntax into elements in the model 
structure. The model structure and assignment function together 
constitute the model. The ordered pair of a domain of individuals, D, 
and a valuation function, V, for example, is a model, D,V , for a 
predicate logical system. The domain is the set of objects which are 
denoted by individual variables and constants in the formal language. 
In other words the domain consists of a set of objects which provide 
referents in the model for terms in the formal language. The 
assignment function assigns values to the individual terms, predicates 
and well-formed sentences of the language. In interpreting an 
individual term, a, of the language, some element, d, of the domain, 
D, is assigned by the valuation function, V, as the value of that 
tern: V(a)=d. One place predicates are interpreted as sets of objects 
having certain properties and, more generally, n-place predicates are 
interpreted as sets of ordered n-tuples (sets with n members) standing 
in a certain relation to each other. For a one-place predicate for 
example the valuation function V assigns a set of elements of the 
domain Dz,(where D5) to the predicate f: V(f)DD : is therefore the 
set of elements in the domain with the property f. The interpretation 
of the whole proposition. is determined. from the interpretation of its 
components e.g.: V(f(a))=1 iff V(f(a))=O iff V(040(f). 
This says that the proposition f(a) is true if and only if the element 
in the domain denoted by a (i.e. g is a member of the set of objects 
in the domain denoted by f (i.e. D. A formula that is true in at 
least one model is called satisfiable while a formula that is true in 
all models is called a valid formula. Logicians are usually interested 
in establishing the valid formulae of a formal language. 
The model outlined above would be inadequate for dealing with the 
semantics of natural language. Many richer formal languages have been 
developed which can deal with a variety of natural language concepts 
including modal expressions, necessity/ possibility (alethic logic), 
belief (doxastic logic), obligation and permission (deontic logic) 
knowledge (epistemic logic) and temporal concepts (tense logic). The 
model structures required to characterise the semantics of these 
systems are correspondingly more complex than the semantics for 
predicate logic. The semantics for modal logic has introduced the 
notion of a possible world to deal with the interpretation of 
possibility and necessity. Model structures for possible world 
semantics thus require in addition to the domain D, a specification of 
such entities as W, the set of possible worlds; Ne a specific element 
of W; R, a relation of accessibility defined over members of W. Recent 
work in the application of model theoretic semantics to natural 
language, which was initiated by Montague in the 1960s, has been 
remarkably promising in characterising the semantic structure of many 
aspects of natural language which had previously not been treated 
formally. 
Despite the success of model theoretic semantics in characterising 
semantic structures in formal systems and in natural language, the 
relationship between formal semantics and psychological theories of 
semantics is very unclear. Lyons (1981) says that it is perfectly 
legitimate to talk about formal semantics "as if it is the aim of 
formal semantics to construct models of the mental representations 
that human beings have of the external world" (Lyons, 1981, p. 165) 
but acknowledges that this is not how logicians and philosophers would 
regard formal semantics. It is tempting to suppose that the 
relationship between formal and psychological semantics should be 
viewed in light of Peters' "ecumenical principle" which holds that 
formal semantics characterizes what is computed in understanding a. 
sentence, while psychological semantics specifes how it is computed. 
Partee (1979) and Johnson-Laird (1982) have dismissed this simple 
relationship between formal and psychological semantics. The main 
problem with the view that models in the mind are the psychological 
couterparts of the models postulated in model theoretic semantics is 
that the mind could not represent the infinitely many possible worlds 
proposed in model theoretic semantics. Johnson-Laird's solution to 
this problem was to propose that "a mental model is a single 
representative sample from the set of models satisfying the assertion" 
(Johnson-Laird, 1983, p.264). 
Mental model theory is the psychological analogue of formal semantics 
in model theoretic semantics. In both theories sentences are 
interpreted by mapping strings of symbols (propositional 
representations) into models. The mental model correlate of the model 
structure of predicate calculus would presumably be the restricted set 
of prototypes which act as referents in the model for terms in natural 
language. The correlate of the assignment function would presumably be 
the mental model procedures mapping the terms in the language onto 
their referents in the model. The procedures in the mental model which 
set up identities between prototypical elements in the model 
correspond to the rules for building up interpretations of sentences. 
It is useful at this point to look at an example of how mental models 
operate. Johnson -Laird (1980, 1982) provides a convincing 
demonstration of the predictive utility of the mental model theory of 
inference in explaining certain effects found in syllogistic reasoning 
tasks. Johnson -Laird and Steedman (1978) described the figural 
effects, previously unreported biases in syllogistic inference 
associated wth the figure of the premises. Logicians traditionally 
recognize four figures of the syllogism: 
(1) (2) (3) (4) 
B-A A-B B-A A-B 
C-B C-B B-C B-C 
C-A C-A C-A C-A 
Johnson -Laird and Steedman point out that the C -A form of the 
conclusion is arbitrary and in a psychological study conclusions of 
the form A -C should also be judged as valid. Johnson -Laird and 
Steedman found that for syllogism forms (1) and (4) there was a bias 
to drawing conclusions of a particular form: the preferred conclusion 
for figure (1) was C -A while for figure (4) it was A -C. For syllogism 
cr7 
forms (2) and (3) there was no preferred conclusion. Johnson-Laird and 
Steednan explained this effect in terms of the asymmetry of the 
connection between the terms in the premises. 
In setting up a mental model of a syllogism such as: 
(a) "Some of the scientists are parents. 
All of the parents are drivers." 
the subject will represent the first premise by imagining an arbitrary 
number of prototypical members of the set of scientists and 
establishing the identitiy of these with an arbitrary number of 
prototypical members of the set of parents (Figure 1.3a). The 
representation of the identity scientist=parent, or generally a=b, is 
asymmetrical in that it is easier to establish 'parent' ('b') given 
'scientist' ('a') than to establish 'scientist' ('a') given 'parent' 
('b') because of the characteristics of working memory. The elements 
in parentheses indicate that the premise "Some scientists are 
parents." allows for the possibility of some scientists who are not 
parents and some parents who are not scientists. The information from 
the second premise is simply added on to the mental model already 
established (Figure 1.3b). In this syllogism the conclusion "Some 
scientists are -drivers." will be preferred to "Some drivers are 
scientists.", which is also valid, because the asymmetry in mapping 
the elements makes it easier to read the model in the direction of the 
mapping than against it. 
Johnson-Laird also predicts an order of difficulty for the different 
syllogistic figures based upon the number of operations which would be 
required in order to form an integrated model of the premises. These 
operations include renewing interpretations of the first or second 
FiRure I.3a 
scientist = parent 
scientist = parent 
(scientist)(parent) 
Figure 1.3b 
scientist: = parent 
scientist = parent 
(scientist) (parent = driver) 
(driver) 
Fiure 1.4 
a = b 
a = b 
(b) 
becomes h= a 
b = a 
(b) 
premises and "switching round" operations which bring the two middle 
terms together. In syllogistic figure (1) the first premise would be 
renewed or re-encoded after the second premise in order to bring the 
middle terms together: thus fl-A would be re-encoded after C-Ba 
B -A C-B 
C-B fl -A 
This renewal interpretation makes it clear why the preferred 
conclusion to this figure is C-A. 
In order to bring occurrences of the middle terms together in figures 
(2) and (3) the switching operation would be required. Thus in figure 
(2), C-fi would be switched to B-C. This switching operation is similar 
to a conversion operation but differs from it in important respects. 
The premise "All A are B" for instance would not he interpreted as its 
'converse "All B are A". The switching operation preserves the logical 
accuracy in that possible b elements are still represented but the 
direction of mapping is changed from a-b to h-a (see Figure 1.4). 
The number of operations required to form an integrated model of the 
premises for a particular figure was zero for figure (4), one for 
figure (1), one or two for figure (2) depending on whether the 
conclusion was A-C or C-A and two or three for figure (3) depending on 
whether the conclusion was C-A or A-C. Johnson-Laird and Bare (1982) 
found that correct response on. the different figures was indeed a 
function of the proposed operations with 51%, 48%, 35% and 22% correct 
on figures (4), (1), (2) and (3) respectively. 
Another factor which was found to influence the difficulty of a 
particular syllogism was the number of mental models of the premises 
that it is possible to construct. Syllogism (a) above for example is 
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relatively easy to solve because there is only one model of the 
premises which can be constructed. A syllogism of the form c 
b) "All the beekeepers are artists. 
None of the chemists are beekeepers." 
on the other hand will only yield a valid conclusion if three separate 
models are considered. The initial model of the premises will look 
like Figure 1.4a where the first premise is re-encoded after the 
second in order to bring the middle terms together. Consideration of 
this model would lead to the conclusion "None of the chemists are 
artists" and indeed 60% of the responses by Johnson-Laird and 
Steedman's subjects were of this type. The bias towards accepting C-A 
conclusions explains why 60% of responses were of this type while only 
10% of responses were "None of the artists are chemists". There are 
other models which can be constructed which satisfy the premises 
however, for example the model in Figure 1.4b. This simple 
manipulation of the model shows the falsity of the previous 
conclusion. The conclusion that follows from this model is "Some 
chemists are artists". The fact that no subjects made this response 
while 10% of responses were "Some chemists are not artists" was 
understood to indicate that the model in Figure 1.4a was constructed 
prior to the model Figure 1.4b and that the latter conclusion was 
abstracted from both models. Figure 1.4c shows the third possible 
model which is compatible with the premises. Subjects who have 
constructed all three models might respond that there is no valid 
conclusion i.e. no conclusion common to all three models and indeed 
20% of responses were of this type. There is an fact a valid 
conclusion which is true in all three models, "Some artists are not 






beekeeper = artist 
beekeeper = artist 
(artist) 
chemist 
chemist = artist 
beekeeper = artist 
beekeeper = artist 
(artist) 
chemist = artist 
chemist = artist 
beekeeper = artist 
beekeeper = artist 
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inference is beyond the great majority of subjects. 
For those syllogisms which have a valid conclusion, either one, two or 
three models are required to generate the conclusion. Johnson-Laird 
and Steednan found that the percentage of valid conclusions drawn was 
a function of the number of models required. Averaging over three 
experiments Johnson-Laird reported 78, 29% and 13% correct responses 
on problems requiring one, two and three models respectively. 
Johnson-Laird argues that the mental model theory of syllogistic 
inference is superior to rival theories like Erickson's (1974), which 
was based on Euler circles, or Guyote and Sternberg's (1978), which 
was based on symbolic representations. According to Johnson-Laird 
mental models are more plausible as psychological models since they 
are "natural" models of discourse in contrast with the models of 
Erickson and Sternberg which are derived from sophisticated 
mathematical notations for dealing with infinite sets and are not 
intuitive psychological models. 
Johnson-Laird claims that reasoning in terms of mental models is 
reasoning without logic. Reasoning with mental models allows valid 
inferences to be made without needing to postulate an internalized set 
of inference rules. The mental model theory of inference is a 
semantically based theory of inference which proposes that valid 
inferences are made by constructing a model as an interpretation of 
the premises, seeking alternative models which are consistent with the 
premises and abstracting from these models a conclusion which is true 
in all models. 
The mental model theory of inference provides an explanation of the 
errors which subjects make in reasoning and also specifies the 
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sequence of operations which would be required to make a valid 
inference. Inferential ability is held to consist of three components 
1) the ability to construct an integrated model of the premises 2) the 
ability to search for alternative models which are compatible with the 
premises and 3) the ability to abstract from all models compatible 
with the premises a conclusion which is true in all of them. Errors in 
syllogistic reasoning were explained in terms of the subject's failure 
to consider all alternative models which are compatible with the 
premises or in terms of their inability to abstract from the 
alternative models of the premise a conclusion which was true in all 
models. Presumably there are also errors which arise from the subject 
constructing an inappropriate model of the premises initially, 
although this is more difficult to assess. 
Johnson-Laird considers that his mental model theory overcomes many of 
the problems which occur for theories of reasoning which advocate a 
mental logic. The theory is intended as a general theory of inference 
which accounts for inferential ability with arguments from standard 
logical systems, such as the traditional syllogisms, propositional 
inferences and the quantificational calculus. However it is also the 
aim of the theory to account for inferences in natural language which 
are psychologically acceptable but which traditional logical systems 
have failed to account for. Although this type of inference has 
traditionally been regarded as non-logical or pragmatic Johnson-Laird 
does not consider the logical/pragmatic distinction useful 
psychologically but, as we have seen, distinguishes between explicit 
and implicit inferences. The valid deductive inferences which 
Johnson-Laird calls explicit inferences do not just include standard 
logical inferences but also natural language inferences which are not 
regarded as logically valid within any standard logical system. The 
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major distinction which Johnson-Laird draws between explicit and 
implicit inferences is in terms of whether there is an active search 
for alternative models of the premises or discourse. 
Johnson-Laird views the average reasoner in the same way as he views 
the early logician attempting to determine the valid inferences of a 
particular logical system. In attempting to discover whether a 
particular inference is valid the reasoner would try out different 
terms in an argument while keeping the form of the argument constant 
e.g. he might argue: 
"All horses are animals. 
Some animals are browm. 
Therefore some horses are brown." 
While this is a true statement it is not a valid conclusion, as the 
reasoner will discover if he attempts to substitute the terms of the 
argument e.g. 
"All horses are animals. 
Some animals are carnivores. 
Therefore some horses are carnivores." 
Since a false conclusion cannot follow from true premises this 
particular form of argument is rejected as invalid. Having established 
a valid set of arguments by these essentially semantic methods the 
logician can then abstract and formulate a set of valid inference 
rules. Johnson-Laird claims that the reasoner constructs valid 
inferences in a similar way by evaluating the truth or falsity of the 
conclusion to a particular argument form with different kinds of 
content. Obviously the average reasoner is not as far advanced as the 
logician in abstracting valid principles of reasoning from repeated 
exposure to instances of particular arguments. Cohen (1981) argues in 
a similar way that the normative criteria by which the validity of 
inferences are evaluated have been derived from a formalisation of 
intuitions about validity. 
The developmental aspect of the mental model theory is largely 
unexplored. Johnson-Laird believes that mental model theory provides a 
more plausible explanation of how children acquire the ability to make 
inferences than theories which advocate a mental logic such as 
Piaget's or theories which propose that logical competence is innate 
(Fodor, 1930). According to Johnson-Laird children cannot learn to 
make valid inferences until they have learned the truth conditions of 
linguistic expressions. Presumably the development of inferential 
ability would be explained by the increasing ability to construct 
models of the premises which are increasingly accurate representations 
of the truth conditions of the premises. i.e. by an improvement in the 
first component of the three component reasoning skills described 
above. Improvement in the other two abilities is more likely to occur 
after the subject has become reasonably proficient at constructing 
models of the premises in the first place. 
Johnson-Laird acknowledges that many people will assume that logical 
inference rules are somehow embedded in the theory of mental models 
but he is adamant that this assumption is untenable. Falmagne (1975) 
suggested that in models of logical reasoning in which information 
from the premises is formalized into concrete models, such as 
Erickson's (1974) Euler diagram theory, Huttenlocher's (1963) spatial 
imagery theory, Johnson-Laird's (1981) mental model theory, and in 
which logic appears not to be involved in the traditional sense, that 
logic is not absent but is hidden in the formalization stage. In a 
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strictly logically based model of reasoning the natural lansuage input 
is formalized, i.e. thr logical form of the premises is abstracted; 
logical inference rules can then be applied to the well-formed 
expressions to derive valid conclusions. When information from the 
premises is formalized into a spatial model there is a sense in which 
the conclusion can be simply "read off" from the model rather than 
derived from the inference rules in the standard way. Falnagne argues 
that in such Isodels the locus of logic has been shifted from the 
system of inference rules to the formallzaton process. 
In choosing the appropriate spatial model to represent the premises, 
e.g. a straight line in a transitive inference task or an appropriate 
mental model in a syllogism task, the subject demonstrates his 
Imowledge of the fornal similarity between the expressions of the 
language and the relevant logical properties of the model. This 
knowledge is also implicated in reading off the conclusion from the 
model. In claiming that the logical burden in these concrete models 
lie in the formalization process Faimagne means that the logical 
properties of expressions which contribute to the determination of the 
set of permissible inferences are inherent in the representation, For 
example, in choosing Euler diagram representation Sa rather than 5h or 
mental model representation 6a rather than 6b as an interpretation of- 
the universally quantified statement "All A are B", the subject is 
deternininp, that some inferences will he permissible while others will 
not he. If the second premise is "No A are C")for instance) models Sb 
and 6b will determine that any 'relationship between 3 and C such that 
"Some P are C" or "Some C are D" is disallowed while models Sa and Sb 
would permit such a relationship. 
Fairies/lc regards the subject's choice of representation, he it a 
Euler circle representations of "All A are B." 
Figure 1.5a 
Figure 1.5b 
Mental Model representations of "All A are B." 
Figure 1.6a 
a = b 
a = b 
(b) 
Figure 1.6b 
a = b 
a = b 
u ole404C,6 a {).e0t0hiPiCC(.4 eXeAr,),pìa,r. 
Of CA M en' \-_' Of 
oQenok-es a p rvt-ohicca 0,cQsvpÍCxv' 
& f a rti,eihter ot t3, . Op,rlaS Civv, 
p1 ..' re,n fiwzYp?5 wNot,L C.cuie, heCt.Î t`^Q- 
ieksvotA4-- tnvt,G1 (c-tc,tcR,4 0/014.1 tact C'lC I St 
"5--7 
logical formalism or a concrete model, as reflecting his knowledge of 
the formal similarity between the premises and that representation. It 
is important Co emphasise that Falmagne defines logical competence as 
including not just competence with logical relationships and inference 
rules but also a competence in translating the verbal problem into the 
appropriate representational format. 
Johnson-Laird (1980) claims that the logical component of the mental 
model theory "consists solely in a procedure for testing models". In 
testing mental models alternative models are constructed which are 
compatible with the premises and an exhaustive search for such models 
would yield valid inferences. By 1982, however, he seems to want to 
include the procedures for setting up mental models as well as the 
procedures for testing them as the locus of the logical component: 
"The logical properties of an expression are not directly represented 
in the mind but emerge naturally as a consequence of the use of the 
expression in the construction and search procedures." (Johnson-Laird, 
1982, p. 12). 
For Falmagne logical knowledge is inherent in the subject's choice of 
representation. Johnson-Laird on the other hand regards logical 
knowledge as an emergent property of the construction and manipulation 
of mental models. For Falmagne the subject appears to have discovered 
the logical properties of language and can use this knowledge to make 
valid deductions while for Johnson-Laird the subject has to construct 
a model of the linguistic premises (an interpretation) from which the 
logical properties will emerge, but only if exhaustive tests are 
carried out. Falmagne would argue that if logical properties were not 
inherent in mental models then mental models would be an ineffective 
medium for generating valid deductions. These two positions will be 
discussed further later in the thesis. 
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PART 2: THE ACQUISITION OF DEDUCTIVE REASONING ABILITY 
INTRODUCTION 
So far very little lias been said about how the ability to make 
deductive inferences might be acquired. Obviously any account of the 
acquisition of this ability should examine the nature of the ability: 
this was the intention of Part 1 of this chapter. However little 
concensus of opinion was found in the literature concerning how people 
make deductive inferences, with some arguing that human reasoning is 
inherently rational (Henle, 1962; Revlis, 1975) and that thought 
processes can be identified with logical inference rules or natural 
deduction schemes (Osherson, 1974; Braine, 1978) and others arguing 
that non -logical response biases (Evans, 1978, 1980) based on 
pragmatic response or availabil.ty effects (Ilanktelow and Evans, 1979; 
Pollard, 1981) provide better accounts of performance in reasoning 
tasks. A weaker, more plausible version of the rationalist hypothesis 
which has recently emerged is that subjects have an underlying logical 
competence which can be characterised in terms of a logical system but 
a variety of performance factors influence actual responses made in 
reasoning (Cohen, 1981). The most recent and controversial theory is 
Johnson -Laird's (1930, 1983) mental model theory which proposes that 
the ability to make deductive inferences should be explained in terms 
of the ability to construct and manipulate mental models of the 
premises. 
Different accounts of the nature of deductive reasoning ability will 
obviously require different accounts of how this ability is acquired. 
Rationalist models of acquisition have tended to argue that logical 
principles are innate (Fodor, 1980) or are acquired in the same kind 
of way as the principles of grammar (Falmagne, 1980). Both accounts 
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are difficult to test. Although Johnson-Laird (1980) claimed that his 
mental model theory obviates many of the problems inherent in 
rationalist accounts of reasoning and consequently provides a better 
account of the acquisition of the ability to make deductive inferences 
than rationalist accounts, the developmental aspect of his theory has 
not yet been explored. Piaget's account of the development of logical 
thinking has dominated the literature on the development of children's 
thinking and will be discussed at length since other developmental 
theories are inevitably compared and contrasted with Piaget's. 
Piaget's theory is essentially a rationalist theory and. therefore 
susceptible to the general criticisms of rationalist theories but 
recent interpretations of Piaget's theory have proposed that it should 
be regarded as a theory of logical competence (Brown and Desforges, 
1978; Wildman and Fletcher, 1979; O'Brien and Overton, 1982). 
Falmagne (1975) points out that the relative dearth of research on the 
development of deductive inferential ability with self-contained 
verbal premises is largely attributable to the strong influence of 
Piaget's conviction that children under the age of 11 to 12 years 
cannot handle propositional reasoning problems. The research that 
there was discussed children's responses on propositional reasoning 
tasks in terms of whether they provided. evidence for or against 
Piaget's theory. lre recently some researchers have questioned the 
relevance of Piaget's theory to explaining performance on purely 
verbal inference tasks (Ennis, 1973; Wason, 1977; Braine, 1970; 
Falnagne, 1980). 
Piaget's Theory of Logical Development 
Piaget's exposition of his theory of developmental stages, including 
descriptions of the structural characteristics of each stage and the 
I 
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transition from one stage to the next, is very complex and has often 
been misrepresented and misunderstood. It is the am of this thesis to 
clarify and evaluate Piaget's claims concerning the abilities of 
children at the concrete and formal operational stages to comprehend 
and reason with universally quantified and conditional statements in 
the light of his claims about the cognitive structures at these 
stages. 
Piaget regarded himself as a genetic epistemologist which can broadly 
be defined as one who studies the development of knowledge both in the 
sense of scientific bodies of knowledge and in the sense of the 
development of an individual's knowledge. Piaget proposed that the 
child acquires. knowledge by acting on his environment and, by 
observing, the results of these actions on the environment, adapting 
these actions, The child is seen not as passively assimilating 
knowledge but rather as constructing his knowledge of reality. Piaget 
proposed four qualitively distinct stages which occur in the course of 
cognitive development. Each stage has a different structure and the 
order of the stages is invariant since the structure of each stage is 
constructed from and therefore dependent upon that of the previous 
stage. 
The first stage, the sensory motor stage, lasts from birth to 18 
months to 2 years. During, this time the infant gradually modifies his 
simple reflex capabilites (sucking, grasping and swallowing) and, 
through experience, expands and combines these modified actions to 
produce new forms of behaviour. By the end of this period the child 
has constructed a "logic of action" the practical precursor of his 
later logical operational thinking. The end of this stage is marked by 
the ability to think symbolically i.e. to internally represent actions 
and events without being dependent on the actual physical presence of 
these actions and events. 
The pre-operational stage, from 2 to 7 years, spans the interval from 
the advent of symbolic representation to the advent of operational 
thinking. The operational stage is marked by the organization of 
thoughts into interrelated systems but the thinking of the 
pre-operational subject lacks this systematization and consequently, 
although in some aspects the child's thinking seems rational, his 
thinking is full of inconsistencies, he is easily misled, and he is 
egocentric. 
The concrete operational stage (7 to 11-12 years) marks the beginning 
of logical operational thinking. By operations Piaget means 
internalized reversible actions i.e. actions which have been 
represented as mental processes. These operations can only be sensibly 
understood as operations within an integrated system of interrelated 
acts. The concept of classification operations for example cannot be 
interpreted as isolated entities but are only meaningful within a 
classification system. 
At this stage the child's thinking appears to reach a relatively 
stable equilibrium which Piaget describes in terms of 
logicomathematical structures. Piaget believes that the cognitive 
structures at this stage of operational thinking are most accurately 
modelled by a logical analogue of the mathematical group which he 
calls a grouping (a hybrid structure combining properties of 
mathematical groups and lattices). Piaget describes nine groupings 
including a preliminary grouping of equalities, four groupings which 
deal with the addition and multiplication of classes and four 
corresponding groupings dealing with addition and multiplication of 
relations* Of particular relevance to this thesis area grouping 1, the 
additive composition of classes; grouping 2, the secondary addition of 
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classes and grouping 3, the bi-univocal multiplication o f classes. 
These are described below. 
Grouping 1, the ad6itive composition of classes describes the 
operations involved in understanding hierarchical classification, for 
example 
labradors (A) + all dogs other than labradors (A') * dogs(i1) 
dogs (B) + all carnivores other than doge (1i1-) oartstveres (C) 
carnivores (C) all animals other than carnivores (C') * animals () 
Mastery of this grouping enables the child to perform successfully on 
a variety of hierarchical classification tasks; the cognitive 
operations involved in these tasks can be symbolised by the logical 
addition and subtraction of classes e.g. the symbolism: 
(+A) + (A') = (4-B) 
corresponds to the mental operation involved in thinking of a 
subclass, e.g. labradors, and its complement, the set of dogs that are 
not labradors, and realizing that this must be equivalent to the 
including class, dogs. 
Grouping 2, the secondary addition of classes is concerned with the 
alternative division of a class into subclasses or what Piaget calls 
vicariances. The class of dogs (B) for example can be divided into 
subclasses spaniels (A and non-spaniels (AO; labradors (P and 
now4abradors (AL); poodles 09 and non-poodles (Ai) etc. where (Ai 
At) * (A2t A) * (A-1- Ay * B 
Grouping 3, the hi-univocal multiplication of classes is concerned 
with the division of a class into subclasses along two different 
dimensions and the multiplication of these subclasses. For instance a 
class of people can be divided in terms of skin colour: Al = white, Bi= 
black, Cie yellow, where Aci- B1-1- Ct= D. The same class of people can 
be subdivided along a different dimension e.g. where they live Al = 
urban, BI= suburban, CI= rural where AO- qt= D. (Al+ C? D = 
(A2+ B2,+ Q = D. (This is a vicariance). Logical multiplication 
generates the following products or "base associations" as Piaget 
calls them t (Ail-Bil-C1)(Atptqt? = AAL+ APO- Akt AAL+ APL+ Y11.71- ciDL. 
Inhelder and Piaget (1964, p.151) acknowledge that logical 
multiplication has a more complex logical structure than logical 
addition but claim nevertheless that "multiplicative and additive 
classification are mastered at the same time - about the age of 7 - 8 
years". The rationale for this claim is that the graphic properties of 
multiplicative classification compensate for their increased 
complexity compared with additive classification. 
Piaget claims that the logicomathematical structures he calls 
groupings model the cognitive structures and operations of the 
concrete child and he provides detailed descriptions of the groupings. 
He has often been criticised for providing an analysis which 
concentrates too much on logical structures and not enough on 
psychological factors which determine performance on tasks requiring 
concrete operational thinking (Bryant and Trabasso, 1971; Boden, 1979; 
Donaldson, 1978). Even some of his followers have questioned the 
existence of the operational structures (Smedsland, 1977) and their 
utility in explaining behaviour in tasks which are supposedly related 
by having the same underlying structure. Although there has been a lot 
of research concerned with some operational structures, e.g. the 
additive composition of classes and the addition of symmetrical 
relations, it is difficult to translate some of the operational 
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structures, eig.the bi-univocal multiplication of relations, into 
empirical tasks. For those tasks which have been extensively studied . 
there is evidence that performance on tasks which can be described in 
terms of the same logical structure is different for problems with 
different content. This is incompatible with Ptagets proposals that 
the logical structure, not the content, of a task determines 
performance. The concept of horizontal decalage has been introduced 
into Piaget's theory to cope with the problem of different levels of 
performance on problems with the same logical structure but different 
content. 
Piaget has also been accused of logicism (Ennis, 1975; Brainerd, 
1976-77) but he did not consider logic and psycholoey to be 
co-extensive as is evident from his conclusion in Mathematical 
Epistemology and Psychology that "logic, as a theory of demonstrative 
reasoning, is completely autonomous in relation to psychology, and 
vice versa," (p.305)* However he frequently talks as if the groupings 
he describes correspond to mental operations carried out in reasoning. 
Formal operations, like concrete operations, can be described in terms 
of logicomathematical structures. Just as the cognitive structures of 
the concrete operational child can be modelled by a set of "groupings" 
so the cognitive structures of the formal operational individual are 
modelled by a fully integrated lattice-group structure - the 
"structure d'ensemble". This structure is derived by an extension of 
the classification operations of concrete operations to include a 
classification of the products of concrete operational classification 
i.e. operations upon operations. This classification of 
classifications is what Piaget refers to when he describes formal 
operations as "second degree or second order operations". 
The concrete operational child can logically multiply two classes (A 
A') and (B B) to obtain the products At + AB' + PP, A°11', the 
subclasses which inhelder and Piaget (1958) call the "base 
associations"; this will be recognized as involving grouping 3, the 
logical multiplication of classes4 The formal operational subject can 
then take these base associations as elements in a further 
classification operation or what is called a "combinatorial analysis". 
That is he can combine them 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 at a time to give all 
possible arrangements of base associations, This nft classification of 
base assoepations will be recognized as involving grouping 2, the 
division of a class into subclasses* There are in fact 16 possible 
conbinations of four elements. Whereas concrete operations were tied 
to concrete objects and events he combinatorial system enables the 
subject to combine objects, factors or propositions; the combination 
of propositions gives rise to a new logic of propositions which 
enables the child to think hypothetico.mdeductively. When the elements 
of the combinatorial analysis are propositions this analysis will 
yield the sixteen binary combinations of propositional logic. Each 
combination of elements corresponds to a particular operation of 
propositional logic* The combinations and the propositional operations 
to 'which they correspond are shown In Table 1.1. The combination (p.q) 
for example corresponds to the propositional operation of conjunction; 
The combination (p.q) (-NO (-pr-q) corresponds to the propositional 
operation of implication ono* The sintoen possible propositional 
operations form a lattice structure with the combinations themselves 
as elements. This lattice structure is shown in Table 1.2* 
A further advance of the formal operational thinker over the concrete 
operational thinker is in the integration of the two separate forms of 
reversibility present at concrete operations, inversion and 
reciprocity, into a single more powerful system - the INRC group. The 
propositional combinations are all inter-related in terns of the 
TABLE 1.1 
PIAGET'S SYSTEM OF SIXTEEN BINARY OPERATIONS 
CONSTRUCTED COMBINATION NAME OF OPERATION 
1 
2 
NEGATION OF COMPLETE AFFIRMATION 
CONJUNCTION (P0l) 
3 3TONIMPLICATIOiN (p. -(1) 
4 NEGATION OF RECIPROCAL IMPLICATION (-Pq) 
5 CONJUNCTION NEGATION (-p.-q) 
6 AFFIRMATION OF p (p.q) (P.-q) 
7 AFFIRMATION OF q (p.q) (-p.q) 
8 EQUIVALENCE (p.q) (-P.-q) 
9 RECIPROCAL EXCLUSION (P-q) (-P.g) 
10 NEGATION OF P 
11 NEGATION OF q 
12 IMPLICATION 
13 RECIPROCAL IMPLICATION 
14 DISJUNCTION 
15 INCOMPATIBII.,ITY 
16 COMPLETE AFFIRMATION 
(-Pq) (-P -q) 
(p.-q) (-p.-q) 
(P.q)'. (-p.q) ( -P. -q) 
(P.q) (P -q) ( -p. -q) 
(P.q) (-p.q) (p.-q) 
(P. -q) ( -Pq) (-P.-q) 
(p.q) (-p.q) (P-9.) (-P.-(1) 
Table 1.2 
The lattice structure of the truth tables for the 
16 binary operations 
Numbers refer to operations in Table 1.1 
identity, negation, reciprocity and correlative transformations. 
Figure 1.7 shows the group structure of the relationships among the 
operations for implication. 
L7hat Piaget means when he says that the implication peg ie true is 
different m what is meant in standard propositional logic. In 
standard propositional logic the implication p?q, called the naterial 
conditional or material implication, is a truth functional connective 
and is defined as equivalent to "not both p and not-q". r material 
implication interpretation of implication incorporates paradoxee. By 
estahlichinn either the falsity of p or the truth of q, the truth of 
the material Implication is established. For instance the statement: 
"If the plant is overwatered the leaves will turn brown." is true 
either if not-p lee true i.e. "The plant is not ovcrwatered." or if q 
ie true i.e. "The leaves turn brown." In other words the conditional 
is true either if (p.q) is true, "the plant is overwatered and the 
leaves turn brown", or if (-p.q) is true, "the plant is 
overwatered and the leaves turn brovv", or if (-p.-q) is true, "the 
plant is not overwatered and the leaves do not turn brown". It would 
seen paradoxical to nany people to say that the conditional "If the 
plant is overwatered the leaves will turn brown" is true when the 
plant is not overt and the leaves turn brown (-p.q) since many 
people would understand the conditional to suggest that the 
overwatering of the plant makes the leaves turn brown. 
In an attempt to understand Planet's use of the symbolism of 
propositional logic Ennis (1975, 1970 suggests that it was perhaps 
Planet's intention in interpreting propositional logic in the way he 
does to avoid the paradoxes of material implication. For Piaget to 
show that a combination, e. g. (p.q) (-p.q) (-p.-q), is true it must 
be shown that instances of all elements in the combination, e.g. 
Figure 1.7 
................................................. ............................... 
Group Structure for relationships among operations 
for implication 
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(p.q), (-p.q) and (-p.-q), "exist" while no instances of elements not 
in the combination, e.g. (p.-q), exist. Obviously Piaget does not 
interpret p and q in the standard way as propositions since if (p.q) 
is shown to be true (-p.q) cannot also be true at the same time. It 
cannot both be the case that (p.q), the plant is overwatered and the 
leaves turn brown, and (..p.q), the plant is not overwatered and the 
leaves turn brown. Parsons (1960) claimed that Piaget's system does 
not make logical sense. He points out that Piaget uses the letters p 
and q to represent propositional functions or open sentences rather 
than propositions, so that rather than p representing the proposition 
"The plant is overwatered." where "the plant" has a definite referent 
Piaget uses p to represent a propositional function or open sentence 
"plant x is overwatered". The truth or falsity of an open sentence 
depends on the value assigned to the variable x and consequently the 
truth value can change depending on the situation. 
Although he uses the symbolism of propositional logic, Piaget's logic 
is not truth-functional and, although he does not acknowledge the 
fact, Piaget uses the device of existential quantification to close 
his open sentences thereby making them interpretable. The open 
sentence Px, "plant x is overwatered" will become xPx "A plant is 
overwatered" or "There is a plant which is overwatered." This is what 
was meant when it was said that for a Piagetian combination to be true 
the elements of the combination had to "exist". Parsons points out 
that the propositional formula poq and its complete disjunctive normal 
form p.q -pyci -1).-q express the same logical operation but Piaget 
tried to establish a correspondence between (x)(Px Qx) and the 
formula: ( x)(Px.Qx).( x)(-Px.Qx).( x)(-Px.-Qx).-( x)(Px.-Qx). Parsons 
indicates that these formulae are not equivalent since the former 
states that for all x, if x is a p then x is a q, while the latter 
states that there is an x whichto and q, there is an x which is not-p 
f 
and q, there is an x which is not-p and not-q but there is no x which 
is p and not-q. The formula (x) (Px Qx) does not make existential 
claims in the way Piaget proposes and for instance could be true even 
if there were no p.q elements. 
Although the interpretation discussed above is a very strict 
interpretation of Piaget's account of the formal operational 
combinations it is the interpretation which Piaget's interpreters 
(Flavell, 1963; Papert, 1963; Ginsberg and Opper, 1969) and critics 
(Parsons, 1960; Ennis, 1975, 1976) have come up with. But would a 
formal operational subject really have to establish that, for 
instance, a thin flexible rod (p.q), a thick flexible rod (-p.q) and a 
thick inflexible rod (-p.-q) exist and a thin inflexible (p.-q) does 
not exist in order to say that an implication sentence like "If a rod 
is thin then it is flexible" is true? It is important to Piaget that 
he would because by establishing existence and non-existence of 
elements the formal operational establishes the truth of a 
certain combination and distinguishes it from all other possible 
combinations* For instance the formal operational subject would be 
able to discover whether an implication or equivalence relationship 
existed between two propositions p and q by establishing whether the 
combination (p.q) (p.-q) (-p.-q) or the combination (p.q)(-p.-q) was 
true. The crucial difference between an equivalence and an implication, 
is whether the element (-NO exists or not. The Piagetian 
combinations specify the truth, conditions for different propositional 
relationships. 
Ennis notes that although the above seems to be the accepted 
interpretation of Piaget's combinations there is a suggestion in The. Clooist% of 
11(s0" that the possibility of existence of the elements in the combinations 
[1.94Y\ DinafkinOOCI 
K0504sDrather than their actual existence is all that is required for a 
particular combination to be true. Ennis rejected the possibility of 
existence interpretation as incorporating paradoxical requirements, 
Ennis's objections ran along the lines that it was unreasonable to 
require the possibility of a thick flexible rod in order for it to be 
true that if a rod is thin it is flexible. This was also a problem for 
the "existence" interpretation, A major problem with the possibility 
of existence interpretation which Ennis does not discuss is the 
problem of how the combinations would ever be learned if elements in 
the combinations only possibly existed. If specific elements were not 
found it would be unclear whether they were not allowed, e.g. the 
(-p.q) element for the equivalence combination, or whether they were 
possible elements but simply not present on that occasion. 
If Piaget's theory is to be useful as a psychological theory of 
reasoning the logical structures which characterise the different 
stages should have observable behavioural correlates. It would be 
tempting to suppose that the cognitive operations typical of the 
concrete and formal operational stages would be reflected in the 
subject's language. Piaget5view on the relationship between language 
and cognition has always been that language is dependent upon 
cognition. It might be supposed then that the cognitive operations 
typical of each stage will determine the subject's understanding and 
use of language. Indeed it was Inhelder and Piaget's original proposal 
that children at the concrete and formal operational stages would use 
different linguistic expressions. Specifically children at concrete 
operations would not be expected to use propositional connectives such 
as 'if..then' 'either or' etc, but rather their language would be 
expected to reflect their understanding of classification and 
relational operations, e.g "Maggie is tougher than Neil.", "All men 
are strong,". 
Inhelder and Piaget looked at the statements that subjects at concrete 
and formal operations produced in their attempts to solve some of the 
standard Piagetian formal operational tasks and they attempted to 
reduce the statements to the logical formulae of classes and relations 
or propositions. They found it almost impossible to say for a 
particular statement whether it involved class and relational 
operations or propositional operations. As an example they offer, the 
statement: "This rod bends because it is made from steel." and argue 
that it is not possible to say whether the cognitive operations 
underlying the production of this statement involve a recognition of 
the transitivity of class inclusion: "All steel bars are flexible. 
This bar is steel. This bar is flexible" or whether it involves a true 
implication: "If a bar is steel it is flexible.". Inhelder and Piaget 
consequently reject a purely linguistic criterion as an index of a 
subject's operational level since it is always possible to express 
propositional operations in the language of classes and vice versa. 
They claim that although a concrete operational child may produce 
statements with propositional connectives he has no real understanding 
of the propositional relationship involved but rather that his 
statement reflects the simpler operations underlying class inclusion 
or relational operations e.g. a concrete operational subject saying 
for instance "If a bar is steel it is flexible" is simply using a 
propositional connective to express simpler cognitive operations of 
class inclusion. The formal operational subject producing such a 
statement is presumably understood to produce this on the basis of a 
combinatorial analysis of the situation i.e. he will have found 
flexible steel bars (p.q), flexible, non-,steel bars (-p.q) and 
inflexible non-steel bars (-p.-q) but no inflexible steel bars (p.-q). 
Inhelder and Piaget also argued that the formal operational subjects' 
use of class and relational language reflects underlying propositional 
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operations. The different cognitive structure s of concrete and formal 
operational subjects are not reflected in a straightforward way in 
terms of the subject's production of language: an isolated statement 
cannot be identified as a "concrete" statement or a "formal" 
statement. 
Inhelder and Piaget's discussion and rejection of the linguistic 
criterion is framed in terms of language production. Presumably 
Inhelder and Piaget would also want to dismiss a linguistic criterion 
for the comprehension of language, They would not predict, as some 
have claimed (Roberge and Paulus, 1971; Ennis, 1975, 1976) that a 
concrete operational subject would be able to understand statements in 
the language of classes and relations but not statements containing 
propositional connectives. Rather Inhelder and Piaget would claim that 
a subject's language comprehension, like his production, is limited by 
the nature of the cognitive operations available to him. 
Two other ways of determining a subject's operational level are 
discussed by Inhelder and Piaget (1958). The first is to compare all 
the statements and actions of a subject in solving a task. The second 
involves analysing the proofs offered by the subject in the solution 
of a task or an examination of the subject's 'train of reasoning'. In 
practice the two methods do not seem to be different: "comparing all 
statements and. actions of a subject" would seem to be what one does in 
"analysing the subject's proof". 
By comparing all the statements and actions made by a subject, Piaget 
proposes that it then becomes evident whether the child is limited to 
recording his empirical observations of classifications and relations, 
or whether he is able to separate out varialdes. The ability to 
isolate and test variables, a basic scientific reasoning skill, is 
regarded by Piaget as a criterion for determining whether or not a 
child is working within the combinatorial system, According to 
lnhelder and Piaget, separating out variables "implies both 
hypothetico-deductive reasoning and a combinatorial system". The 
reason for this is rather difficult to understand, but is possibly 
easier to explain in the context of an example. 
Suppose that a baker is trying to develop a fool-proof recipe for a 
cake. Be might experiment by making up several different recipes, as 
shown in Table l3, which either contain two eggs or three ergs, and 
which either contain or do not contain baking powder. The resulting 
nixtures either rise or sink in the cooking. From all the 3 possible 
outcomes of whether the cakes rise or sink when eggs and bakinr, nowder 
are included or excluded only 4 kinds of results were actually 
observed, as seen in the Table 1.3. The problem is to decide what 
contributed to the success of a cake (i.e. its rising). The concrete 
operational child would be able to classify the data as follows: he 
would be able to see that the following associations occur: 
2 eggs / baking powder: cake rises, 
2 eggs / no baking powder: cake sinks 
3 eggs / baking powder: cake rises 
3 eggs / no baking powder: cake sinks 
The concrete operational child would be unable to go much further than 
this classification of empirical observations. The advantage that the 
Table 1.3 
EGGS BP POSSIBLE OBSERVED 
OUTCOME OtrTCONE 
2 Y RISES 
2 Y SINKS 
2 N RISES 
2 N S I NKS 
3 Y ' RISES 
3 Y SINKS 
3 N RISES 






Variables (eggs and baking powder (B.P.)) and outcomes 
in isolation of variables example. 
formal operational child has over the concrete operational child, 
according to riaget, is that he has the ability to isolate and test 
variables and hence to formulate and test hypotheses. Let us suppose 
that prior to the experiment the subject guessed that baking powder 
makes no difference to the cakes, but that cakes with 3 eggs will 
rise. In order to test his hypothesis "All cakes with 3 eggs will 
rise", the effect of baking powder has to be excluded. In this case 
the effect of baking powder can be physically excluded by looking only 
at those cakes which contain no baking powder. By keeping the effects 
of baking powder constant (in this case, absent) the subject can test 
the effects of number of eggs on whether the cake rises or sinks. He 
discovers the following associationsl cakes with 2 eggs which rise 
(p.x), and cakes with 2 eggs which sink (p.-x), cakes with 3 eggs 
which rise (-p.x), and cakes with 3 eggs which sink (-p.-x). The 
forme' operational subject knows what the combination (p.x V p. -x 
V -p.x V ep.-x) means, because he "is working within the combinatorial 
system". He knows that this combination, one of the 16 possible binary 
combinations of propositional logic, represents complete affirmation 
(see Table 1.1), that is, number of eggs and rising or sinking are 
independent factors, 
Having made the initial observations of which outcomes are actually 
observed as a function of the number of eggs and presence or absence 
of baking powder as shown above, the subject will possibly change his 
mind at this point and predict that it is baking powder, not 3 eggs, 
which makes the cakes rise. (Subjects are notoriously set on trying to 
verify hypotheses, so possibly many would not change their Initial 
hypotheses, even in the face of apparently conflicting data!) 
The subject will now hypothesise that "All cakes with baking, powder 
will rise" and will attempt to test thia. In this particular case, of 
course, it is not possible to physically exclude the effects of eggs: 
the subject must decide instead to hold the factor "eggs" constant at 
a particular value while testing the effects of baking powder on the 
rising or sinking of the cakes. This technique of holding factors 
constant is critical if the subject is to discover how a particular 
factor influences the outcome independently of other factors. The 
subject may decide to look at how baking powder influences the 
rising/sinking of the cakes when 2 eggs are included in the recipe: he 
would find the associations q.x and -q.-x i.e. when baking powder is 
added the cakes rise, when baking powder Is not added the cakes sink* 
In this case the same associations would have been found if the factor 
eggs had been held constant at "3 eggs". The formal operational child 
working within the cosnbinatorial system knows that the combination 
(q.x V -q.-x) represents equivalence: when baking powder is added the 
cake rises; when baking powder is not added the cake sinks, Of course, 
as we have already seen, the propositional relationship of equivalence 
is different froz the propositional relationship of implication, which 
would have held if the hypothesis "All cakes with baking powder will 
rise" had been true. The equivalence relationship corresponds to the 
combination (q.x V -q.x) while the ' plication relationship 
corresponds to the combination (q.x V .q.-x V eq.x). According to 
Piaget, the formal operational subject can distinguish one logical 
combination from another and would conclude on the basis of the 
experiment that "All cakes with baking powder will rise and all cakes 
that rise have baking powder", or "All and only those cakes with 
baking powder will rise". In practice it is possible that the subject 
who proposes "All cakes with baking powder will rise" will not regard 
the absence of a -q.x association, a cake with no baking powder which 
Is° 
riees, as disconfirming his hypothesis, although according to Piaget, 
he should, since it is not just the absence of q*-x instances but also 
the presence of selix instances which are important for the 
interpretation of this combination. Of course it is possible that 
there would be a more complex effect of baking powder and eggs such 
that for example only cakes with either 3 eggs or baking powder but 
not both would rise. The formal operational subject should be able to 
deal with interactive effects too. It seems likely that interactive 
effects, being more complex than main, effects, should be more 
difficult to deal with but Piaget does not mention this aspect of 
hypothesis testing* 
Ennis (1975, 1976) interprets Inhelder and Piaget's claim that the. 
attempt to separate out variables implies hypothetico-deductive 
reasoning and a combinatorial system as meaning that the isolation of 
variables strategy is a hallmark of formal thinking i*e* the subject 
who attempts to isolate and test variables demonstrates that he is 
"working within the combinatorial system" of formal operations since 
use of this strategy does not make sense unless the subject possesses. 
the "structured whole" within which he can interpret the particular 
combination of elements that he finds* 
Although Piaget seems to argue (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 279) 
that the isolation of variables strategy is an index that the subject 
has acquired the combinatorial system he undermines the presence of 
this strategy as an index of combinatorial thinking by arguing that 
the subject who has not yet acquired this system will be led to its 
imminent discovery by using the isolation of variables strategy: 
"isolation of variables *...necessarily ends up at a combinatorial 
system*" (Irthelder and Piaget, p. 283). The isolation of variables 
st 
strategy cannot be regarded both as a -criterion of combinatorial 
thinking and also as a means of acquiring this system. 
Ennis (1975, 1976) cites the evidence of Anderson, 1965 that children 
under 11-12 years can isolate and test variables. However Piaget 
himself acknowledged that isolation of variables by negation, i.e. by 
exclusion of the affects of a factor in one case and inclusion in 
another case, can be found at the concrete level, Isolation of 
variables by neutralizing, i.e. by holding the effects of one variable 
constant for the purposes of testing another variable, S not found 
until the formal operational level. 
Ennis argued that the ambiguities associated with Flagette theoretical 
account of the relationship between the isolation of variables 
strategy and the combinatorial system nade the isolation of variables 
strategy inadequate as a criterion of formal operational thinking. 
Ennis claims that Inhelder and Piaget put forward another criterion of 
formal operational thinking - the ability to distinguish one operation 
from another. According to Piaget the formal operational thinker can 
understand and differentiate one from another the sixteen binary 
operations of propositional logic. Inhelder and Piaget illustrate this 
with the protocol of a subject from one of their reasoning tasks (the 
iole of Invisible Magnetism) in which they claim to identify examples 
of the sixteen binary operations of propositional logic. Ennis 
criticises this approach on the grounds that it is they, Inhelder and 
Piaget, who are distinguishing one operation from another, not the 
subject. Inhelder and Piaget would presumably defend their approach by 
arguing that they are merely making explicit the operations which can 
b identified from the subject's proof. 
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Identification of the operations from the protocol is not as clear-cut 
as Inhelder and Piaget sugeest. Bynum, Thomas and Weitz (1972) 
examined the same protocol and could only distinguish eight of the 
sixteen operations identified by Inhelder and Piaget. It 15 difficult 
to see how a subject's ability to distinguish one operation from 
another could ever be conclusively demonstrated since what the subject 
says and does in the solution of a problem is very difficult to 
interpret unambiguously. How would a subject express the underlying. 
logical combination, (peg) (p.-q) (-peq) (-p,-q), corresponding to 
complete affirmation for example? Conversely would we want to say that 
a subject who said that "p is independent of but compatible with q" 
was actually expressing the underlying operation of complete 
affirmation, In the example above it was claimed that it was unlikely 
that a subject would require a -p.a. example (a cake with 2 eggs which 
rises) to be present in order to say that "All cakes with 3 eggs 
rise.". Subjects simply do not seem to be as precise in distinguishing 
one operation from anoth as Piaget's theory requires. 
7v1dence from many studies showing improvement in performance at 
adolescence on a variety of 'formal operational' tasks, including 
combinations (Barrett, 1975; Uartorana, 1977; Roberge, 1976; ROberge 
and Flexer, 1979), isolation and testing of variables (Kuhn; 1977; 
Kuhn and Angelev, 1976), propositional logic (Kuhns; 1977;,)Roberge, 
1976; Taplin, Staudenmayer and Taddanio, 1974) and proportionality 
(Brainerd, 1971; lartorano, 1977) supports Piaget's claims about the 
intellectual advances at this age. There is less agreement however 
concerning the nature of, or even the existence of, a unifying 
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structure underlying the putative formal operational abilities. Some\ 
of the problems which Ennis described in establishing a criterion of 
formal thinking have been liscussed. Others too have found it 
difficult to generate unambiguous testable predictions from Piaget's 
theory concerning how to identity behaviour unique to the formal 
tbinker. Roberge and flexer (1970) point out that although the ability 
to senerate all possible combinations of n elements is used a8 a 
standard test of formal thinking it is not clear whether Inhelder and 
Plaget (1958) intended this or the ability to understand the 
combinatorial system of sixteen binary operations as an index of 
formal thought. Lunner (1965) supported Piaset's view that the 
distinctive characteristic of formal operational thinking was the 
recognition of second order relations, i.e. a recognition of relations 
between relations. By 1978 however he rejected the view that the 
intellectua/ advances of the formal operational subject are related by 
a common underlying structure. He did however identify two 'features' 
of advanced thinking acceotance of lack of closure, (AIX), and 
multiple interacting systems (MIS). Tasks which are complex and 
require an understanding of the interaction of two different systems 
involve MIS. Acceptance of lack of closure seems to be a general 
feature of the thinking of older children but not of younger children. 
It Involves the ability to deal with intermediate stages in the 
solution of a problem which have indeterminate values. A good example 
of ALC is in the same 'Mastermind' in which the aim for the 'subject' 
is to guess which colour of pegs his opponent has put into four 
different slots. The subject is given feedback as to whether his 
guesses about colour and position arc correct (black peg), whether 
colour only is correct (white peg) or whether colour is incorrect (no 
peg) but he is not informed about which feedback key corresponds to 
which of his response pegs s he may for instance be informed that two 
of his response pegs are the correct colours in the correct positions 
and that two are incorrect colours but he will not know which of his 
responses are which. According to Lunzer the younger subjects should 
find this kind of task difficult because the feedback they are given 
is indeterminate with respect to which of the four response pegs it 
relates to. Another example of ALC which will be discussed later in 
the thesis occurs with Denial ofthe Antecedent and Affirmation of the 
Consequent inferences in reasoning tasks. Young subjects cannot 
appreciate that the correct response to these argument forms is that 
no determinate conclusion can be drawn. Lunzer regards ALC as a 
'feature' of more advanced thinking but not necessarily as a feature 
which depends upon a common underlying structure in the tasks for 
which it is required. 
The main concern of Ennis in attempting to understand Piaget's theory 
was in trying to establish what predictions the theory made concerning 
the development of the ability to make deductive inferences from 
linguistic premises. Fron Piaget's description of formal thinking in 
terns of the operations of propositional logic and Inhelder and 
Piaget's assertion that "the principal novelty of the formal 
operational stage is the ability to reason in terms of verbally stated 
hypotheses and no longer merely in terms of concrete objects and their 
reninulation" (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958 ) it seems clear that 
Piaget Intended his theory to apply to developmental changes in 
linguistic reasoning as well as more general changes in reasoning 
abilities. However,following a critical attempt to translate Piaget's 
theory about the logical structure of concrete and formal operational 
thought into empirically testable claims about verbal deductive logic 
ability at the different operational stages./ Ennis (1975) dismissed 
Piaget's elates as either false, untestable or not about deductive 
logic. 
One interpretation that can be made of Piaget's claim that children 
ared 7-U to 11-12 years can handle class and relational 1o3ic lout not 
propositional logic that it entails that children in this age 
group can make valid deductions with linguistic problems expressed in 
terms of class and relational premises but not with arguments 
formulated in propositional logic (Osherson, 1975; Ennis, 1975, 1976; 
Brainerd, 1976-1977;). Thus subjects at concrete operations would be 
able to make correct logical deductions from linguistic expressions 
corresponding to class statements like "Ali A are B" but not until 
formal operations would they be able to make correct logical 
deductions from linguistic premises corresponding to propositional 
arguments such as "If p then q.". Empirical evidence however dons not 
support this proposed difference in performance in reasoning with 
class and propositional argumentsqshowing unsystematic effects of the 
linguistic form of the premises on response (Hill, 1961; O'Brien and 
Shapiro, 1968; Roberge, 1970; Roberge and Paulus, 1971; Osherson, 
1975). Under this interpretation Piaget's claims would be false. 
However Inhelder and Piaget's rejection of the linguistic criterion 
for determining a subject's operational level would indicate that this 
is probably an oversimplistic interpretation of the predictions of 
Piaget's theory vis a vis the development of linguistic reasoning 
ability* 
A more theoretical problem which arises in trying to distinguish 
between the reasoning, abilities typical of subjects at the concrete 
and formal operational levels is described by Brainerd (1976-77). He 
argues that Inhelder and Piaget's use of the logic of classes and 
relations as a model of concrete operational thought and propositional 
logic as a model of adolescent thinking is logically unsound since 
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propositional lofjo i$ the most fundamental branch of log,ic (Quine, 
1951) and provides the 17,asi for both the logic of classes and the 
logic of relation. T'or.ainord argues that if the logic of classes and 
relations is a viable model of concrete operational thinking it is 
logically impossible (and presumably untenable as a developmental 
theory) that a more basic form of logic should be a model of a more 
nature developmental stage. In fact, according to Brainerd, logical 
considerations would dictate that the proposed order of acquisition of 
logical abilities would be the reverse of that proposed by Piaget 
since a subject who has mastered propositional logic should have the 
competence to master the logic of classes and relations* 
It has already been mentioned that the logic Piaget uses as a model of 
formal operational thinking is not standard propositional logic but is 
rore like propodtional functional logic. Interpreting Piaget's 
propositional logic as pr positional functional logic avoids 
Brzincrd's criticism of the priority of Piaget's logical models but 
introduces further problems, since contemporary systems use 
propositional functional logic to interpret class inclusion statements 
like "All A are Ti". Propositional functional logic, or predicate 
logic, was developed to extend the logical analysis of sentences to a 
deeper level by attempting to deal with the problems of quantification 
but, given that the concrete operational subject is supposed to be 
able to deal with quantified statements like "All A are B", it becomes 
Increasingly difficult to understand exactly ghat distinction Plaget 
intended between the logic of concrete and formal operations. Ennis 
(1975, 1976) found Piaget's use of a class inclusion example to 
demonstrate propositional implication in "Tratte de Logique" (1949) 
particularly confusing for anybody trying to establish a useful 
distinction between concrete and formal logic and operations. It is 
this difficulty in distinguishing the logic of concrete and formal 
operations that led Ennis to argue that, under this interpretation, 
Piaget's theory is untestable. 
The reasoning that Inhelder and Piaget describe in their hypothesis 
testing, experiments involves reasoning from observed instances to 
general rules. This reasoning, as Ennis (1975) points out, is more 
like inductive reasoning than deductive reasoning. This was what Ennis 
meant when he objected that, according to one interpretation, Piaget's 
claims are not about deductive logic. Ennis claims that Piaget's logic 
goes from observed cases to general rules, which is an invalid 
deductive procedure« Piaget was attempting to specify how subjects 
come to abstract, from repeated exposures to instantiations of 
particular logical relationships in empirical situations, the specific 
combinations of elements corresponding to particular logical 
relationships. It seems plausible to suggest that although logically 
invalid, this procedure, might be regarded as valid psychologically 
since the only way that a subject can come to propose that rules are 
general rather than domain specific is by extrapolation beyond 
observed instances. 
Because of the difficulties Ennis found in establishing how Piaget's 
developmental theory was related to empirical findings about the 
acquisition of verbal deductive logical competence Ennis proposed an 
alternative framework for studying competence in reasoning with verbal 
premises. Ennis's framework takes cognizance ot three different 
factors which have been found to influence acquisition of logical 
competence - logical principles, complexity and content. Ennis's 
system allowed for the acquisition of different logical principles at 
different ages In line with the empirical finding that valid 
principles e.g, detachment (Maus Ponens) an0 contrsposition (rodeo 
Toilers) are solved at an earlier age than Invalid principles e.g. 
conversion (Affirmaton of the consequent) and inversion (Denial of the 
antecedent). This o.:,; t-,:ast8 with Piaget's theory which entails 
synchronous development of all principles relevant to the particular 
logical system used to caracterise the developmental statsss. 
Ennis maintained Cse distinction between logical prInciples of class, 
propositional and propositional functional logic in his framework but 
did not equate these different logics with particular developmental 
stages as Piaget did. Ee acknowledges that empirical studies might 
reveal no developmental differences at all between performance on 
logical principles from these systems. Ennis quotes the ults of 
rlever's (1974) study which found no difference in the reasoning 
sbilities of adult subjects with principles from propositional and 
propositionalsfunctional logic. 
Pnnis's framework for studying loLdcal competence acknowledges the 
substantial influence of content on conclusions drawn in reasoning 
tasks. His content dimension includes fivs elements* premise 
disbelief, commisment to a conclusion, symbolization, unfamiliarity 
and abstractness. 
Ennis's framework also has a complexity dimension. More complex 
problems will be solved at a later stage than less complex problems. 
The three different factors are not independents the relative 
difficulty of different logical principlesfor example ,can be seen as 
partly attributable to their relative complexity, e.g D.A. is more 
difficult than M.P. because it includes negation, one of the factors 
which contributes to the complexity of a problem. Other factors 
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contributing to the complexity of a problem include the number of 
connections, intricacy of argument, unrelatednees of content, 
nonstanderd order and irrelevant material, 
Despite Ennis's rejection of Piaget's theory as irrelevant in 
explaining the acquisition of deductive reasoning with verbal premises 
Piaget himself undoubtedly considered that his theory was relevant to 
reasoning with self-contained verbal premises: propositional 
operations....are necessary for formal reasoning on hypotheses stated 
verbally" (Piaget and Inhelder, 1969 p.135). "The advent of formal 
operations brought about a major change in the eubject'n understanding 
of language and hence his ability to reason verbally" (Placet and 
Inhelder, 1966). This was regarded as only one of the intellectual 
advances of the formal subject but the intellectual advances were of 
course presumed to be related by their common. underlying stucture - 
the integrated structure of the combinatorial system with its 
transformational (INRC group) properties. Concrete proof that Piaget 
considered his theory relevant to explaining performance on verbal 
reasoning problems (if further proof is required) comes from his reply 
to a direct question about verbal deductive ability put to him by 
Suppes at a conference and quoted by Ennis (1975). Suppes asked him to 
explain his experimental observation that 6,7 and 8 year olds were 
very good at making simple Modus Ponens and Modus Tollens Inferences. 
Presumably Suppes, like Ennis, felt that this facility with 
propositional logic inferences was a direct contradiction of Piaget's 
claims. The very fact that Piaget did not dismiss the question, 
arguing that his theory was not intended to cover purely linguistic 
reasoning, indicates that it was intended to do so. 
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Piaget explained in his reply how the distinction between the' 
reasoning of concrete and formal operational subjects would be evident 
in purely linguistic problems: 
"The problem is to know how the child reasons. Does he reason. by means 
of situations that he can evoke or imagine, or does he reason by means 
of combinations of terms." (Piaget, 1967, p4277) 
Although Ennis states that Piaget does not specify which subjects, 
co-rte or formal, reason in which way, it is obvioue that Piaget 
means that the concrete operational subjects reason by 'evocation of 
situations*. and the formal operational subjects reason by 
*combinations of terms*. There is no reason for Piaget to regard 
Snppes* evidence as running counter to his theory since he 
acknowledges that: 
"it is possible to get correct reasoning about simple propositions as 
early au the 7-8 year level provided these correspond to sufficiently 
concrete representations." (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 252) 
Suppes and Piaget seem to be in agreement that 7-8 year olds can give 
correct responses on natural language inference tasks provided that 
the content of the premises is sufficiently concrete (Piaget) or 
familiar to the subject (5.ppes). Piaget does not regard the correct 
responses of the concrete subjects as evidence of precocious formai . 
reasoning i.ee reasoning based upon an analysis of the formal stucture 
of the problem. Piaget always claimed that a child's understanding of 
language is constrained by the nature of the cognitive operations 
available to him. The concrete operational subject's understanding of 
language is constrained by the concrete or 'reality-based' nature of 
the operations available to him: with sufficiently concrete problems 
these operations can generate correct responses. The formal 
operational subject's response though is presumed to be generated by a 
qualitatively different analysis of the problem based upon the formal 
structure of the problem. 
Although Piaget acknowledges that reasoning with simple propositions 
is possible at concrete operations "provided the correspond to 
sufficiently concrete representational. (inhelder and Piaget, 1958) he 
does not discuss exactly what a "sufficiently concrete repreeentation" 
right be. This leaves him open to criticisms of unt stability since 
correct propositional reasoning by concrete operational subjects could 
be attributed to reasoning with sufficiently concrete representations 
while failure to respond correctly would indicate that the problems 
were not "sufficiently concrete". The distinction Fiaget makes between 
the different means of reasoning of the concrete and formal subject is 
apparently similar to the distinction made in modern information 
processing theories between reasoning carried out by means of imaginai 
and propositional representations. The difficulties described in Part 
1 in finding clear empirical evidence for the different 
representational modes are also relevant to Piaget's distinction 
between the verbal deductive abilities of concrete and formal 
operational subjects in terms of their "means" of reasoning. 
The theoretical and empirical problems encountered in trying to 
establish the relevance of Piaget's theory to explanations of 
deductive reasoning ability and difficulties in trying to formulate 
empirically testable predictions of the theory have led others as well 
as Ennis to abandon Piaget's theory as a model for investigating 
deductive logical competence and its acquisition (Wason, 1977; Braie, 
1978; Johnson-Laird, 1982, 1983). Besides the problems discussed 
already Piaget (1972) introduces further difficulties in 
distinguishing concrete and formalj reasoning abilities with his 
admission that formal operational subjects are more likely to 
demonstrate their formal reasoning in problem areas with which they 
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are fax or in their areas of specialism. This modification was 
made in the light of evidence from many studies of the failure of 
supposedly formal operational subjects to respond correctly on a 
variety of formal reasoning tasks and significant improvements in 
performance when the content of the problem was concrete rather than 
abstract (Kodroff and Roberge, 1975; Evans, 1972; Wason, 1966, 1968, 
1977; Wason and Johnson-Laird, 1972). However it introduces a further 
lack of testability into the theory since lt would not be clear 
whether a failure to find formal operational thinking should be 
cttributed to the lack of formal ability or to testing the subject in 
an unfamiliar content area. Changing the content of the problems until 
a suitable content. area is found does not seem to be a very convincing 
method of demonstrating formal reasoning! 
A& with other putative fornal operational abilities obero is empirical 
evidence of substantial improver eats in perforvance durioo early 
adolescence on tasks Involving propositional lotto (Shapiro and 
O'Brien, 1970; Noboru°. and Paulus, 1971; Taplin et al, 1974; 
:taudenmayor and Pourne, 1977; Kuhn, 1977; Rot,crge ame Flexor, 1979, 
r80). The results of studies of intortelationshios between 
performance on propositional logic tasks and other fotral operational 
tnIss however havc been more difficult to intorpret (Kuhn, 1977; Kuhn 
5ra1 Angelev, 1976; Roberg4,, 1976). Roberge (Inn) found evidence of 
significant improvements in performance on both a propositional logic 
MO: and a continations problem. at adolescence but found no 
correlation between scores on the two tasks. Roterge and Plover (1979) 
foond no significaot correlation between scores on a prepositional 
logic task and a corhinaticros tool* for Sth. graders (mean au 13.5 
yenrs) or adults (22-6e years) but did find sicrificant correlations 
between scores on the propositional logic test and a proportionality 
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test, another formal operational task, for the adolsecents and adults. 
T1oberge and Flexer (1980) found a significant correlation between 
performance on a control of variables task, another standard formal 
operational task, and a propositional logic task for grade 6 subjects 
(11.9 years) but not for grade S subjects (14.1 years). 
The propositional logic tasks used as formal operational tasks 
typically require the subject to deduce conclusions from propositional 
premises: Roberge and Flexer, for instance included premises such as 
"If there is an A then there is a B. There is an A" and "Either there 
is an A or there is a B.". However other kinds of propositional logic 
tasks have also been regarded as requiring formal operational ability. 
Johnson-Laird and Wason (1977) and Wason (1977) for instance have 
argued that subjects at the stage of formal operations should have the 
competence to solve their selection task since this task involves a 
knowledge of propositional logic and hypothesis testing. Kuhn (1977) 
proposed that a task involving the conditional interpretation of 
empirical evidence was essentially a formal operational task. 
Not only is the evidence concerning interrelationships between 
propositional logic tasks and the standard formal operational tasks 
like the isolation of variables and combinations tasks inconsistent, 
so too is the evidence concerning interrelationships between different 
propositional logic tasks. Roberge and Flexer (1980) reported no 
significant correlation between scores of 8th. grade subjects (14 
years 1 month) on two propositional logic tasks, the propositional 
logic argument test, which required deductions like that described 
above, and the propositional logic statement test which involved 
verification of statements expressing a propositional logic 
relationship but the correlation at grade 6 (11 years 9 months) 
cty 
between scores on the two tasks was significant. Roberge and rlexee 
argue that this supports Kuhn's (1977) view that syllogistic reasoning 
is not dependent upon the emergence of fornal operations. 
Ieterestingly Kuhn herself found a significant correlation between 
scores on a "conditional reasoning" task (a conditional verification 
task) and a propositional reasoning task involving categorical and 
conditional syllogisms at grade 8 (mean age 13 years 10 months) but no 
significant correlation at grade 6 (mean age 11 years 11 months). 
Inconsistent results such as these make it difficult to draw any firm 
conclusions about relationships between different propositional logic 
tashs and about whether particular tasks are focal operational. The 
significance of Kuhn's correlation between the two propositional logic 
tasks for grade S subjectsvfor iestanoeydoes not seem to support her 
conclusion that syllogistic reasoning does not require formal 
operations since the rationale for correlational analyses is that 
scores on tasks requiring formal operational thinking should be 
significantly related only for subjects at that stage since the set of 
abilities required to solve formal operational tasks is mediated by an 
organized, integrated structure. If Kuhn's claim is correct 
propositional inference tasks of the type which have been used as 
tests of formal operations are clearly inappropriate. The "substantial 
differences" Roberge and Flexer found in correct response on the two 
propositional logic tasks led Rcberge and Flexer to conclude that: 
"any assessment of adolescents' comprehension of propositionil logic 
i:, highly dependent upon the pree:se naturs of She problems used to 
measure this ability and thattt;smeaningless to speak of propositional 
reasoning ability per ee," 
Inconsistency of response by the eamc subjects on different 
propositional reasoning tasks (Evans 1978, 1980) and even by the same 
subjects on the same task (Taplin and Staudenmayeee 1973) was also 
noted in Part 1 where It was adduced as .evidence against taa 
-rationalist approach to reasoning. Since Piaget's theory is a 
rationaliat theory the inconsistent results on studies of performance 
olyInd interrelationships between, propositional and other formal 
reasoning tasks has also been adduced as evidence against Piaget's 
thaory. 
liowever the more recent interpretation of the rationalist position in 
which a distinction is made between logical competence and performance 
has also been applied to Fidget's theory by Flavell and Wohlwill 
(1969). According to this view Piaget's description of operational 
structures constitutes a model of logical competence (Brown and 
Desforaes, 1973; Boden, 1979; Falmagne, 1980; O'Brian and 07erton, 
1932). It has been argued that if Piaget's theory is understood as a 
model of logical competence it is incomplete as a theory of reasoning 
since it does not incorporate an account of the processes involvad in 
utilising the logical knowledge characterized in the competence 
eorponent (Brown and Desforges, 1977). Although from the point of view 
of their logical structure certain tasks might be within the 
competence of the formal operational subject, a complete account of 
the responses subjects give in reasoning tasks also requires an 
account of the deviation of responses from the predictions of the 
competence model. Perfornance factors can be identified which account 
for the poor performance of adolescents and adults on propositional 
reasoning tasks, inconsistent response on different tasks a;1 are 
nevertheless related in terms of their underlying logical structure, 
and inconsistent results on studies of interrelationships between such 
formal operational tasks. These include the informatien'processing 
capacities of the different subjects, differences in:the complexity, 
structure and content of the tasks, and different methodological 
procedures. .Plaeet'e ceneeetteLion on the loeical etructure of formel 
thought, his tenure to give an edequete account of how tte formal 
subject utilisee this leGical structure it solving particuler preleme 
ena his iailure to eccognise that (Afferent aepecte of teeta ethet 
than their logieal etructure can determine hoe well subjects perfore 
on tasks make it' s theory as an acccunt of the acquisition of 
reasoning abilities if not incorrect at leaet incomplete. 
Falmagne's framework for investi ,ating loeical comeetence 
Falmagne (1975, 1980) offers a very useful perspective on the 
development of logical competence. while Piaget regards propositional 
logic ability (in the sense of reasoning with verbal premises) as just 
one of the abilities which acquisition of the combinatorial structure 
of formal operations gives rise to, Falmagne distinguishes 
propositional reasoning studies and Piagetian scudies as two different 
traditions in the approach to the development of logical competence. 
Falmagne points out that the two different traditions nave focused 
upon different aspects of the child's logical development and claims 
that the extent to which these aspects are related is an empirical 
question and one watch has not yet been rigorously addressed. The 
different traditions have dealt with different tasks and consequently 
implicate different subsets of cognitive skills. Within the 
propositional tradition the child is regarded as a logician attempting 
, 
to make valid inferences by relying solely upon the formal properties 
of the premises and disregarding their content. Within the Piagetian 
tradition the chill is regarded as a scientist attempting to discover 
and test general laws about the world. Falmaene herself was concerne 
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with developing an account of the acquisition of loF,ical competence 
with linguistic prOblems, an area she feels has been neglected due to 
the impact of Piaget'; contention that pre-adolescents are unable to 
make propositional deductions. 
Valmagnc regards tasks within the propositional tradition as more 
strictly logical than tasks within the Piagetian tradition since the 
prepositional tasks focus on the child's facility with the deductive 
procedures of the logician while the Piagetian tasks involve logical 
deductive reasoning as only a component part. The typical Piagetian 
task, unlike propositional reasoning tasks, also involves the 
subject's ability to generate and test hypotheses, an ability which 
involves inductive rather than deductive reasoning. The subject is 
required to observe empirical events, encode them in an appropriate 
way and abstract from this encoding a general rule or hypothesis which 
he can test. 
Although the information encoded from linguistic and non-linguistic 
problems may be represented in similar ways, the way in which the 
information is extracted from the different types of problem must be 
different. (It will be remembered from the discussion of propositional 
representation that both linguistic and nonlinguistic information can 
be represented prepositionally.) Falmagne regards propositional 
reasoning as dependent upon the same kinds of representations and 
operations proposed in more general models of language comprehension 
and use, whereas the scientific reasoning tasks require processes 
involved in the encorling of empirical information. Falmagne 'proposes 
that both propositional and scientific tasks can be dealt with either 
formally, in which case the logical form of the problem would be 
extracted, or by a variety of content-based procedures. Although the 
propositional reasoning tasks are more strictly logical than the 
empirical tasks within the scientific tradition it is not clear 
whether a formal treatment of linguistically based problems would be 
more or less likely than a formal treatment of empirical problems. On 
the one hand the logical form of a verbal problem is more perspicuous 
than the logical form of an empirical problem. One reason for this 
seems to be that empirical states of affairs do not instantiate Unique \ 
logical relationships. On the other hand the ambiguities associated \ , 
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with the formalization of natural language expressions would be absent 
in formalizing information in non-linguistic situations. It might be 
expected that empirical problems are more amenable to solution in 
terms of concrete modes of reasoning and verbal problems in terns of 
formal representations since these mappings between problem and 
representation are more intuitive than other possible mappings. 
The alternative representations that Falnagne envisages to the formal 
approach to reasoning include reasoning with spatial/imaginal 
representations (Trabasso et al, 1975; Puttenlocher, 1968), 
protypical/analogical representations (Johnson-Laird, 1975; 
Johnson-Laird and Steedman, 1978; Guyote and Sternberg, 1978), 
Venn/Euler diagram representations (Pevlis, 1975; Erickson, 1974). 
Falmagne distinguishes between. two different types of logical 
competence which are defined in terms of the different modes of 
reasoning. A subject is logically competent in the "strong" sense to 
the extent that he can generate correct inferences from a formal 
representation of the problem. Logical competence in the weak (or 
operational) sense requires only that subjects can generate correct 
inferences on a variety of inference tasks regardless of how these 
inferences are generated. Correct inferences could be generated 
by means of any of the alternative representationa/ formats. ralmagne 
proposes that logical competence in both senses develops througout 
childhood and adulthood. Palmagne's distinction between weak and 
strong logical competence is similar to Piaeet's distinction between 
concrete and formal operational thinking in that correct response by 
concrete operational subjects on linguistic reasoning problems is 
presumed to be generated not by an analysis of the logical structure 
of the problem but by means of concrete representations or 'evoked 
images'. Although Falmagne did not identify the different types of 
logical competence in terms of different developmental stages as 
Piaget did, she did propose that an important aspect of logical 
development was the increasing availability of different 
representational formats for solving problems and particularly the 
increasing availability of the formal mode for an increasingly wide 
range of problems with increasing age. For Piaget the essential 
difference between the reasoning abilities of concrete and formal 
operational subjects is the difference between the structures and 
operations available at the different stages. Falmagne draws the 
distinction between the reasoning abilities of younger and older 
subjects in terms of the availability of different representational 
formats for carrying out the deductions at different ages. 
Falmagne's theory is more flexible than Piaget's in allowing that 
younger subjects, although more likely to use concrete based modes of 
representation to solve problems, can and do make purely formal 
deductions. She also argued that although the formal mode is 
increasingly available for the older subjects they will not 
necessarily solve problems formally even when the formal mode is 
available because it may be more expedient for a variety of reasons to 
use a concrete mode of representation. 
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ralmaene's definition of logical competence is different from other 
definitions (Osherson, 1974; Braine, 1977) in that she includes not 
just knowledge of logical relations and inference rules but also the 
ability of the subject to translate the natural language input in 
terms of an appropriate representational format to which inference 
rules can be applied. Other researchers would attribute the encoding 
of the premises to the linguistic encoding component of the model of 
reasoning, part of the performance component, rather than to the 
competence component. The encoding of the problem into a suitable 
representational format, or functional representation as Falmagne 
calls it, can be regarded as a mapping between the problem and the 
relevant available structures and representations in long term memory. 
The nature of this napping is assumed to depend on the logical form of 
the problem, the nature and content of material and the availability 
of cues as to the logical form of the problem. A formal representation 
of the problem is a mapping between the problem and logical 
0s?vacy 
relationships in Iseejieere-reihen the functional representation is not 
formal the structural properties of the representation are largely 
determined by the content of LTM. Falmagnes account of the 
formalization of natural language input into a functional 
representation highlights her view of logical reasoning as closely 
integrated with the general processes carried out in language 
comprehension. 
It will be remembered from the discussion earlier on that Falmagne 
does not regard logic as absent from reasoning carried out by means of 
the alternative (non-formal) representational modes but rather she 
claims that logic is hidden in the formalization process. By this she 
seems to mean that the choice and use of one particular 
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representational format rather than. another to represent the problem 
is determined by the subject' tored knowledge of the logical 
properties of that representation and his ability to identify a 
particular representational format as relevant to the solution of the 
problem. The subject has stored in long term memory knouledge of the 
logical properties of the particular representational format and can 
une cues from the problem to recognise the problem as an example of 
that representational format. 
If the concrete modes of reasoning incorporate loicel Imowledge it 
seems pertinent to ask why coacrete representations are necessary at 
all and why the information is not just represented formally. Logical 
knowledge incorporated in concrcte models of reasoning is not logical 
in the same way that logical knowledge incorporated in a formal 
representation is logical. Concrete representations represent the 
logical properties of statements i71 an explicit "graphic" way. PI* her 
this explicit representation of logical properties should be rea,arded 
as logica/ knowledge Is an equivocal i$3110 and is obviously related to 
the longstanding philosophical problem of what in to be counted as . 
logical knowledge. Fa/macne regards logical knowledge as knr,!Aedge 
ebout linuttic structur e. and knowledge about the Teal world "to the 
extent that language itself is semantically grounded in the empirical 
world to which parts of it refer" (Falmagnel 1930, p,176), Falmagne 
lteve that in choosing a specific Concrete representation of a 
particular sentence, the subject is demonstratinr!: his understanding of 
thlt isomorphism between the logical properties oT that sentence and 
the logical properties of the concrete representation; knowledge of 
the Acal properties of the concrete representation is stored in 
lorg term memory. Thin reflecte her belief that lotc1. ?mcwledge 
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derives from an awareness of how language maps on to the real world. 
Ths contrasts with Piaget's view since for Piaget language is not 
central to the acquisition of logical knowledge. For Piaget logical 
operations are constructed by the internalization of actions upon 
objects in the environment and the integration. of these into a 
coherent interconnected system; logic is both constrained by and is 
the result of our cognitive processes. Johnson-Laird's proposal that 
logic is an emergent property of manipulations of 'models' -concrete 
representations seems to be dependent upon his view that language is 
interpreted with respect to a determinate model. The logical 
properties of a sentence can only be derived from an exhaustive 
consideration of all the distinct models which accurately represent 
the truth of the sentence. For Falmagne the concrete representation of 
a problem which the subject chooses is a canonical representation 
incorporating its logical properties i.e. an abstraction from all 
models compatible with the truth of the sentence. Falmagne would argue 
that the choice and use of a particular model as an. appropriate 
representation of a sentence reflects the subject's knowledge of the 
structural properties of the model and its relevance in encoding the' 
sentence. It is interesting in this respect that Falmagne does not 
account for how the child would come to have this knowledge of the 
logical properties of concrete representations although it seems 
likely that she would invoke a Piagetian explanation since she regards 
any of the basic assumptions of her framework as "in a general sense, 
entirely congruent with the constructive epistemology represented in 
Piaget's theory" (Falmagne, 1980, p.181). 
Falmagne argues that her approach to the study of the acquisition of 
verbal deductive logical competence is "not seen as incompatible with 
Piaget's theory". Like other recent theorists within the infornation 
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proce86Ln3 tradition., she regards Piaget's tncr)ry ot formal operations 
as a structural description of the aoolescent's logical competence 
and, as such, she regards Piaget's theory as incomplete since he fails 
to account for diecrepareies between tae predictions of the logical 
model and the observed behaviour of subjects in reasoning tastsi other 
than to invoke the concept of horizontal decalage to explain why 
evhi-ete eo 
facility with conceptsifrom different content areas but which have the 
same underlying structure does not emerge concurrently. 
Central to Falreerros framework for studying the acquisition of 
leeical reasoninr eeilities is her view of the ability to rake loeical 
deductive inferoneee as closely Integrated with the structures and 
representations proposed in thenriPs of language comprehension and in 
general theories of cognitive processes within cognitive psychology. 
Fer view that deductive reasoning with linguistic premises can he 
exnlained in terms of the same structures and processes as those 
pronosed in theories of sentence comprehension highlights some of the 
Inadequacies of Piapet's theory since Piaget did not consider 
opecifically linguistic aspects of logical abilities. lt makes her 
eopeoach to verbal deduction more useful than ltiaget's approach 
although "not incompatible" with it. FaImaene'e approach offers a way 
of giving more substance to PiageOs elairs about the different 
"means" of reasoning of younger and older subjects. Falragne 
distinKuishes between a Femoral account of the development of logical 
competenco with respect to the development of other aspects of 
coenition and an account of more specific "microdevelopmentel changes" 
which may determine fecility with particular pntterns of inference or 
logical relationships. Piaget has provided a general theory' of the 
feemees in cognitive structure which take place around adoleeceeec but 
has not been concerned with exploring the detnile of this chen-e. 
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It is the r+tajec.`ti.ve of tb},k: tiiesi,r? to explore the details of how the 
ahiLit?c to end erstanri end r.R915!0n with i.;,ti,vpr;sa7,3.y rFttentif.'ierl 
statements and general ccmrtirinnral statements acquired. rrnr± 
Pi.rariet.',cs account of the development of logical thinking it i_s 
r?i.fff. .r.u?.t to make clear, a.r.rranbi.euoctès predictions co92Ce,.s? ittt*, the 
development of linguistic reasoning abilities concerning these 
statements. However because of the centrality of the conditional to 
ftccc+iants of reasoning it is important to establish the extent tc., which 
r.hi.ldren are capable of enefersta.ridi.np this relation. 
Research on language comprehension and inference ha.a been czrircerned 
with providing models of performance on different comprehension and 
Inference tasks in teens of the different c() ¡t1it:.7..äF? processes 
implicated in solvins; these tasks. Performance is typically agsesßeci 
in terme of error rates o... 1 axencti.tas. Idittai..r, tee F'iagetiaán tra.riition 
r r4'.S1'iat:l.'Síi iriam correct response on it. ft3L7'ral inference task has 
been considered a3 evidence aryaillst: Pi tt;j;et 's theory. A more frstitfttl 
approach to provicîine a theory of t^ea4onì,ne ability is to attempt to 
characterise the demands of the different tasks and, by presenting 
the tasks to subjects of ct3fferent ages, to establish the aee at 
which facility on the different tasks is acquired. This would allow 
the cievel.opments.l course esi" the acquisition of the component abilities 
implicated in tYLe solution of these tasks to be el,uciciatrsd. It is 
tempting to suppose that certain tasks assess r.Arrpreher.nynn of 
sentences while others 'si£iEie£Yär inference from these S??'ftte'.t3c:e£t. Iï.? 
practice it i.s impossible to comete'hensi_e3,*s and i.nfnrence 
independently since the interpretation of a.,ens-ence determines to a1 
certain extent the pe ri.ssibie inferences while anequtate cranprehFn.sion. 
of a sentence requires that certain l,n.terences he made, The di,ffi icult:y 
(05- 
tn characterisine comprehensien and ieferenee eeperately was discussed 
in part 1. Itather than tecoin g embroiled in the debate i0oUti-t4la._ 
to which. different task involve eomezeension and inferenee 
more fruitful approach to providing a theory of reasoning ability is 
to attempt to characterise the demande of the dieferent tasks and, by 
presenting these take to subjects of different eeee, to establleh,the 
age at which facility on the different tasu s. is acquired. This wnuld 
allow the developmental course of the acquisition of the component 
abillties implicated in the solution of theme tits t he elucidated. 
The different t44:31a used in this thesis include a verification task, 
ee evaluation task and syllogiatic reesening task. 
verifieaelou teeka ute eftoe referred to as eimple. reaeonine 
tanko they des not involve deductive reasonin g. but require the subject 
to say whether a sentence ts a true Or .felse deocriptien of a 
particular empirieal situation. However aa Zvano (19C2) statee "those 
taaits provide taforeation about people'e ebility to repeeeeet and 
proceea linguistic etrueturee that are involved ia Vend ;Itele deductive 
teeasonine problee4". 
As explained in part 1 the rationalist proposal that inference tasks 
reflect the interpretatieee of linguistic premises on which inference 
i5 then carried out in accordance with logical principles led to an 
abundente of reeearch neine inference tuft In ttenpt to establish 
'1(4T.r enntentes are understood. The evaluation ta$k le 7,.ie4 of 
inference teak which bes been used to assess comprehension of the 
lineuietio premises and partieeTerly the conditional. The subject is 
preeented with a lieeuietie etetement end either has to say whether 
particular exemplars are compatible with that statement or whether 
particular exemplars make the statement true. This task involves 
puvoly linguistic pocmises and consequently fton a Piagetian viewpoint 
onould be more difficult than the verifioation task, The syllogistic 
oas also been Li4vi t assess now statemeats are 
undotatood. Ihe subjeot 16 presenteo with a major and a minor poemise 
anJ 15 required eit4er to make ai inlezenoo or to assess tne validity 
of an iniecence, The subject's response la considsteu to twilect his 
;oterpretation of the major premise, 
Because of Ilaget's claim about the logical abilities of subjects at 
the concrete and formal operational stdges of development periormance 
on both close and conditional versions of the tasks was ooupared, 
l'xperiments 1, 3, and 4 were concetned with the verification of 
ctatements of this type; experiment S was an evaluation expeiiment 
while experiments u and 7 were studies el: syliogistic reosoning 
tbliticus 
One aspect of the development of comprehension and infetential 
abilities which riaget did identify but which information processing 
theorists have, until recently, largely ignored ia tha fact that the 
nevelopment of logical abilities is, in the. first place, tied to 
concrete objects and relations* The subject's ability to make 
infozenees initially depends upon the presence of concrete objects. It 
seams feasible to propose that comprehension and inference tasks which 
are related to concrete objects and relations will b olved at an 
earlier age than those which require reasoning. with self-contained 
linguistic premises. Purther since class st,tements like "All A are 
loop in a more intuitively obvious way than propositional statements 
"If p then q" onto empirical objects any distinction between the 
ceoptchension of class aad conditional statements would be mote likely 
to occur in comprehension tasks involving interptetation or amp rice' 
17 
information rather than in purely linguistic tasks. 
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CHAPTER 2 
UIdDT;RSTA?dDIP1G UNIVERSALLï' Ut1i?TIFI.ED STATEMENTS 
In "The Early Growth of Logic in the Child" (1964) Inhelder and Piaget 
describe their extensive investigations of the developmental 
mechanisms of the classification and seriation operations which 
characterise the concrete operational stage of the child's cognitive 
development. 
Of particular interest to this thesis was an experiment which they 
conducted on the young child's understanding of class inclusion and 
comprehension of the quantifiers "all" and "some ". In this experiment 
the child was presented with a collection of counters ranging in 
number from 8 to 21 and consisting of blue squares, blue circles, and 
red squares (see Figure 2.1). He was then asked the following 
questions about the collection: 
(1) Are all the circles blue? 
(2) Are all the red ones square? 
(3) Are all the blue ones circles? 
(4) Are all the square ones red? 
Although an adult would immediately respond. "yes" to (1) and (2), and 
"no" to (3) and (4), Inhelder and Piaget found that 5 year -olds found 
the task quite difficult and responded correctly to only 67.57 of such 
questions. 7 year -olds were correct on 85% of questions, while by 9 
year. old 94% of responses were correct. 
Inhelder and Piaget argue that the children's errors on this kind of 
problem are due to "false quantification of the predicate ". Rather 
than interpreting the universal affirmative proposition: 
(5) All the circles are blue. 






















































(6) "All the circles are some of the blue things." 
the young children misinterpret (5) as: 
(7) "All the circles arc all of the blue things." 
With the collection of shapes in Figure1.1 this interpretation would 
clearly lead the subject to give the wrong answer i.e. that all the 
circles are not blue (i.e. are not all the blue things) because there 
are some blue squares. 
Inhelder and Piaget argue that the difficulty that the young child has 
in quantifying the predicate arises from more fundamental cognitive 
difficulties in operational classification. A child who has mastered 
operational classification understands that the statement: "All the 
roses are flowers" is true because the extension of the set of roses 
defined by the quantifier "all", namely every member of that set, is 
marked by the intensive characteristic of being a flower. In a similar 
way the concrete operational child would understand that: "All the 
circles are blue" is true because every member of the set of circles 
in the collection has the common characteristic "blue". Similarly, 
"All. the blue shapes are round" is false because it is not true that 
the extension of the set of blue shapes designated by the quantifier 
"all", i.e. every blue shape in the collection, is marked by the 
common characteristic "round" since some blue shapes are not round. 
The adequacy of the false quantification of the predicate hypothesis 
(the F.Q.P. hypothesis) has been questioned both on theoretical 
grounds and empirical grounds. Kneale and Kneale (1962) point out that 
quantifying predicates raises problems of logical formulation. Bucci 
(1978) has criticized the F.Q.P. hypothesis on empirical grounds. She 
points out that young children incorrectly reject sentence (1) as 
false not just "because there are blue squares" but also "because 
there are red. squares." Bucci argues that the F.Q.P. hypothesis cannot 
explain the "red squares" type of error since the presence of red 
squares would be irrelevant in a comparison of "all the circles" with 
"all the blues". 
Although. Bucci claims that the F.Q.P. hypothesis cannot account for 
the "red squares" typo of error Inhelder and Piaget did 
. offer an 
explanation of such errors in young children. Inhelder and Piaget 
claimed that the preoperational child cannot yet reason in terms of 
classes because he cannot differentiate between the intension and 
extension of a class. He reasons instead in terms of 'non-graphic 
collections', which are prelogical collections of objects with similar 
characteristics. Rather than regarding "all" as a quantifier defining 
the extension of a class, the child at the pre-operational stage 
regards "all" as referring to the properties of a collection of 
objects. In the words of Inhelder and Piaget: 
"the collection as a whole is exclusively and entirely blue and made. 
up of circles just as a particular object must be entirely blue as 
well as circular to be called a 'blue circle.'" 
In assessing the truth of: 
"All the circles are blue." 
the subject compares the two collections of round elements and blue 
elements to decide whether these two sets coincide. Any element which 
is not blue and round, including red squares, would be a 
counterexample to this interpretation of the quantified statement. 
Another hypothesis proposed to explain how quantified statements are 
interpreted is Chapman and Chapman's (1959) illicit conversion 
1)2. 
Aypothesis. According to t1113 Nyponesis any subject5 inLerpret 
stacerents of the type "All As are Bs" to mean that the converse "All 
Bs are As" is also true. Effectively the F.O.P. hypothesis and the 
conversion hypothesis both assume that the subject misinterprets an 
inclusion relationship (ha) as an equivalence relationship (A = 
The difference is that according, to the F.O.P. hypothesis this 
misinterpretation is not strictly logical since it is based upon 'the 
subject's manipulations of collections rather than 1cTical classes. A 
subject who converts "All As are Bs" to "All Bs are As" apparently 
understands that the conjunction of the inclusion relation and its 
converse "All As are Bs and All Bs are As" is a logical equivalence 
relationship (A .t 
Revlin and Leiter (1980) have recently proposed an alternative form of 
the conversion hypothesis. They propose, rather counterintuitively, 
that in the process of comprehension the subject converts the sentence 
"All A are B" to "All J; aro A" and that this converted relationship is 
most salient in further processing, during comprehension or reasoning 
tasks and hence in determining the subject's response. This hypothesis 
would presumably not be relevant in explaining the errors of younp, 
children however since the conversion operation is dependent upon the 
correct assicnnent of the inclusion relationship and it is this 
inclusion relationship which the younger children have not mastered. 
'ucci rejects the TO.P. hypothesis and the illicit conversion 
hypothesis of how the subject-predicate distinction can he nullified, 
an proposes instead a "structure neutral" hypothesis which holds 
that, in interpreting universal affirmative propositions, subjects of 
certain ages and in certain circumstances, hot assign the 
subject-predicate distinction properly. The universal affirmative 
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proposition "All the circles are, blue" is encoded as an unordered 
string of content words without any structure "All, circles, blue ". 
Unless further interpretation is imposed by the content or context of 
the statement or by re- encoding the sentence with further attention to 
its structure, the most likely interpretation of this structure 
neutral encoding will be something like "Everything is a circle and 
blue" or "They're all blue circles ". The strucNre neutral 
interpretation is similar to the Piagetian interpretation which. 
proposed that "All A are B" is understood to mean that the collection 
as a whole is "all A and B ". Bucci presents evidence in her paper that 
even adults apparently interpret universally quantified statements in 
this way sometimes. 
A subject using a structure neutral (S.N.) interpretation of sentences 
(1) -(4) would respond "false" to all 4 sentences since in every case 
there are shapes present in the collection of Figure 2.1 which would 
contradict the S.N. interpretation. In sentence (1) for instance, his 
interpretation "Everything is round and blue" would be contradicted 
both by the presence of blue squares and red squares. Bucci's S.N. 
hypothesis would predict that if young children do use a S.N. 
interpretation they should respond "false" even to sentences which are 
true. Performance on the task described by Piaget should be 
characterised by superior performance on false items compared with 
true items. 
Although Bucci claims that the implications of this differential 
performance on true versus false items were not discussed by Inhelder 
and Piaget, this would also be a prediction of Piaget's 
"collection -as -a- whole" interpretation since this interpretation is 
similar to the S. N. hypothesis and Inhelder and Piaget do say (in 
"The Early Growth of Logic in the Child", p. 71) that children find it 
easier to say that All Bs are A is false than to say that All As are 
It 
1 is true. Indeed the difference is evident in Piaget's experimental 
data. Inhelder and Piaget's data show that overall more subjects 
respond correctly to all false items than all true items although they 
do not say whether this difference is significant. This differential 
performance on true and false items would also be predicted by the 
F.Q.P hypothesis and the Chapmans' conversion hypothesis. The false 
statement "All blues are round" would be classified false under the 
F.Q.P. interpretation and the conversion hypothesis because of the 
presence of blue squares. The true statement "All circles are blue" 
would also be classified as false under both the F.Q.P. and conversion. 
interpretations, because of the presence of blue squares. 
Bucci reports an experiment - "The Display Task" - which was 
essentially a replication of Inhelder and Piaget's study of the 
comprehension of the quantifier "all". Bucci used three different 
age-groups: 37 children from 6 years 6 months to 8 years 8 months; 38 
children from 11 years 5 months to 12 years 5 months and 28 adults. 
The subject was presented with a card on which there were five or six 
small plastic blocks varying in size, shape and colour, and a sentence 
e.g. on one card there were yellow squares, blue squares and blue 
rectangles, and a sentence: 
(1) On this card all the yellow blocks are square. 
or (2) On this card all the blue blocks are rectangles. 
The major differences between Bucci's and Inhelder and Piaget's tasks 
were: 
(a) The set size: Bucci used 5 or 6 objects whereas Inhelder and 
IIs 
Piaget used3 to 21 objects. 
(b) The number of items: Bucci used 3 true and. 3 false items: 
Inhelder and Piaget used only 2 true and 2 false items. 
(c) The type of task: Bucci's task was a verification task: Inhelder 
and Piaget's task was a question/answer task. 
Comparable data were available from Inhelder and Piaget's study only 
for the 6-8 year olds. The results for this age-group were similar: 
347, of responses by Bucci's 6-8 year-olds and 85% of responses by 
Inhelder and Piaget's 6-8 year-olds were correct. 54% of Bucci's 6-8 
year-olds and 47% of Inhelder and Piaget's 6-8 year-olds were correct 
on all items. 
Bucci's results show that her predictions about differential 
performance on "true" versus "false" items was upheld. Performance on 
false items was virtually unchanged between groups. Just over 80% of 
6-8 year-olds, 11-12 year-olds and adults answered all false items 
correctly. Performance on true items however was 
very poor with only 39% of 6-8 year-olds and 59% of 11-12 year-olds 
answering all the true items correctly. There was little difference in 
performance on true versus false items by adults: 88% of adults 
answered all true items and 82% of adults answered all false items 
correctly. There was a significant difference between older children 
and adults in response to true items (chi-square = 7.86, df = 1, 
p4).01). The difference between younger children and older children's 
response to true items just missed significance (chi-square = 3.07, df 
= 1, p40.10). 
Bucci attributes the difference in performance on true and false items 
to a structure neutral interpretation of the universal affirmative 
proposition by most of the younger children (6-8 years) and many of 
the older (11-12 year-olds) children. however, as we have seen, this 
difference is also compatible with Piaget's F.Q.P. hypothesis and the 
Chapmans' conversion hypothesis. 
There were several flaws in Bucci's experiment which could account for 
her results: 
(1) Bucci used the term "rectangle" in problems where squares and 
rectangles were presented in the same collection. It is quite likely 
that most 11-12 year-olds and adults if not 6-8 year-olds know that 
"All squares are rectangles". If this is considered to be relevant in. 
Bucci's experiment, statements like "All the blue blocks are 
rectangles" are actually true of a collection of blue and yellow 
squares and blue rectangles like that used by Bucci. This example 
would lead to errors on false items rather than true items, and would 
not affect the S.P. hypothesis. Consider though the col-situ-5a 
this statement which was presumably used in Bucci's study: 
"All the rectangles are blue." 
of 
This statement is true only if one considers squares and rectangles to 
be disjoint classes. If the subject considers that his knowledge that 
"All squares are rectangles" is relevant, the sentence is clearly 
false since there are yellow rectangles (i.e. yellow squares) present. 
It ìs possible that this type of "error" contributed to the poor 
performance on true statements by the 11-12 year-old subjects since it 
it usually impressed upon subjects of this age that "All squares are 
rectangles". Since young subjects find it easier to respond to 
statements with shape rather than colour in the subject position and 
since all statements of the type Bucci used with the term "rectangle" 
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in the subject position will be false if the fact that "All squares 
are rectangles is taken into account, it is plausible that more 
"errors" will be made in classifying sentences which Bucci classifies 
as true (i.e. those with "rectangle" in subject position) than in 
classifying those which Bucci classifies as false (i.e. those with 
"rectangle" in predicate position). Any errors attributable to 
ambiguity associated with the term "rectangle" could easily be avoided 
by excluding that term from the experiment. 
(2) Young children presented with 5 shapes (2 yellow squares, 2 yellow 
circles and a blue square) and asked whether "All the circles are 
yellow" is true might respond that it is false, the reason being that 
only 2 circles are yellow. Inhelder and Piaget report this kind of 
justification by younger children who seem to require that "all" 
refers to a larger number of items than two. Errors of this type would 
also lead to an inflated number of errors on true items compared with 
false items. It is possible that some errors on true statements were 
due to this type of error since Bucci used small set sizes. The small 
set size was used to obviate the possibility of errors due to careless 
inspection of the shapes. A set size of 8 to 9 objects would be more 
likely to avoid both pitfalls. 
(3) Piaget reports that children produce more errors on both true and 
false items when the quantified term concerns colour (sentences 2 and 
3) than when the quantified term concerns shape (sentences i and 4). 
Since Bucci does not mention this factor we do not know whether she 
controlled for it or not. If there were more true items than false 
items with a. quantified shape tern then this would lead to an increase 
in errors on true items over false items. 
(4) As previously mentioned, Bucci's results were reported in terms of 
11? 
percentage of subjects correct on all the true versus false items. It 
is not obvious why she reports her results in this way rather than in 
terms of mean correct response to "true" versus "false" terns. This 
latter method of analysis is more useful for comparing the results of 
different experiments since the former method depends to some extent 
on the number of items included. Obviously the more items the less 
likelihood of a subject being correct on all items of a particular 
kind although there is no reason why there should be a differentiation 
in correct response! to "true" versus "false" items for any particular 
number of items. 
Experiment 1 was carried out to discover whether Bucci's results could 
be replicated in a study which obviated some of the flaws in Bucci's 
study. The following modifications were made: 
(a) No rectangles were used. 
(b) Set sizes of 8 objects were used. 
(c) Quantified terms concerning colour and shape were balanced across 
the "true" and "false" items. 
(d) Analysis was performed both. in terms of percentage correct 
response to "true" versus "false" items by subjects at a given age, 
and also in terms of percentage of subjects at a given age responding 
correctly to all "true" versus "false" items. 
EXPERIMENT 1 
THE INTERPRETATION OF UNIVERSAL AFFIRMATIVE PROPOSITIONS 
METHOD 
Faterials 
Twelve different 8" by 5" index cards were prepared for presentation 
to the subjects. On each card there were eight shapes of three 
different kinds, varying along the dimensions colour and shape. Three 
different shapes (triangle, circle and square) and three different 
colours (blue, red and green) were used but the attributes on any one 
card were binary. The relationship between the attributes of the 
coloured shapes on each card could be characterised as one of 
inclusion. A card on which there were blue circles, blue squares and 
green squares, for example, represented the inclusion relationship: 
"All the circles are blue." or "All the green shapes are square.". 
Twelve out of the thirty-six possible such relationships between the 
attributes were chosen in such a way that each colour and type of 
shape appeared four times over the twelve cards. 
In addition to the shapes, each card had printed on it a universal 
affirmative proposition like the following: 
(8) On this card all the circles are blue. 
Six of the statements were true of the relationship depicted on the 
card, and six were false. The false statements were always the 
converses of statements which were true of the relationship depicted 
on the card. If, for example, it was actually true that all the 
circles on the card were blue the false statement used would be: 
(9) On this card all the blue shapes are circles. 
The nature of the quantified term, colour or shape, was crossed with 
truth value of the statement so that there were 3 true and 3 false 
statenents with the quantified terra concerning colour (TC and FC) and 
3 true and 3 false statements with the quantified term concerning 
shape (TS and FS). Each colour and shape appeared once in each of 
these four different proposition types. 
Seven practice cards were also prepared. 3 of these served as an 
Introduction to the experiment and required the children to name the 
shapes on each of the cards - triangles on one card, squares on the 
second, and circles on the third. Each shape was presented in red, 
blue and green, and the child was also required to name the colours. 
This was to ensure that the child was familiar with the shapes and 
colours used. The next two practice cards contained two different 
types of shape and a statement to be verified (one true and one false) 
and the last two practice cards contained three different shapes and a 
statement to be verified. The practice session familiarised the 
subject with the task and ascertained whether the subject could read 
all of the words used in the experiment. 
SUBJECTS 
Subjects were 20 Primary 2 children, and 20 Primary 7 children from an 
Edinburgh Primary School. Mean age of the Primary 2 children was 6 
years 2 months (with a range of 5 years 5 months to 6 years 8 months), 
and for the Primary 7 children, 11 years 0 months (with a range of 10 
years 5 months to 11 years 6 months). Subjects were chosen randomly by 
their form teachers as of average to above-average ability. 
PROCEDURE 
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Fach child was interviewed individually by the experimenter and the 
task took between ten and fifteen minutes. With the aid of the 
praltice material it was explained to the subject that the task 
involved colours and shapes, and that he was going to have to say 
whether some sentences about colours and shapes were true or false. 
The twelve experimental cards were then presented to the subject' one 
after the other in random order.. The child was told to look carefully 
at the coloured shapes on each card, to read the sentence and then to 
say whether the sentence was true or false. Some of the Primary 2 
children found it easier or more natural to say "right" or "wrong" 
instead of "true" or "false" as they were more familiar with these 
terms. As it was felt that the two types of judgement did not differ, 
the children were allowed to use "rir,,ht" and "wrong" if they wished. 
fo child had any difficulty with the procedure. 
RESULTS 
Table 2.1 shows the percentage of correct responses to the different 
types of proposition for subjects at different grades. Overall,. 
Primary 2 children were correct on 71% of responses and. Primary 7 
children were correct on 95% of responses. A t-test on independent 
means revealiada significant effect of grade (t=6.87, df=38, p(0.001). 
The Primary 7 children show essentially mature performance on this 
task, but Primary 2 children still make errors. 
Contrary to Bucci's predictions, there was no difference between 
correct response to true items and false items for children at either 
rade. 71% of true responses and 70% of false responses by Primary 2 
children, and 94% of true responses and 95% of false responses by 
Primary 7 children were correct. In contrast with Bucci's results 
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TABLE 2.1 
PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSE TO DIFFERENT TYPES OF PROPOSITION 
FOR SUBJECTS AT DIFFERENT GRADES 
P2 
TC 58 92 
TS 83 97 
FC 60 95 
FS 80 95 
MEAN TC +TS 71 94 
MEAN FC +FS 70 95 
MEAN TC +FC 59 93 
MEAN TS +FS 81 96 
OVERALL MEAN 71 95 
TC: True statement with colour subject 
FC: False statement with colour subject 
TS: True statement with shape subject 
FS: False statement with shape subject 
TABLE 2.2 
NUMBER OF SUBJECTS AT EACH GRADE CORRECT ON ALL PROPOSITIONS 
OF A PARTICULAR TYPE 
P2 P7 
TC 5 15 
TS 13 18 
FC 5 17 
FS 12 17 
TC+TS 3 13 
FC+FS 5 14 
TC+FC 1 12 
TS+FS 9 15 
MEAN 1 12 
TC: True statement with colour subject 
FC: False statement with colour subject 
TS: True statement with shape subject 
FS: False statement with shape subject 
which showed a trend towards a sienificant difference between the 
responses of the younger and older children only on true items, a 
significant difference was found between the responses of younger 
children (6 year-olds) and those of older children (11 year-olds) on 
both true (t=4.290 df=38, 1140.001) and false (t=4.44, df=38, p4.0.001) 
propositions. 
Since BUCCige, analysis was in terms of percentage of subjects correct 
on all the true versus all the false items, a similar analysis was 
performed here. Since more items were included in this experiment 
fewer subjects would be expected to be correct on all items, but 
according to Bucci's predictions, a true/false differentiation should 
occur. Table 2.2 shows the percentage of subjects at each grade 
correct on all propositions of a particular type. There were 12 
propositions to be verified in this experiment and only one 6 year old 
subject (5g) and twelve 11 year olds (60%) were correct on all 
propositions (compared with 54% for Bucci's 6-8 year-olds and 71% for 
11-12 year olds). As regards the number of subjects correct on all 
true versus false items, (15%) Primary 2 and 13 (65%) Primary 7 
subjects were correct on all "true" items, while 5 (25%) of Primary 2 
and 14 (70%) of Primary 7 subjects were correct on all "false" items. 
The difference in correct response between Primary 2 and Primary 7 
children, as with the percent correct response analysis, was 
significant on both the true items (Chi-Square = 10.416, df=1, 
p(0.001), and on false items (Chi-Square =8.12, df=1, p40.005) but 
there was no difference in correct response to true versus false items 
at either grade. 
From Table 2.1 it can be seen that Primary 2 children gave more 
correct responses to items with shape. subjects (81%) than to items 
with colour subjects (597). A t-test for correlated means shows that 
this difference is significant (t=2.81, df=19, p(0.01). There is no 
such difference. for Primary 7 subjects who performed well on 
propositions of both. types: 93% of responses to colour itens and 96% 
of responses to shape iters were correct. 
Table 2.2 shows that the shape/colour subject difference is also 
reflected in the number of Primary 2 subjects correct on all colour 
items only 5%) compared with all shape items (45%). No such 
difference was found for Primary 7 children. 
DISCUSSIOV 
The results of experiment 1 do not support Bucci's prediction 
concerning response differences to "true" and "false" propositions. 
There was no difference in response on "true" versus "false" items for 
the 6 year-olds or the 11 year-olds, whether this was in terms of mean 
correct response to "true" versus "false" items or in terns of number 
of subjects at a given age correct on all "true" versus "false" items. 
There was a significant effect of grade with 11 year-olds performing 
better than G year-olds overall. The effect of grade was also 
significant for both "true" items and "false" items. This indicates 
that the absence of a true/raise differentiation in response was not 
due to an absence of errors by 6 year-olds. Indeed 6 year-olds in 
experiment 1 made more errors (29% ) than the young subjects in Bucci's 
study (16%) although the errors were on both "true" and "false" items. 
The higher error rate for 6 year-olds than that for Bucci's subjects 
was probably due to the wider age-range used by Bucci who used 
children aged from 6-8 years. 
Tucci's results did not uniquely support her stucture neutral 
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hypothesis since both Piaget's F.Q.P. hypothesis and the Chapmans' 
conversion hypothesis would also predict a higher error rate on true 
compared. with false items. The absence of a higher error rate in 
experiment 1 is thus incompatible with the S.N. hypothesis, the 
F.Q.P. hypothesis, and the Chapman's conversion hypothesis. Although 
all three hypotheses can explain errors on true items none of these 
can explain errors on false items. Of the hypotheses mentioned in the 
introduction only Revlin and Leirer's conversion hypothesis could 
explain errors on false statements. This conversion hypothesis 
proposes that in encoding quantified sentences subjects carry out a 
conversion operation on the subject so that the converse is prepotent 
in future processing. Thus the true statement. "All the round shapes 
are blue" of Figurell would be converted to a. false statement "All the 
blue shapes are round" while the false statement "All the blues are 
round" would be converted to the true statement "All round shapes are 
blue". All other things being equal, errors on true and false 
propositions would be equally likely. Although Ilevlin and Leirer's 
conversion hypothesis was not thought to be applicable to young 
children's responses on verification of quantified statements this 
type of conversion hypothesis can account for the similar error rates 
on "true" versus "false" items. 
Despite Bucci's contention that the true/false differentiation which 
she found was not reported by Inhelder and Piaget, Inhelder and Piaget 
(1964) did report superior performance with false statements. They 
explained the errors on true statements in terms of the F.Q.P. 
hypothesis and also emphasised that some correct responses on false 
statements were probably correct for the wrong reason i.e. some 
subjects who correctly argued that "All B are A" is false were basing 
their responses not on the fact that there are some Bs which are 
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not-a, but on the fact that Ds and As are not co-extensive. Inhelder 
and Piaget argued that errors on false items arise because of 
conversion of "All D are A." to "All A are D.". Although Inhelder and 
Piaget argued that interpreting thy inclusion relation as its converse 
is similar to substituting equivalence for inclusion this is not true: 
the interpretation is one of reciprocal inclusion rather than 
equivalence. As we have seen interpreting a false inclusion statement 
(All B are A) as an equivalence would not lead to errors in 
classifying false statements. 
Inhelder and Piaget proposed that the difference in response on true 
and false propositions would be found only for younger subjects. Eucci 
actually found a significant increase in correct response on true 
propositions between 11-12 year olds and adult subjects indicating 
that older subjects are also liable to misinterpret the true 
propositions. This suggests that the absence of a true/false 
differentiation in experiment I was not caused by using subjects who 
were too old to demonstrate the effect. 
The difference in response of 6 year olds to items with shape subject 
(8l% correct) compared with a colour subject (59% correct) supported 
Planet's view that children of this Age are still heavily influenced 
by the perceptual characteristics of the picture or array since they 
base their response on collections of elements rather than on an 
understanding of one class included in another. It seems that 6 year 
olds find it easier to group together items of a particular shape 
rather than items of a particular colour. It seems likely that the 
young subjects adopt a strategy of grouping together shape items 
rather than colour items even when it is not appropriate to do so. 
":hen the subject of the sentence concerns shape, this strategy is 
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effective whether the sentence is true or false. If the sentence is 
true e.g. "All the circles are blue." the subject will group together 
the circles and will readily affirm that they are all blue: 83% of P2 
responses on true sentences with a shape subject were correct. If the 
sentence is false e.g. "All the square shapes are red." the subject 
will group the squares tOgether and realize that t1 Rite. square is a 
counterexample to the truth of the sentence 80% of P2 responses to 
false sentences with shape subjects were correct, iihen the subject of 
the sentence concerns colour the strategy of grouping by shape is 
s 
likely to lead to error with both true and false sentences. The 
subject who uses a 'grouping by shape' strategy in responding to a 
true sentence such as "All the red shapes are square." will tend to 
ncoCrci-ly 
group the squares together and. regard a blue squarefas a - 
counterexample to-the sentence: only 58"/, of P2 responses to true 
sentences with colour subjects were correct. Grouping by shape would 
also lead the subject to regard a false sentence such as 
Qr-t-ovieoay 
"All the blue shapes are round."fas true since the subject would group 
the circles together and would find that these are all blue: only 60% 
of false sentences with shape subjects were correct. Either the child 
focuses on the shape whether or not this is the subject or predicate 
of the sentence or the child converts the sentence where necessary so 
that the shape is the subject. 
It is interesting to note that Just (1974) found that adults in a 
sentence picture verification task verified both true and false 
sentences with a colour subject e.g. "All the red figures are round." 
1(46n5. faster than sentences with a shape subject e.g. "All the round 
figures are red." when they were required to respond as quickly as 
possible. The difference disappeared when subjects were given ample 
time to respond. Just argued that since colour is processed better 
than shape in peripheral vision under time pressure subjects fixate 
items of a particular colour rather than items of a particular shape. 
Donaldson (1978) reports an experiment in which what might be called 
'conceptual salience' rather than perceptual salience determined, 
response on a verification task. The problem concerned four garages 
and a set of either three cars, in which case the three cars were in 
garages with one garage empty, or five cars in which case the four 
garages had cars in them with one ear left over. Children under seven 
years were required to judge whether the sentences* 
(1) "All the cars are in the garages." 
(2) "All the garages have cars in them." 
were true or false in the three car and five car cases. In the three 
car case, (1) was true and (2) false while in the five car case (1) 
was false and (2) true. Subjects seen to focus on 'cars in garages' 
saying that both (1) and (2) are true with five cars but that they 
were false with three cars. It could be argued that their 
Interpretation is a kind of "structure neutral" interpretation 
(A11)(cars)(garages), with further interpretation imposed by pragmatic 
factors in the way suggested by Bucci. Response of this type is 
apparently determined by the conceptual salience of 'cars in garages' 
i.e. the subjects' expectations about 'cars in garages'. 
P-7 
SU WARY PLì 1Ai;lr
In this chapter the ability of young children to understand 
universally quantified propositions of the type "111 A are T3." was 
examined, particularly in the light of Bucci's (1978) claim that, in 
their initial attempts to understand such statements, young children 
frequently encode these statements as unordered, unstructured strings 
(All)(A)(ß). Experiment l involved a task similar to Bucci's "Display 
task" which avoided some procedural difficulties of Bucci's study. Ho 
evidence was found for a specific prediction of Bucci's theory that 
performance by young subjects in interpreting false propositions 
should be superior to that in interpreting true propositions. In fact 
the truth value of the statement had no effect on performance. 
ta 
CHAPTER 3 
VERIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL AND UNIVERSALLY QUANTIFIED SENTENCES 
In experiment 1 the ability of 6 year olds and 11 year olds to perform 
a simple sentence /picture verification task with universally 
quantified propositions like "All A are B" was studied. In experiment 
1 the false sentences used were always the converses of sentences 
which were true of the collection being considered e.g. if it was true 
that "All the red shapes are square." the false sentence used would be 
"All the square shapes are red." 
Dean Kuhn (1977) describes a task similar to the quantified 
verification task of experiment 1 but in which conditional rather than 
class statements were to be verified. Instead of simply using true and 
false statements Kuhn included the eight possible different types of 
conditional statement which can be made by combining positive and 
negative values of two binary propositions p and q. 
The problem Kuhn used concerned different types of bug in a garden. 
The bugs could he big (p) or small ( -p), striped (q) or black ( -q). 
There were three different types of bug present in the garden and 
these were a big striped bug (pq), a small striped bug ( -pq) and a 
small black bug ( -p -q). The relationship represented in the picture 
(See Figure 3.1) between the binary attributes p and q could thus be 
said to represent the implication relationship big (p) implies striped 
(q) or black ( -q) implies small ( -p). The subject's task was to say 
which of the eight possible conditional sentences which can be made by 
combining the attributes of size and marking were true and which were 
false. The sentences are shown. in Table 3.1 along with the truth value 









































































THE EIGHT CONDITIONAL STATEMENTS USED -U THE CONDITIONAL 
VERIFICATION TASK ITU THE TRUTH VALUES FOR Tm: DirrrnENT 
STATEMENTS FOR DIFFEPENT INTEMETATIONS 
1) 
2) 




If a bug is big it is striped. 






3) E If a bug is small it is striped. F r T 
4) B If a bug is snail it is black. F. T 
5) B If a bug is striped it is big. F T T 
6) E If a bug is striped it is small. F r T 
7) If a bug is black it is big. F F F 
R) T If a bug is black it is small. 
TABLE 3.2 
THE EIGHT CLASS STATEMENTS USED IN THE CLASS 
VERIFICATION TASK. WITH THE TRUTH VALUES FOR THE DIFFERENT 
STATEMENTS FOB DIFFERENT INTERPRETATIONS 
CODE POSSIBLE STATEMENTS INTERPRETATIONS 
REV. C.I. EQU, CON. 
1) T All the big bugs are striped. 1 s, ,. T F 
2) N All the big bugs are black. F F F F 
:3) F Ail the small bugs are striped. F F T F 
4) B Al). the small bugs are black. F 
, 
J. T T 
5) 13 All the striped bugs are big. F 1 T T 
6) E All the striped bugs are snail. F F T F 
7) U All the black bugs are big. F F r F 
S) T All the black bugs are small. T i T T Y 
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conditional, biconditional and conjunctive - of the sentences. 
It is useful for the purposes of discussion to code the sentences. 7 
denotes a sentence which is true under all interpretations; D denotes 
a sentence which is true under a biconditional and conjunctive 
interpretation but not under a conditional interpretation; E denotes a 
sentence which is true under a conjunctive but not under a conditional 
or a biconditional interpretation; N denotes a sentence which is false 
under all interpretations because no elements with the attributes 
mentioned in the sentence are present in the picture. 
Subjects correctly interpreting the conditionals as conditionals would 
classify only T type sentences as true. Previous research in reasoning 
with conditionals has shown that children, frequently misinterpret 
conditionals as biconditionals. Under such an interpretation T and D 
type sentences would be classified as true and L and N type sentences 
as false. 
7:uhn discovered in her task that two response patterns predominated. 
Children over 11 years predominantly adopted the correct conditional 
interpretation while children up to 11 years classified T, D and E 
type sentences as true and N type sentences as false. In other words 
subjects adopting this interpretation appeared to ignore the 
conditionality of the sentences treating then instead as conjunctions. 
Sentences were classified as true if an element (i.e. a bug) with the 
attributes mentioned in the sentence was present in the picture. 
The sharp transition from a predominantly conjunctive interpretation 
at 11 years to a predominantly conditional interpretation at 13 years 
led Kuhn to propose that the task involved conditional reasoning and 
that performance on the task was "significantly influenced by the 
development of the basic logical reasoning operations defined by 
Inhelder and. Piaget (l958) as 'formal operations'. Kuhn claimed that 
the verification. task with conditional sentences which she called the 
'conditional reasoning task' involved the ability to comprehend a 
given combination of the products of the logical multiplicatNan of two 
dichotomous variables p and q in the context of other possible 
combinations. It will be remembered. from the introduction that this 
ability to comprehend propositional relations is one of the abilities 
which Inhelder and Piaget considered to be acquired at formal 
operations. In the trglitional Piagetian hypothesis testing task 
(-Asset hCine.t-CkQSg) 
described kflish.W.11'(e.g. the pendulum task, the flexibility of rods 
task etc.) the subject was required to formulate and test hypotheses. 
From the child's approach to the task Piaget was able to "diagnose" 
the subject's operational level. Kuhn's task involves only some of the 
component skills involved in the hypothesis testing task and 
consequently is apparently simpler than these tasks. Kuhn's task does 
not require the subject to formulate a hypothesis for instance; rather 
the subject is presented with different hypotheses (conditional 
sentences) which he has to test (classify as true or false) with 
respect to a picture. The "hypothesis" or conditional sentence is true 
if the implication relationship which it expresses corresponds to the 
implication relation represented in the picture. According to Ennis's 
interpretation of Piaget's combinatorial logic an implication such as 
"If a bug is big it is striped." is true if there exists at least one 
big striped bug (pq), at least one not-big, striped bug (-pq) and at 
least one not-big, not-striped bug (-p-q) and there exist no big, 
not-striped bugs (p-q). Kuhn's picture represents exactly such a 
situation and the task is apparently a straight test of comprehension 
of implication. The conditional verification task is also simpler than 
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the standard Piagetian hypothesis testing tasks in that it only 
includes implication relationships and not any of the other possible 
propositional relationships including disjunction, conjunction, 
equivalence (biconditional), complete affirmation etc. 
To substantiate her claim that the conditional reasoning problem is a 
formal operational task Kuhn compared her subjects' performance on 
this problem with their performance on another reasoning problem said 
to require formal operational thinking - the isolation and testing of 
variables problem developed by Kuhn and Brannock (1977) and Kuhn and 
Angelev (1976). Kuhn found that subjects rarely showed correct 
reason on the conditional verification problem (Kuhn's conditional 
reasoning task) before they reached the formal level on the isolation 
of variables problem, a finding which she interpreted as supporting 
her claim that the conditional verification problem requires formal 
operational thinking. 
It is interesting however to note the conclusions of Roberge and 
Flexer (1980) in a similar comparison of performance on propositional 
logic tasks and a control of variables task: 
"the acquisition of propositional logic prior to the ability to 
control variables is congruent with Inhelder and Piaget's contention 
that the acquisition of propositional logic is a prerequisite to the 
complete mastery of the controlling variables procedure." (p. 9). 
In both studies significant correlations were found between 
performance on the control of variables task and the propositional 
verification task for grade 6 (around 12 years) and grade 8 (around 14 
years) subjects but the putative order of acquisition of the skillp 
was different in these studies with Kuhn claiming that acquisition of 
the isolation of variables procedure predates conditional verification 
ability and Roberge and Flexer claiming that the ability to verify 
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connected propositions is acquired prior to the ability to isolate and 
test variables. It appears that the contradictory conclusions 
concerning developmental priority are attributable to the nature of 
the specific items used in the tasks. Roberge and rlexer included the 
propositional relations biconditional and inclusive and exclusive 
Jisjunction as well as the conditional in their verification task 
while Kuhn only included the conditional. It is well established that 
biconditiona,l and disjunctive relations are easier to comprehend and 
are dealt with at an earlier age than the conditional (Shine and 
L'alsh, 1971; Suppes and Feldman, 1971; Paris, 1973; Sternberg, 1979). 
Consequently performance on Roberge and Flexer's propositional 
verification task would be predicted to be better than that on Kuhn's 
conditional verification task. In addition it seems that the control 
of variables procedure used by Roberge and Flexer was particularly 
difficult: only 15% and 35% respectively of grade h 
and grade 8 students respectively were classified as formal on this 
task. The major difficulty seemed to be in simply understanding the 
requirements of the task. Leaving aside the question of the order of 
acquisition of the ability to perform the tasks the correlations 
between the tasks in both studies are interpreted as indicating that 
similar subsets of cognitive abilities are implicated in correct 
solution of the two tasks. 
It is not obvious that aget would have regarded Kuhn's "conditional 
reasoning task" as a test of formal operational thinking. It was 
pointed out in Chapter 1 that it is difficult to derive from Piaget's 
theory unambiguous predictions concerning the verbal deductive 
reasoning abilities typical of subjects at different operational 
stages. Piaget claimed that the major identifying feature of formal 
operational thought is the ability to deal with hypotheses instead of 
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only with objects (Piaget, 1972, p. 47) although it is not obvious 
from his theory exactly what it is that makes hypothesis testing a 
formal operational ability. It is not clear whether it is the ability 
to formulate and test hypotheses or the ability to understand a 
particular propositional relationship as corresponding to a particular 
combination that is the hallmark of formal. thinking. If it is the 
interpretation of empirical evidence as corresponding to a particular 
propositional relationship which is essentially formal operational 
then correct response on the conditional verification task would 
require formal operational thinking. However if it is the formulation 
and testing of hypotheses which is formal operational then the 
conditional verification task would not necessarily require formal 
operational thought. 
There is a further ambiguity concerning whether the interpretation of 
empirical evidence in terms of propositional relationships should be 
regarded as a formal operational ability. On the one hand Piaget 
argues that the combinatorial system enables the formal operational 
subject to understand propositional relationships as corresponding to 
particular combinations of elements or "base associations". On the 
other hand he argues that concrete operational subjects can reason 
with propositions provided these correspond to "sufficiently concrete 
representations". If the concrete operational subject can reason with 
such propositions he should surely be able to say whether they are 
true or false with respect to "concrete representations". It is not 
clear whether Piaget (1972) is suggesting that the ability to verify 
hypotheses against concrete empirical data is a concrete or formal 
operational ability: 
"hypotheses, not being objects, are propositions and their content 
t 1 3 
consists in intrapropositional operations of classes, relations, etc., 
which can be verified directly; the same is true of the consequences 
derived from them." (p. 47) 
The intrapropositional operations of classes and relations are the 
operations available to the subject at concrete operations and 
consequently this statement might be interpreted as saying that the 
ability to verify propositions is a concrete operational ability. 
However Piaget's theory is generally understoOdnas entailing that the 
interpretation of empirical information as corresponding to a 
particular propositional relation is a formal operational ability. As 
we have seen the data from Kuhn's "conditional reasoning" experiment 
suggest that conditional verification is indeed a formal operational 
ability. 
Kuhn does not discuss the class inclusion analogue of the conditional 
verification problem but it is likely that, like Piaget, she would 
regard it as a concrete operational ability. The class inclusion 
analogue of the conditional verification problem was discussed in 
Chapter 2. The ability to verify class statements such as "All A are. 
B" was said to depend upon. the classification operations typical of 
concrete operations. Presumably 
concrete operational subjects can verify statements like 
"All A are B" provided such statements correspond to "sufficiently 
concrete representations". In the verification task the subject is 
presented with an empirical array against which to verify the 
statement. 
Although the proposal that while the class verification task is a 
concrete operational task the conditional verification task is a 
formal operational task is congruent with Piaget's theory, Inhelder 
13q 
and Piaget rejected the linu,uistic criterion for determining a 
subject's operational level and maintained that the subject's 
linguistic comprehension is constrained by the cognitive operations 
available to the subject rather than the linguistic expression of a 
relationship. This position might be understood as entailing that 
concrete operational subjects could understand the conditional in 
terms of the corresponding concrete classification operations. In "fact 
Kuhn's data indicated that this was not the cake! 
Propositional theories of verification which propose that verification 
is a function of propositional structure (logical form) would predict 
no difference in the verification of class and general conditional 
statements since these statements have the sane logical form, viz 
x(A3e-Cx). 
The hypotheses considered in experiment 1 to explain errors in 
verifying universal affirmative propositions can be extended to make 
predictions about performance on E and N type class statements. The 
class logic analogues of the conditional statements in Table 3.1 are 
shown in Table 3.2 along with the appropriate code and response 
patterns for different interpretations of the class statement. The 
class inclusion interpretation corresponds to the conditional; 
a\so 5110wi'l ave, 
equivalence to the biconditional;f"structure neutral" CtrIci the 
Istev\ear? Ort!)-5 
conjunctive \another possible interpretation of the class inclusion , 
statement is the conversion interpretation under which only B type 
statements would be classified as true and the rest false. 
Since no elements with the attributes mentioned are present in the 
picture for N type statements all hypotheses would predict that 
subjects at all ages would find it easy to classify N type statements 
as false. 
Kip 
The structure neutral hypothesis would predict that there would be no 
difference in performance on E and B type class statements and 
performance on these statements would be good at all ages. This is 
because any elements which do not have the attributes p.q are 
counterexamples to the structure neutral interpretation of "All P are 
Q" as "Everything is p and q". As before performance on T type 
statements would be predicted to be poor for younger subjects and 
improve significantly with age. 
The r.Q.P hypothesis and the Chapmans' conversion hypothesis which 
made the same predictions as Ducci's S.U. hypothesis concerning T and 
E type statements differ from the S,11. hypothesis in predicting 
superior performance on E type over i type statements. According to 
the F.Q.P. hypothesis, in interpreting e.g. "All the small insects are 
striped." the subject is trying to establish whether the small insects 
are co-extensive with the striped insects. For E type statements both 
big, striped insects and small, black insects are counterexamples to 
this, while for the n type statements "All the small insects are 
black." only small, striped insects falsify the statement. 
Eevlin and Leirer's conversion hypothesis, which predicted no 
difference in correct response to T and B type statements, predicts a 
lower error rate on E type statements compared with B and T type 
statements since on conversion an E type (false) statement becomes 
another E type (false) statement while conversion of a T or a B type 
statement changes its truth value. 
Experiment 2 was designed to compare the performance of subjects over 
the age range from the onset of concrete operational thinking to well 
into formal operations on the verification of universally quantified 
and conditional sentences. The conditional verification procedure was 
a replication of Kuhn's "conditional reasoning" task. From the 
contrasting results of the previous studies of the verification of 
class and conditional statements it seemed likely that the younger 
children at least would respond in different ways on the conditional 
and class verification tasks. 
1 ca 
GENERAL PROCEDURE 17C. 7 2 ND 6 
Since the same subjects performed on the tasks reported in experiments 
2, 3, 5 and 6 the subjects used and the general procedure used in 
presenting the tasks are described here. 
SUBJECTS 
192 children. took part in the study: 32 from each of primary grades 2, 
4 and 6 from an Edinburgh primary school and 32 from each of the 1st, 
3rd. and 5th, years of an Edinburgh secondary school. The mean ages 
and age ranges were as follows: 6 years 5 months (6 year 0 months to 6 
years 10 months), 8 years 6 months (8 years 1 month to 3 years 10 
months), 10 years 6 months (10 years O month to 10 years 11 months);- 
12 years 8 months (12 years 0 months to 13 years 2 months), 15 years 1 
month (14 years 3 months to 15 years 9 months) 17 years 1 month (16 
years 7 months to 17 years 11 months). The primary school was a feeder 
primary for the secondary school. Half the subjects were boys and half 
were girls. Primary school subjects were randomly selected by class 
teachers and secondary school subjects by the deputy head master as 
being of average to above average ability. 
TASKS AND DESIGN 
The sentence verification task (EXPERIMENT 2) was presented along with 
the picture verification task (EXPERIMENT 3), the evaluation task 
(EXPERIMENT 5) and the syllogistic reasoning task (EXPERIMENT 6) in 
order to assess how subjects performed on a variety of tasks involving 
the comprehension of and reasoning with class and conditional 
143 
sentences. Each subject was presented with all four tasks. The results 
of experiments 2 and 3 are discussed in Chapter 3; experiment 5 is 
discussed in Chapter 5 and experiment 6 in Chapter 6. 
All four tasks involved the same kinds of statement - class statements 
of the type "All A are B" and the logically equivalent general 
conditional statements of the type "If x is an A then x is a B" but 
the requirements of the task differed. Similar content of two 
different kinds - insects and shapes - was used in all four tasks. 
Since there were four tasks and four combinations of linguistic form 
and content, subjects were given a different linguistic.., form /content 
combination on each task. Since performance on the evaluation and 
syllogism tasks was to be compared, subjects were given statements of 
the same linguistic form in the evaluation and syllogism tasks. 
Linguistic form on the verification tasks for any subject was also the 
same. 
Although presenting factorial combinations of content, task and 
presentation order would minimise the effects of order of 
presentation, performance on the verification task was to be compared 
with performance on Kuhn's conditional verification task and 
experiment 1 and this task was always presented prior to the picture 
verification task. The evaluation task was always presented before the 
syllogism task since P,arcus and Rips (1979) have shown that, for 
adults at least, presentation of the evaluation task prior to that 
syllogism task does not affect response on the syllogism task. 
Consequently tasks were presented in two different orders. These were 
either 1) sentence verification, 2) picture verification, 3) 
evaluation and 4) syllogism or 3) evaluation, 4) syllogism, 1) 
sentence verification and 2) picture verification. In order to 
minimise any influence of the evaluation task on the syllogism task 
the content of the problem for a particular subject was changed from 
the evaluation task to the syllogism task. Although there are problems 
in using the same subjects in different tasks, analysis of 
presentation order of the tasks would determine whether prior 
presentation of the empirical verification tasks influenced 
performance on the reasoning tasks (evaluation and syllogism tasks) 
and vice versa. 
PROCEDURE 
Subjects were seen individually in a quiet room. The session lasted 
about 30 minutes for the younger children and about 20 minutes for the 
older children. Subjects were told that they were going to answer some 
problems which, although not difficult, could be a bit tricky and they 
would require he subject to think carefully before responding. It was 
hoped that this would dissuade the subjects from adopting 
oversimplistic strategies. Subjects were asked some preliminary 
questions in order to establish that they knew what true and false 
meant: some of the younger subjects preferred to use "right" and 
"wrong" and were encouraged to use these responses instead. Four 
practice items were presented: two sentences which were to be 
evaluated as true or false with respect to a picture and two sentences 
which were to be evaluated as true or false in the absence of a 
picture. The four tasks were then presented to the subject. 
Kf 
EXPE=UT 2 
THE SENTENCE VERIFICATION TASK 
METHOD 
The task was similar to Kuhns (1977) 'conditional reasoning task but 
involved the verification of either class or conditional sentences and 
was presented by means of two different_oontent vehicles, either 
insects or shapes. 
The subject was presented with a picture of three different kinds of 
insect (or shapes) - big striped insects (pq), small striped insects 
(-Pq) and snail black insects (-p-q): there were three insects of the 
three different kinds making nine in all. The relationship between the 
stimulus attributes, size and marking, was thus an implication 
relation such that big (p) implied striped (q) or black (-q) implied 
small (-p). 
In order to provide a context for the problem a short story was read 
which also contained the task instructions. The story for the insect 
problem was as follows (that for the shape problem is in Appendix A): 
"One day when Ur. Jones was in his garden he noticed lots of insects. 
e watched carefully and saw three different kinds of insect. This is 
what they looked like...(PICTURE PRESENTED). .Later he was telling a 
friend about the insects. Uhich of the following sentences that 'irs 
Jones night say about the insects he saw in his garden are true and 
which are false?" 
The subject was then presented with the eight sentences which 
represented all the possible implication relations between size and 
marking. The sentences were the same as those in Tables 3.1 and 3.2 
except that the word 'insects' was substituted for the word 'bugs'. 
Each sentence was printed in large letters on separate cards which 
were presented to the subject one at a time in random order. The 
subject's task was to say, for each card, whether the sentence on the 
card was true or false with respect to the picture. The subject was 
encouraged to read each sentence aloud and to examine the picture 
carefully before responding. Half of the subjects were given class 
statements like "In my garden all the big insects are striped " and 
half were given the logically equivalent conditional statements like 
"In my garden if an insect is big it is striped. ". Linguistic form and 
content were combined factorially and subjects were assigned to groups 
in the way described in the general procedure. 
RESULTS 
In the original analysis content (shapes /insects) was included as a 
factor and the data were dichotomous. Lunney (1970) has shown that 
analysis of variance can be validly applied to dichotomous data 
provided there are sufficient degrees of freedom for error. (at least 
20). Since this criterion was met an analysis of variance was applied 
to the data. 
There was no main effect of content and no interaction of content with 
any other factor was significant. Consequently the analysis with . 
content as a factor is not reported and further analysis was performed 
excluding this factor. 
Table 3.3 shows mean percent correct response to the different 
statement types, T, N, E and B for the two different linguistic forms, 
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FIGURE 3:2a 
PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSES TO THE DIFFERENT STATEMENT TYPES (T,N,E,B) 
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FIGURE 3:2b 
PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSES TO THE DIFFERENT STATEMENT TYPES (T,N,E,B) 






represented graphically in Figures 3.2a and 3.2b. The results of a 6 
(grade) X 2 (linguistic form) X 4 (statement type) analysis of 
variance with grade and linguistic form as between subjects factors 
and statement type as a within subjects factor are shown in Table 3.4. 
All factors and interactions were significant. The significant effect 
of grade, F(5,180)=19.05, p(0.001, was mainly attributable to the 
superior performance of secondary compared with primary subjects. The 
significant main effect of linguistic form, F(1,180)=63.66, p4.0.001, 
showed that overall class statements (88% correct) were responded to 
better than conditional statements (71% correct). The significant 
effect of statement type, F(3,540)=73.24, p 4. 0.001, showed that 
performance on some statement types is better than that on others: 
specifically the order of difficulty with the easiest first was 
N T E B. The grade X linguistic form interaction, F(1,180)=3.09, 
p(0.05, indicated that the effect of linguistic form was significantly 
greater at some grades than others. The highly significant linguistic 
form X statement type interaction, F(15,540)=22.65, p<0.001, reflected 
the fact that the superior performance on class statements was almost 
entirely attributable to the superior performance on E and B type 
class statements. The grade by statement type interaction, 
F(15,540)=7.73, p<9.001, indicated that the general difficulty with B 
and E type statements relative to N and T type statements was much 
greater for the younger subjects i.e. up to Si than for the older 
subjects, S3 and 55. The grade X linguistic form X statement type 
interaction, F(15,540)=2.52, p0.005, indicated that the difficulty 
young subjects had with B and E type statements was greater forconditiono( 
statements than for c1te5 statements. 
To test the simple main effects of linguistic form at grade(i), the F 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































footnote 3.1). The results of this analysis are shown in Table 3.4a. 
Significant F ratios, calculated against degrees of freedom (1, 180), 
were found at all primary grades and at first year secondary but not 
at third and fifth year. secondary. 
To test the simple interaction of linguistic form by statement type 
the F ratio has the form F =NS(bc at a(i)) /MS(error at abc). Table 3.4b 
shows that the interaction was significant at all primary grades and 
at first year secondary but not at third or fifth year secondary. The 
significant linguistic form by statement type interaction indicates 
that different patterns of response were given on the class and 
conditional verification problems at least for subjects up to first 
year secondary. Further analysis was performed separately on the data 
from class and conditional statements. 
VERIFICATION OF CLASS STATEMENTS 
RESULTS 
A 6 (grade) X 4 (statement type) analysis of variance with grade as a 
between subjects factor and statement type as a within subjects factor 
was carried out on correct response on class statements as a 
preliminary to analysing simple effects (see Table 3.5). Both factors, 
grade F(5,90) =5.10, p 60.001, and statement type F(3,270)= 14.13, 
p<O.001, and the grade by statement type interaction, F(15,270) =2.76, 
p(0.005, were significant. 
Tests of simple interactions were carried out on adjacent grades 
(Bruning and Kintz, 1968, p.120). Only the comparison between P6 and 
S1 was significant, F(3,270) =2.95, p <O.05 (see Table 3.5a). However it 



























































































































































































































































































































TESTS OF SIMPLE INTERACTIONS FOR GRADE X STATEMENT TYPE INTERACTIONS 
FOR CLASS STATEMENTS: F VALUES AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS FOR BETWEEN 
GRADE COMPARISONS 
P2 P4 P6 S1 S3 S5 
P2 - 
P4 0.279 - 
ns 
P6 1.631 1.824 - 
ns ns 
S1 7.684 6.947 2.952 
p40.001 p40.001 p<0.O5 
53 2.059 2.715 0.107 2.283 
ns p4.0.05 ns ns 
S5 4.955 4.378 1.112 0.454 0.781 - 






















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































year secondary subjects who performed even better than third and fifth 
year secondary subjects on this task. Non-adjacent comparisons 
revealed no significant primary/primary or secondary/secondary 
comparisons and the comparisons between P6 and 33 and between P6 and 
55 subjects were not significant although all other primary/secondary 
comparisons were significant. 
To test the simple main effect of statement type the F ratio has the 
form (Winer, 1971, p.529), F=MS(statement type at grade(i))/US(error 
between subjects). The effect of statement type was significant for 
all primary grades but for no secondary grades (see Table 3.5b). 
The F ratio for the test on simple main effects of grade has the form 
F=MS(grade at statement type(i))/MS(within cell) (Winer, 1971, p.529) 
and was calculated against df=(5,329) (See Footnote 3.2). Significant 
F ratios were found for B type, F(5,329)=8.05, 10(0.01, and E type, 
F(5,329)=4.98, p(0.001, statements but not for T or N type statements 
(See Table 3.5c). 
Newman Keuls comparisons on the means for the different statement 
types collapsed across grade were carried out (see Table 3.5d). Means 
for T and E type statements were the same but all other comparisons 
were significant. Although the means for T and E type statements 
collapsed across grade were similar the significant main effect of 
grade for E type but not for T type statements reflects the fact that 
performance on E type statements was poorer for primary subjects. 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS 
The data were also examined in terms of the individual subjects' 
patterns of response to all eight statements in order to discover 
/6 o 
wbether subjects adopted consistent interpretations of the quantifiect 
statements and, if so, whether the interpretation adopted changed with 
age. The systematic interpretations considered were the 
conjunctive , equivalence (biconditional) and class inclusion 
(conditional) interpretations (see Table 3.b). A modified 
classification of response pattern data was also carried out in which 
subjects responding to a particular interpretation except for one 
error were classified under that response pattern. The modified 
cel4i 
classification will be discussedi) where it differs from the 
standard classification. 
From Table 3.6 it can be seen that the only systematic response 
pattern adopted with any regularity was the correct one - the class 
inclusion pattern: overall 547: of response patterns were of this kind. 
Some subjects at all grades responded according to this pattern and 
although there was an increase in the number of correct response 
patterns with increasing age there were no significant comparisons of 
response pattern distributions even for the P2/S1 comparison. An 
analysis of response consistency across grade showed that only for the 
modified response pattern classification was there a significant 
increase in consistency of response with increase in agel!(5)=27.08, 
p<0.0001. 
Very few response patterns were c-0.-`itve__- -only 3Z -and there 
were no equivalence interpretations of the class inclusion statement. 
In short errors made in verifying class statements were apparently not 





CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS 
CLASS 
TiICOND CONO INCONSISTENT GRADE CONJ 
P2 1 0 6 9 
P4 2 0 5 9 
P6 0 0 7 9 
Si. 0 0 12 4 
S3 0 0 10 (6 
85 0 0 12 »4 
TOTAL 3 0 52 41 
CONDITIONAL 
BICOND CONI) INCONSISTENT GRADE CONJ 
P2 8 0 0 8 
P4 8 1 0 7 
P6 7 2 0 7 
81 3 1 2 10 
S3 I 0 8 7 
85 0 0 9 7 
TOTAL 27 4 19 46 
TOTAL 
BICOND CONO INCONSISTENT GRADE COD.] 
P2 9 0 6 16 
P4 10 1 5 16 
P6 7 2 7 16 
SI 3 1 14 14 
83 1 0 18 14 
35 0 0 21 11 
TOTAL 30 4 71 87 
(61 
The results of experiment 2 showed that primary school children 
perform well on the verification task with universally quantified 
sentences with even P2 children (mean age 6.5 years) correct on 81% of 
items overall. The response pattern classification indicated that the 
errors which the primary children did make were not attributable to 
any particular systematic misinterpretation of the class stat6ments 
although the statement type analysis showed that more errors are made 
on some statement types than others: 98% of IN type statements, 88% of 
both T and E type statements and 76% of B type statements were 
verified correctly. 
If the absence of a simple main effect of statement type is taken as 
an index of mature performance on the task then only at S1 do subjects 
perform maturely. However the nonsignificarice of the P6/S3 and P6/S5 
comparisons on the tests of simple interactions for the statement type 
analysis indicated that P6 subjects (average age 10.5 years) perform 
very well on the task. 
The statement type analysis showed that the subjects made the highest 
number of errors on B type statements and the significance of the 
simple main effects analysis of grade for only 15 and E type statements 
showed that the improvement in performance with increasing age was 
attributable only to improvement with these statement types. Although 
the mean correct response to T type statements was exactly the same as 
for E type statements the absence of a simple main effect of grade for 
T type statements showed that errors on T type statements were 
distributed across all age groups whereas errors on E type statements 
were made mainly by primary school subjects. 
While the results of experiment 1, in which subjects responded 
¡'73 
correctly to the same number of true (T type) and false (B type) 
statements, did not support Ducats structure neutral hypothesis, the 
results of experiment 2 are exactly the opposite of those predicted by 
Bucci. The S.N. hypothesis would have predicted no significant 
difference in correct response to false items (B and E type 
statements) with increasing age but a significant increase in correct 
response to true items (T type) with increasing age. In experiment 2 
there was no significant increase in correct response to T type 
statements but there was a significant increase in correct response to 
both B and E type statements, In addition the response pattern 
analysis showed that only 3 subjects over all responded according to 
the structure neutral response pattern. 
Both Piaget's P.Q.P. hypothesis and the Chapman's conversion 
41(.95e, of- 
hypothesis made similar (incorrect) predictions tornirci concerning 
response on T and B type statements. Both hypotheses correctly 
predicted however the superior performance on E type over B type items 
since two different kinds of element from the picture falsified an E 
type statement but only one kind of element falsified a B type 
statement. 
Uhile the results of experiment I were compatible with Revlin and 
Leirer's conversion hypothesis the superior performance on T type 
over B type statements in experiment 2 was not. Revlin and Leirer's 
conversion hypothesis, along with the Chapmans' and the F.Q.P. 
hypotheses, did however predict the superior performance on E over B 
type statements. 
Just (1974) describes a task very similar to the class verification 
task of experiment 2 in which adults rather than children were 
required to verify quantified. statements with respect to pictures 
16Lf 
depicting different kinds of relationship between the subject and 
predicate of a sentence: the relations included subset, superset, 
disjoint, overlap and identity. Just considered two models, the 
comparison model and the computation model, which correctly predicted 
some, but not all, response latencies and error rates on this 
sentence/picture verification task. It is of interest to consider 
whether either of these models could explain the errors in experiMents 
1 and 2 and, more generally, whether these models are appropriate as 
models of children's thinking. 
Slightly different versions of the general comparison model were 
developed by Trabasso et al (1971), Clark and Chase (1972) and 
Carpenter and Just (1973) but they all comprised four basic stages as 
shown in Figure 3.3a. 
At STAGE 1 the information from the sentence is encoded. The 
representation of information is held to be in a propositional format. 
In Just's notation, for instance, the sentence "All A are B" would be 
represented as Aff(A1l(Aff(A is a 
At STAGE 2 the information from the picture is encoded. The 
information from the picture is represented in a similar, i.e. 
propositional, format to the sentence and when the picture follows the 
sentence the information encoded from the picture depends on the 
sentence representation. A picture depicting a subset relation between 
A and B would have the same representation as the class inclusion 
statement "All A are B" viz Aff(A1l(Aff(A is a B))); a superset 
relation would be represented as Neg(All(Aff(A is a B))); an overlap 
relation would be given the same representation as a superset 
relation; a picture depicting a disjoint relation between A and B 
would be represented as Aff(A1l(Neg(A is a B))). 
FIGURE 3.3a 
4 -STAGE MODEL OF SENTENCE /PICTURE COMPARISON 
ENCODE SENTEtiCE 
STAGE 2 Er cobE PICTuQE 
STA 6E 3 
STAGE L. 
i 
CoMPARE SEnfiEticE AND PGTuRE 
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STAGE 3 is the comparison stage, the central component of the 
comparison model. Figure 3.3b shows the sequence of operations in the 
comparison stage. Sentence and picture representations are in a 
similar format and are compared by matching corresponding constituents 
of the two representations starting with the most embedded 
constituents and proceeding until a mismatch is found or until all 
constituents have been compared. In verifying "All A are B" against a 
picture depicting a superset or an overlap relation between A and B 
all constituents would have to be compared since a mismatch only 
occurs on the outermost constituents. Similarly in verifying a subset 
relation all constituents would have to be compared in order to 
establish that there was no mismatch. A mismatch on the innermost 
constituents would occur in verifying the class inclusion statement 
against a disjoint picture. Since difficulty of verification, as 
measured by response latencies or error rates, is dependent upon the 
number of comparisons required, subset, superset and overlap 
verifications would be predicted to have the same error rates while 
disjoint verifications would be predicted to have a very low error 
rate. 
STAGE 4 is the decision/response stage. 
The set relations used in experiment 2 which were coded T, B, E and N, 
were essentially similar to Just's subset, superset, overlap and 
disjoint relations respectively. They differed in that the picture in 
experiment 2 showed three different kinds of element rather than the 
two used by Just (except in his overlap relation which obviously 
included three elements). The picture corresponding to the true 
statement "All the round shapes are red" for instance would show red 
circles, red squares and blue squares whereas Just's subset relation 
l67 
would simply show red circles and red squares. However the 
representation of information from the picture is held to depend upon 
the representation of information from the sentence and this would 
concern only the subject and predicate terms, which in the case of the 
sentence above would be round shapes and red shapes. 
The constituent comparison model would predict few errors on N type 
statements (disjoint relationships) since innermost constituents 
mismatch and no further processing is required. Higher error rates 
would be predicted for T, E, and B type statements: since these 
require similar amounts of processing the error rates on these three 
statements would be predicted to be the same although it seems 
reasonable to suppose that more errors on B-type and E-type statements 
would occur than on 7-type statements because subjects night not be 
sufficiently rigorous in comparine all constituents. If subjects 
failed to compare all constituents an incorrect 'true' response would 
he given for D-type and E-type statements while a similar lack of 
rieour in comparison of constituents on the true (T-type) statement 
would still result in a correct 'true' response. The comparison model 
does not account for the higher levels of correct response on T type 
compared with D type statements nor for the higher levels of correct 
response on E type compared with P type statements since B and E type 
statements have the same representation in the comparison model. 
The attraction of the comparison model of sentence-picture 
verification is that the kinds of operations proposed are the same 
kinds of operations as those proposed to explain results in other 
kinds of deductive reasoning tasks, linguistic-based tasks, e.g. 
semantic memory tasks, and general sentence comprehension tasks. There 
is a lot of evidence to support the assumption that verification tasks 
are essentially linguistic tasks in which verification times depend 
upon the extent of propositional embedding in a sentence. This has 
been shown to be true with sentences expressing many different types 
of semantic relation, including quantifiers (Just and Carpenter, 1971; 
Just,1974), passives (Gough, 1966), and counterfactuals (Carpenter, 
1973). In addition. sentence verification latencies have been found to 
correlate relatively well with measures of general verbal 
comprehension (Hunt, 1981). 
Despite the success of the constituent comparison model in explaining 
the results of many verification studies with adult subjects Just 
found that the model could not account for some of the effects 
observed in his experiment. He found for instance that factors 
relating to the presentation of the task differentially affected 
response times and error rates in verifying superset (B type)and 
subset (T type) relations. Specifically he found that error rates and 
latencies on subset and superset relations could be changed by 
altering the stimulus and response probabilities. Whe'nel the 
we:eoctQrk14 
probability of a subset relation (i.e. a true statement)?the latency 
and error rate associated with a true response was increased while the 
latency and. error rate associated with the superset relation (a false 
statement) was decreased. Just concedes that the comparison model 
cannot account for the changes in difficulty on the subset and 
superset relations brought about by changing stimulus and response 
probabilities. Given that this type of presentation factor influences 
the responses of adults on sentence verification tasks it seems likely 
that similar effects will be found with children's responses on 
verification. tasks. 
One of the differences between experiment 1 and experiment 2 was just 
/69 
such a change in stimulus and response probabilities: this was brought 
about by the inclusion in experiment 2 of the N and E type statements. 
In experiment l both stimulus and response probabilities were 
balanced: only two types of statement were used and the presentation 
of these statement types was balanced. Since the correct response to 
one of the statements was true and to the other false the response 
probability was also balanced. In experiment 2 four different types of 
statement were used and these were presented with an equal 
probability. Although the stimulus probability was balanced the 
response probability was not and a 'false' response was three times as 
likely as a 'true' response. In experiment 2 the decrease in 
probability of a true response was accompanied by an increase in 
correct response to T type statements (94% correct) relative to 
experiment 1 (70% correct) for primary 2 subjects (I'2 subjects were 
chosen for a comparison with experiment 1)» This contrasts with Just's 
results since he found that increasing the probability of a true 
(subset) statement increased correct response on that statement. It 
seems likely that these different effects of changing the stimulus and 
response probabilities are due to the ways in which. the probabilities 
were changed. In experiment 2 new kinds of sentence/picture 
relationships were introduced while in Just's task the same relations 
were presented more or less frequently. It is likely that in 
experiment 2 where four different statement types were used the 
subjects may contrast the N type statements, for which a mismatch is 
found at an early stage in processing, with all other statement types. 
If a preliminary response was based upon a contrast between statements 
for which an early mismatch was found (false) and those for which no 
early mismatch was found (true) an increase in correct true responses 
to T type statements and incorrect true responses on B type statements 
170 
would be expected relative to experiment 1. In experiment 3 only 63% 
of B type responses for P2 subjects were correct compared with 70% in 
experiment 1. 
Neither the comparison model nor any of the other models considered 
can account for differential changes in error rates on particular 
kinds of statement brought about by changes in presentation of the 
task. Any theory which was to explain the superior performance on B 
type statements over T type statements found $y Bucci, the similar 
error rates on B and T type statements found in experiment 1 and the 
superior performance on T type over B type statements in experiment 2 
would have to be very flexible. 
Another model which Just (1974) extended to the domain of verification 
of quantified sentences was the computation model. This model is 
possibly more appropriate as a model of verification for younger 
children since it does not presuppose, as the comparison model does, 
that information from sentence and picture is encoded in a 
propositional format. 
The computation model has 2 stages (Figure 34). At stage 1 a decision 
As made as to whether the subject (S) intersects the predicate (P) 
i.e. whether the subject and predicate have any elements in common. A 
NO response at this stage (an N type statement) would be relatively 
fast and error free. The low error rate on N type statements in 
experiment 2 accords with this prediction. A YES response at this 
stage would indicate that further processing is required to determine 
the exact nature of the relationship between S and P. At stage 2 a 
decision is made concerning whether S is a subset of P. If S is a 
subset of P (i.e. a T type statement) a true response would be made, 
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statement) a false response would be made. Decisions requiring stage 2 
processing (T, E and I type statements) would. be predicted to take 
longer or have more errors than those not requiring stage 2 processing 
(N type statements). So far the model does not make very interesting 
predictions limever if it is assumed that subjects sometimes fail to 
execute stage 2 processing, responding prematurely after stage 1, it 
is evident that more errors would be predicted on B and E type 
statements compared with T type statements since the response given 
after stage I on these statements would be an incorrect 'true' 
response. Premature response after stage 1 on a. 7 type statement would 
still result in a correct 'true' response. The primary children in 
experiment 2 did indeed make more errors on. Fs type (64% correct 
averaged over P2, P4 and P6) and E type (77% correct) statements than 
on. T type statements (87% correct). In experiment I stage 1 is 
unnecessary since only B and T type statements were included. S always 
intersected F and the greater number of errors on B type statements 
relative to T type statements caused by premature response would not 
he predicted and was not found (70Z correct on both Í and T type 
statements). The computation model can explain the effects of changing 
stimulus/response probabilities in experiments 1 and 2 in terms of the 
extra stage in processing reouired in experiment 2. 
The 1115elihood of an erroneous response at stage 2 was just as high for 
B as for T type statements. The higher error rate on B over E type 
statements on experiment 2 could be explained in terms of the 
computation model as due to the higher likelihood of an incorrect 
assessment of whether S is a subset of 1 for B type statements than E 
type statements. 
Uhile Bucci's structure neutral hypothesis was not supported by the 
experimental evidence of either experiments 1 or 2 Bucci's own data 
indicate that certain subjects in certain situations do adopt a 
sentence representation in which the relation between S and P is not 
clearly represented. In a representation of the type Bucci proposes, 
(All)(S)(P), the appropriate decision to make is not whether S is a 
subset of P, or whether S intersects P, or even whether S is 
equivalent to P but whether all relevant elements are both S and 'P, 
It is interesting to consider a proposal of Revlin and Leirer's (1979) 
in attemping to explain the diverse results of the studies on the 
verification of quantified sentences. They suggest that in 
comprehending a sentence such as "All A are B" the subject constructs 
a "meaning stack" consisting of increasingly complex levels of meaning 
built up by progressive extraction of elementary features of the 
sentence from orthographic through phonological and syntactic 
features. Successively higher levels of the stack correspond to more 
recently derived meanings. Figure 3.57shows the meaning stack which 
Revlin and Leirer proposed for the universally quantified sentence 
"All A are B". According to Revlin and Leirer the topmost level of the 
stack is the converted meaning of the universally quantified 
statement. Revlin and Leirer's conversion hypothesis seems to be quite 
implausible since, as the meaning stack shows, the correct inclusion 
interpretation of the sentence has to be derived before the converted 
inclusion interpretation can be derived. It is not this aspect of 
their theory which is of interest here however: it is their account of 
comprehension in terms of a meaning stack and especially their claim 
that progressively higher levels of the stack reflect not just a 
temporal processing sequence but also a developmental sequence. For 
the younger child the topmost level in his meaning stack might be 
similar to that described by Bucci as the structure neutral 
FIGURE 3.6' 
MEANING STACK FOR UNIVERSALLY QUANTIFIED STATEMENT "ALL A ARE B" 
Í 
STACK LEVEL SENTENCE CODE 
N QUANTIFIER(PREDICATE(PREDICATE IS A SUBJECT)) 
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interpretation. The topmost level would become increasingly complex as 
the subject was able to extract a meaning which was more logically 
correct. It seems reasonable to propose that the same subject may 
access different levels of the meaning stack depending on the nature 
of the task, the content of the task, the effort the subject puts into 
solving the task and other factors. It seems likely for instance that 
a higher level in the stack would be accessed in a task involving 
concrete content since the concrete content would provide concrete 
referents either in the sense of physically present referents for the 
linguistic terms or in the sense of concrete /familiar linguistic 
terms. It also seems plausible that in certain. situations pragmatic 
factors associated with the task will induce a lower level 
representation of the sentence. In one task - a "Block Building" 
task - Bucci found that even adults could be induced to adopt a 
"structure neutral" interpretation of a universally quantified 
statement and would use only big yellow bricks when instructed to make 
a building in which "All the big bricks are yellow. ". 
Stedmot1 (1982) drew a distinction between tasks which involve an 
understanding of the intensional aspects of quantification and those 
which involve an understanding of the extensional aspects of 
quantification. She argues that many class inclusion problems involve 
comprehension of an intensional logic relationship and that this kind 
of relationship is understood at an earlier age than an extensional 
logic relationship. An example of the former kind of problem would 
be asking the child as in the standard Piagetian class inclusion 
problem "Are all roses flowers ?" or "Are there more flowers or more 
primroses ? ". Although the latter type of problem could be solved by 
examining the relevant set of flowers, the correct response can be 
derived in the absence of an extensional array of flowers by a subject 
(76 
who understands the intensional class inclusion relationship of the 
set of primroses included in the set of flowers. Stedman argues that 
understanding quantifiers in an extensional context requires not so 
much comprehension of class inclusion but rather comprehension of the 
extent of the domain of reference that is intended by the quantifier 
and that this interpretation of the scope of a quantifier can be shown 
to depend upon psychological, semantic and discourse factors. Children 
are undoubtedly easily misled in understanding the intended scope of 
quantifiers in extensional situations by various factors including 
those discussed in Chapter 2 - perceptual and conceptual salience. 
Presumably Stedman regards intensional tasks as easier than 
extensional tasks because the intended scope of the quantifier is 
unambiguous in an intensional task: "All roses" would mean just that 
i.e. every single rose. 
Stedmon's claim that the intensional asects of class inclusion are 
understood prior to the extensional aspects would seem to run counter 
to Piagetian theory which would claim that tasks which require an 
extensional understanding of the quantifier, i.e. concrete tasks, 
would be solved at an earlier age than intensional tasks which would 
seem to require an understanding of the logic of class inclusion 
rather than the empirical fact of one class included in another. 
Narkman (1978) makes a claim which runs counter to Stedmon's.She 
argues that although correct response on the standard kind of 
Piagetian class inclusion problem has frequently been taken as an 
index that the subject has mastered logical class inclusion, this 
interpretation of the subjects' responses is unwarranted since many 
subjects in their initial solutions to the problem base their 
responses on the empirical facts about the inclusion relation rather 
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than an understanding of the logic of the inclusion relation. She 
argues in other words that the subjects can deal with the extensional 
aspect of inclusion prior to the intensional aspect. Markman would 
argue that for instance, in answering the question above: "Are there 
more flowers or more primroses?" the concrete operational subject 
would base his response on his empirical observation rather than 
deriving his response from consideration of the logical inclusion 
relation between flowers and primroses. Markman hypothesised that, in 
the absence of the empirical info Elation on which to base their 
responses, subjects who could respond correctly on the standard class 
inclusion task (concrete operational subjects) would have difficulty 
in working out the answers to problems requiring some manipulation of 
the logical inclusion relation in the absence of empirical information 
on which to base their response: in one such task the subject had to 
decide whether the class inclusion relationship still holds if some of 
the items from the superordinate set are removed while in another task 
subjects were asked whether they could make it so that there were more 
of the subordinate elements (e.g. chairs) than the superordinate 
elements (e.g. furniture). Markman found that many concrete 
operational subjects had difficulty with this problem and other 
similar problems, and The interpreted this as consistent with tun view 
that correct response on class inclusion problems does not entail that 
a subject understands the logic of class inclusion. 
The good performance of even the youngest subjects in the class 
verification problem (8O correct overall) might be understood as an 
indication that subjects at this age can understand the logic of class 
inclusion and consequently that they should be able to perform well on 
a variety of tasks requiring an understanding of the logic of class 
inclusion. However as Markman's results have shown the ability to 
17 
solve tasks involving class inclusion in the presence of an 
appropriate extensional situation does not Guarantee the ability to 
solve class inclusion tasks in the absence of empirical support. Good 
performance on the verification of universally quantified statements 
in an extensional situation does not necessarily entail that the 
subject fully understands the logic of quantificational inclusion. 
However Stedman on the other hand would presumably argue that the good 
performance on the verification task (an extensional task) would 
entail that subjects should have an understanding of the intensional 
aspects of inclusion. 
Smith (1979) presented evidence that subjects from 4 to 7 years can 
respond correctly on tasks requiring comprehension of quantified 
inclusion and tasks involving an understanding of the logical 
consequences of this relation. Smith's tasks included: 
(1) A quantified inclusion task: subjects were required to answer 
questions like: 
(a) Are all boys people? 
(b) Are all animals cats? 
(c) Are all spoons bumblebees? 
(2) Class and property inference tasks: subjects were required to 
answer questions such as: 
(a) A pug is a kind of dog (animal). Does a pug have to be an animal 
(cat)? (Class inference) 
(b) All flowers (roses) have stamens in them. 
Do all plants (flowers) have stamens in them. 
The items in the quantified inclusion task were like non-empirical 
l7c 
(intensional) analogue, of the universal affirmative propositions used 
in experiment 2. Rather than being verified empirically Smith's 
propositions were to be verified against knowledge in semantic memory. 
Questions like (a) corresponded to T type or subset relations, (b) to 
B type or superset relations and (c) to N type or disjoint relations 
respectively. E type or overlap relations were not included but would 
he something like "Are all women tories?". Stednon would predict that 
young subjects should perform well on problems of this type since they 
involve understanding of an intensional aspect of class inclusion. 
Markman, on the other hand, would predict poor performance since 
response cannot be based on examination of an extensional array. Smith 
found good performance on the task even by the nursery group (mean age 
4 years 8 months) with 82% correct. This high level of correct 
response provided some support for Stednon's view that intensional 
tasks are easier than extensional tasks. However performance was very 
susceptible to presentation factors. Specifically performance was 
substantially worse for a group who had previously verified a block of 
questions invojving the existential quantifier: in addition peformance 
was significantly worse on the second half of the blocks of questions. 
Errors seemed to occur either because subjects adopted the F.Q.F. type 
of interpretation and responded false to all three types of question 
since "all dogs are not all animals" or because subjects interpreted 
the quantifier as an existential quantifier and responded "Yes" to 
both subset and superset items and "No" on disjoint items. Smith 
argued that interpretation was initially determined by consideration 
of syntax hut, as with the extensional tasks, was not stable and was 
liable to be influenced by pragmatic factors particularly after 
prolonged questioning. The kinds of errors made in verifying 
universally quantified propositions from semantic memory were similar 
ugo 
to those made in verifiying universally quantified propositions 
against empirical arrays. 
Smith also found better performance on the inference tasks than. that 
usually found. but again performance was highly susceptible to the 
influence of pragmatic factors. 
VERIFICATION OF CONDITIONAL SENTENCES 
RESULTS 
A 6 (grade) X 4 (statement type) analysis of variance was carried out 
on correct response to conditional statements and the results of this 
analysis are shown in Table 3.7. Both factors, grade, F(5,90)=15.31, 
p0.001, and statement type, F(3,270)=66.60, p40.001, were significant 
and so was the grade X statement type interaction, F(15,270)=6.94, 
p(0.001. 
Comparisons of simple interactions on adjacent grades showed that only 
the P6/S1 comparison was significant, F(3,270)=4.44, p0.0( (Table 
3.7a). Comparisons of simple interactions on non-adjacent grades 
showed that no primary grade comparisons were significant and only the 
Sl/S5 secondary comparison, F(3,270)=2.79, 140.05, was significant 
while all primary/secondary comparisons were significant. 
The simple main effects analysis of statement type showed that 
statement type was significant at all primary grades and first year 
secondary but not at third or fifth year secondary (Table 3.7b). 
Tests of simple main effects of grade showed significant F ratios only 
for E type statements, F(5,357)=1_, , p(0.001, and B type statements, 
































































































































































































































































































































TESTS OF SINPLE INTERACTIONS F'OP, GRADE X STATI:NENT TYPE INTERACTIONS 







Hx. Tï-;EE N GRAp7, Cî fi.tl'Aá.tI:.=;t'iNS 
P6 Sl S3 55 
r°6 0.626 0.461 - 
ns ns 
S1 7.671 4.443 - 
3?40.001 p4.O.001 p40.01 
53 14.869 13.515 10.680 1.475 
pC0 . 001 p40.001 p<O. t)01 ns 
55 14.701 12.460 11.503 2.794 0.823 







































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































NEWMAN KEULS COMPARISONS ON STATEI LENT TYPE 
MEANS FOR CONDITIONAL STATEITENTS 
STATEMENT B E T N r s q(.95)(r,270) 
TYPE 0.948 1.083 1.667 1.979 s q(.99)(r,270) 
B - 0.135 0.719 1.031 4 0.160 
0.948 ns ** ** 0.211 
E - 0.584 03896 3 0.191 
1.083 ** ** 0.239 
T - 0.312 2 0.210 
1.667 ** 0.257 
(SS 
the Satterthwaite approximation) (Table 3.7c). 
Newman Keuls comparisons on means for statement types showed that all 
comparisons except that between E and E type statements were 
significant (see Table 3.7d). 
As explained in the general introduction the sentence verification 
task was presented along with the picture verification, evaluatiOn and 
syllogistic reasoning tasks in a within subjects design. The 
verification tasks were presented prior to the evaluation and 
syllogistic reasoning tasks to half of the subjects and for the other 
half the inference tasks preceded the verification tasks. 
Since it was possible that experience with the inference tasks would 
lead to a facilitation of response on the verification tasks an 
analysis of order of presentation was carried out. Since levels of 
correct response on the class verification task were fairly high 
anyway it was thought that any improvement in performance when the 
verification task followed the inference tasks would be greater for 
conditional statements than for class statements. A 6 (grade) X 2 
(linguistic form) X 2 (presentation order) analysis of variance was 
carried out on correct response. The results are shown in Table 3.8. 
Significant main effects were found for grade, E(5,168)=74.57, 
p<0.001, linguistic form, F(1,168)=246.58, p 0.001, and presentation 
order, F(1,168)=11.32, p<').001. The grade X linguistic form 
interaction, F(5,168)=6.30, p4,0a001, and the grade X presentation 
order interaction F(5,168)=3.90, p<0.01, were also significant. 
The effect of presentation order reflected the fact that there were 
more correct responses when the verification task followed the 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































correct). The grade x order interaction indicated, that this was 
any 
truel4for subjects at certain grades, specifically only for subjects at 
primary 4, F(1,168)=6.11, p(0.001, and 5th. year secondary, 
F(1,16)=9.03,p.001. This unsystematic improvement in response is 
difficult to interpret. Neither the linguistic form X order nor the 
grade X linguistic form X presentation order interaction was 
significant indicating that presentation order effects weré not 
greater for conditional statements. 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS 
P.ItA 
Table 3.6, shows the number of subjects at each grade who responded 
according to the different interpretations of the conditional - 
conjunction, biconditional and conditional. A modified classification 
of response patterns was also carried out but results on this will 
only be reported where they differ from the standard classification. 
The predominant consistent response pattern of primary children was 
the conjunctive response: about half the primary school children 
responded according to this pattern. No primary children responded 
according to the conditional interpretation. The advent of a 
conditional interpretation at first year secondary was accompanied by 
a decrease in conjunctive and an increase in inconsistent response. 
17o adjacent grade comparisons of response pattern distributions were 
significant although all primary/secondary comparisons except the 
P6/S1 were significant on a chi-square test as was the Sl/S5 
comparison, ;3)= 6,984, TAD.05, 
DISCUSSION 
The simple nain effects analysis of grade for shateme.nt 
rg? 
types confirmed what an inspection of Figure 1.2bsuggests: improvement 
in performance with increasing age was due only to improvement on E 
and 11 type statements. Performance on N and T type statements did not 
change significantly across grade. Primary school subjects performed 
very poorly on P, and E type statements: only at first year secondary 
did subjects begin to realize that these statements were false. The 
significance of the test of simple interactions on the 1)6/S1 
comparison reflected the increase in correct response only on B and E 
type statements, but the response pattern classification showed that 
there was only a gradual change in response pattern with still only 
two subjects at first year secondary classified as conditional. 
Considering the two analyses together it seems that there is a general 
increase in the realization that. B and E type statements are false at 
first year secondary but subjects are still at a transitional stage 
and their responses are still rather inconsistent. Interestingly, 
despite the transitional nature of response at this stage, very few 
hiconditional response patterns were found. The further 
non-significant increase in correct response on B and E type 
statements from $1 to $3 was accompanied by an increase in the 
predominance of the conditional response pattern indicating that 
performance on the task was stabilising. The absence of a simple main 
effect of statement type for $3 and S5 subjects indicated that by S3 
performance on the conditional verification task was mature. 
The results of the conditional verification task replicated those of 
Kuhn's conditional reasoning task showing the predominance of the 
conjunctive interpretation by primary school children and the change 
to conditional interpretation around 12 years. The age at which the 
conditional interpretation appears is consistent with Kuhn's view that 
the conditional verification task is a formal operational task 
involving comprehension of implication. 
The significance of the simple effects of linguistic form at all 
grades up to first year secondary reflected the superior performance 
on class verification compared with conditional verification at these 
grades while the significance of the simple interaction of linguistic 
form and statement type at these grades suggested that the superior 
performance on class statements was specific to statement types B and 
E. The superior performance on class statements and the' significant 
increase in correct response on conditional verification. from P6 to 81 
are consistent with Piaget's claim that concrete operational subjects 
should be able to deal with arguments stated in class and relational 
logic but not until formal operations should they be able to deal with 
propositional logic arguments. 
It could be argued that a result showing no difference in performance 
on class and conditional statements would also have been compatible +k. 
Piaget's theory since, as mentioned in the introduction to this 
chapter, Piaget's theory makes ambiguous predictions about the 
abilities of concrete operational subjects to comprehend propositional 
relationships. Inhelder and Piaget argued that the language of a 
subject at a particular operational level is not a reliable guide to 
his underlying cognitive operations. Since a subject's linguistic 
comprehension is also constrained by the operational structures 
available rather than by the linguistic expression of the logical 
relationship no difference in performance might be predicted between 
the logically equivalent class and conditional statements. 
however the results of experiment 2 indicated that for subjects at the 
concrete operational stage the linguistic expression of the logical 
relationship is an important factor in determining how the logical 
relationship is understood, lalen universal quantification is expressed 
linguistically in a form which corresponds more naturally to class 
inclusion, i.e. as "All A are B", the younger subjects can understand 
it, whereas when universal quantification is expressed linguistically 
using the general conditional, "If x is an A then x is a P the 
younger subjects have difficulty with it. Presumably this difference 
in performance with the different linnuistic expressions would he 
explained within the Piagetian framework in terms of the subject 
mapping the class statement onto the classification operations of 
concrete operations but failing to map the conditional onto the 
classification operations and not yet having the appropriate 
propositional operations to map the conditional onto. Only once the 
subject has acquired the formal operational structures would the 
mapping from the conditional to the appropriate cognitive structures 
be possible. 
Although the conditional reasoning task has been discussed as though 
it involved a propositional conditional in fact it involved a general 
conditional. The general conditional involves quantification which the 
propositional conditional does not and it is consequently more complex 
than the propositional conditional. It is possible that the younger 
children give incorrect responses on the conditional verification task 
not because of a failure to understand implication resulting from the 
lack of formal operational structures, but because the young subjects 
do not understand the specific use of the conditional in conjunction 
with the indefinite article "a/an" as corresponding to universal 
quantification (Nine, 1941/80). Certainly a subject who did 
understand the conditional as corresponding to the universal 
Tuantifier should be able to respond on the conditional statements in 
exactly the same way as on the class statements. Subjects who did not 
(a ( 
understand the device of the conditional plus the indefinite article 
as corresponding to a universal quantifier are quite likely to 
understand the general conditional as a statement about a specific 
entity. A. statement like "In my garden if an insect is bit,; it is 
black. ", for example, will probably be understood as an existential 
statement about a big black insect, i.e. "In my garden there is bit-, , 
black insect. ". It is possible that some of the difficulties of the 
younger subjects on the conditional verification task are due to the 
kinds of difficulty described by Stedmor (1982) in establishing the 
relevant reference sets for quantifiers. The use of the indefinite 
article, a /an, in the general conditional probably makes it 
particularly difficult to identify the appropriate reference sets in 
the extensional task. However difficulty in establishing the relevant 
reference sets would seen to stein from a more fundamental difficulty 
in understanding; the linguistic convention. According to the 
linguistic explanation the significant increase in correct response on 
the conditional verification task at from primary to secondary would 
simply be explained in terms of the acquisition of the ability to 
understand "conditional plus indefinite article -- universal 
quantifier" rather than entailing a re- organisation of cognitive 
structure. 
Although failure to comprehend the quantificational aspect of the 
general conditional may be what causes the problems in the conditional 
verification task, consideration of how an analogue of the conditional 
verification task involving a propositional conditional rather than a 
general conditional night be constructed reveals that it would be 
difficult to construct such a task since, as was mentioned in the 
introduction, a propositional conditional is a statement of a specific 
relationship and is true when any one of three different conditions 
/RL 
holds (pq, -pq or. -p -q) whereas a general conditional is a general 
rule. For example the General conditional "In my garden if an insect 
is big it is striped." is a rule which applies to every insect in the 
specified domain (in my garden) and states that for every insect in 
the domain the relationship between its size and marking can be 
described in terms of a conditional relationship. A propositional 
conditional similar to this general conditional would be e.g. "In my 
garden if the insect(s) is(are) big then it is(they are) striped." A 
verification task like that above with a propositional conditional 
would not make sense since the conditional cannot be evaluated as true 
or false with respect to three different types of insect 
simultaneously. The evaluation of the truth of a propositional 
conditional with respect to specific exemplars is discussed in Chapter. 
5. Since is not possible to carry out an analogue of the verification 
task with a propositional conditional it is not possible to say 
whether the difficulty of the younger subjects on the verification 
task with the general conditional is due to their inability to 
comprehend the implication relation or their lack of comprehension of 
the general conditional construction as corresponding to universal 
quantification. There is however evidence from other studies showing 
that young children have difficulty in comprehending implication. 
The results of the class and conditional verification problems in 
experiment 2 are, as we have seen, consistent with the broad framework 
of Piaget's theory. The different response patterns of primary. school 
children on the verification of class and conditional statements 
clearly cause problems for propositional models of verification, like 
the comparison model, which would propose that errors in verification 
are a function of propositional structure. Since the universally 
quantified statement "All A are P" and the general conditional "If x 
143 
is an A then x is a r." have the same propositional representations 
4^t(Ax >nx), a propositionaily based theory uoult predict the same 
patterns of error on these statements. The analysis of simple 
interactions for the statement type by linguistic fern interaction in 
the overall analysis of variance showed that only at third and fifth 
year secondary was the interaction non -significant. The predictions of 
a propositionally based theory are not upheld for subjects ycíunger 
than third year secondary. 
An interesting'. divergence of opinin emerges in the literature on 
information processing models of langunee comprehension and deductive 
inference on the one hand and the development of reasoning abilities 
on the other, concerning the relative difficulties of sentence 
verification tasks and tasks involving deductive reasoning. The 
similarities between the operations proposed in recent models of 
deductive reasoning (Clark, 1969; t;evlis, 1975; rayer and. kevlin, 197" 
etc.) and recent models of sentence verification (Chase and Clark, 
1972; Traha sso et al, 1971 etc.) has been emphasised by Revlis (1975) 
and Evans (1982). Figures 306a and 3.Gb illustrate the similarities in 
the sequences of operations in the models. Loth models propose that 
the information from the two separate sources - either premises and 
conclusion or sentence and picture are encoded in similar formats. 
These representations are then compared in a systematic way. 
The models differ in that the reasoning model includes a stage at 
._,'rich a composite representation of the information from the premises 
is formed. Since task difficulty is predicted to he a function of the 
complexity of the model it would he reasonable to predict that tasks 
involving deductive inference would be more difficult than sentence 
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contrary to laihn's proposals concerning the relative difficulty of 
verification and syllogistic reasoning. She claimed that syllogistic 
reasoning ability is a concrete operational ability and is 
consequently acquired prior to the ability to verify conditional 
statements which is a formal operational acquisition. Although the 
results of experiment 2 are in accordance with Kuhn's claims there are 
problems with ber claim that syllogistic reasoning is a concrete 
operational ability. These will be discussed in Chapter 6. 
PICTURE VERIFICATION 
In the sentence verification task the subject was presented with a 
picture depicting an inclusion /implication relationship and was 
required to say whether eight different class or general conditional 
sentences were true or false with respect to the picture. Although 
primary school subjects performed well with the class statements they 
performed very poorly with certain types of conditional sentence since 
they seemed to interpret the conditional as a conjunction. Models of 
sentence verification like the comparison model propose that when the 
sentence is presented prior to the picture, the encoding of the 
picture depends upon the terms in the sentence (Revlin and Leirer, 
1980). In encoding the picture the relationship represented in the 
picture between the terms of the sentence must be determined. In 
experiment 2 the picture was presented prior to the sentences to be 
verified. It is possible that, since younger subjects tend to focus on 
perceptual information, they tended to encode the information from the 
picture in a fixed way and did not reconsider the representation of 
the picture in the light of each sentence. It was thought that 
changing the picture rather than the sentences might encourage the 
younger subjects to consider each sentence /picture pair more carefully 
and improve response, particularly on conditional verification. 
EXPEENT 3 
THE PICTURE VERIFICATION TASK 
METHOD 
The task was similar to that in experiment 2 in that the subjects were 
required to say whether certnin sentence/picture combinations were 
true or false. The difference was that whereas in experiment 2 the 
subject had to say whether the eight different implication/inclusion 
sentences which can be made py combining positive and negative values 
of two binary propositions p and q were true or false with respect to 
a particular picture depicting an implication relationship, in 
experiment 3 the subject had to say whether a particular 
implication/inclusion sentence was true or false with respect to the 
four different "inplication" pictures which can be nade from 
combinations of three different kinds of element. For instance, the 
pictures to be verified against a sentence such as "In my garden if an 
insect is big it is striped." are shown in Figure 3.7. As in 
experiment 2 the instructions for the problem were contained within a 
story. The story for the insect problem was as follows (that for shape 
content is in AppendiNBO: 
"One day when Mr. Jones was in his garden he noticed lots of insects. 
He watched carefully and saw three different kinds of insect. Later he 
was telling a friend about the insects in his garden and he said "In 
my garden if an insect is big it is striped". Is this sentence true 
for these insects....thcse insects? etc.". 
The subject was then presented with the four different implication 
pictures one at a time in random order and had to say whether the 
Figure 3.7 




Figure 3.7 (cont.) 
TX? 
sentence was true for each picture in turn. Hair of the subjects were 
required to verify class statements and the other half conditional 
statements. Subjects dealt with statements of the same linguistic form 
in experiments 2 and 3 but those subjects who received insect content 
in experiment 2 received shape content in experiment 3 and vice versa. 
RESULTS 
Table 3.9 shows percent correct response as a function of grade, 
linguistic form of statement and statement type while Table 3.10 shows 
the results of an analysis of variance carried out on correct 
response. The results were similar to those observed in the sentence 
verification task except that the grade X linguistic form interaction 
did not reach significance since correct response on class statements 
was superior to that on conditional statements at all grades. Overall 
levels of correct response on experiments 2 and 3 were similar: 
Overall 87% of responses to class statements on experiment 3 and 88% 
on experiment 2 were correct cmpared with 70 of responses to 
conditional statements on experiment 3 and 71 on experiment 2. 
Following Sternberg's (1979, p. 485) method for comparing the 
difficulty of two tasks a paired t-test was carried out on the mean 
proportion of correct responses collapsed across linguistic form and 
statement type on the sentence and picture verification tasks for 
subjects at each grade. The t-test for related measures, t(5) = 1.34, 
indicated that mean correct responses on sentence and picture 
verification tasks were not significantly different. 
Table 3.l shows the distribution of response patterns across grade 
for the picture verification task. Broadly speaking the results were 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS FOR PICTURE VERIFICATION TASI, 
CLASS 
CONJ BICOND CONI) INCONSISTENT 
P2 3 1 4 8 
P4 2 4 6 4 
P6 1 1 10 4 
S1 0 1 12 3 
S3 1 O 12 3 
55 0 0 15 1 
TOTAL 7 `7 59 23 
COI]DITIONAL 
COITJ BICON'I) CONI) INCONSISTENT 
P2 (, 1 2 7 
P4 15 O 1 O 
P6 10 0 3 3 
S1 3 0 8 5 
S3 0 0 9 6 
SS 2 0 10 4 
TOTAL 36 1 33 26 
TOTAL 
CONJ BICOND CONI) INCONSISTENT 
P2 9 2 6 15 
P4 17 4 7 4 
P6 11 1 13 7 
S1 3 1 20 8 
S3 1 0 21 10 
S5 2 0 25 5 
TOTAL 43 8 92 49 
202 
more response patterns were classified according to a consistent 
response pattern in the picture verification task (74 %) than in the 
sentence verification task (55%). A t -test on related measures was 
carried out on mean proportion of correct conditional /inclusion 
response patterns to the sentence and picture verification tasks and 
the significance of this test, t(5) -3.93, 40.05, reflected the higher 
number of correct response patterns on the picture verification' task 
(48 %) compared with the sentence verification task (37 %). However this 
probably reflected nothing more interesting than the fact that the 
picture verification task included only four items while the sentence 
verification task includd eight items and consequently subjects were 
more likely to be classified consistent on the picture verification 
than on the sentence verification task. 
Despite the difference in the incidence of consistent response 
patterns between experiments 2 and 3, the predominant response 
patterns for subjects at different grades in experiment 3 were similar 
to those in experiment 2. The predominant response pattern in the 
class verification task at all grades was the class 
inclusion /implication pattern: 61% of patterns overall were of this 
type compared with 54% in experiment 2. There was a gradual increase 
in correct response with increasing age. As in experiment 2 the 
predominant consistent response pattern in the conditional 
verification task for primary subjects on. experiment 3 was the 
conjunctive response but this changed to the conditional for secondary 
subjects. Overall there were more conditional response patterns on 
experiment 3 (34%) than on experiment 2 (9 %). 
The analysis of mean correct response to the sentence and picture 
te 
verification tasks showed that changing the pictures totverified 
rather than the sentences in a sentence picture verification task did 
not affect the levels of correct response. Since the sentence 
verification task has already been discussed the picture verification 
task is not discussed further. 
SUNMARY 
Txperiment 2 extended the class verification task to include all 
possible class inclusion relations which can be nade by combining 
positive and negative values of two binary, attributes p and q. 
Performance on this class verification task by subjects from 6 to 17 
years was compared with that on a similar task described by Kuhn 
(1977) involving the verification of conditional statements. Since the 
class and general conditional statements are logically equivalent, 
propositional models of verification which are based on the logical 
form of the statements would predict no difference in performance on 
verifying class and conditional statements. 88% of responses on the 
verification of class statements were correct and even the youngest 
subjects performed well. As in experiment 1 the errors they did make 
were not compatible with Bucci's "structure neutral" hypothesis but 
seemed to be related instead to aspects of the presentation of the 
task. The results of the conditional verification problem replicated 
Kuhns results showing that children under 12 years have specific 
difficulties with the conditional verification problem. The pattern of 
errors on different statement types indicated that children of this 
age seemed to interpret the conditional as a conjunction. Significant 
increases in correct response were found for secondary subjects. These 
results are compatible with a simple interpretation of Piaget's theory 
which would hold that the concrete operational subject can deal with 
linguistic statements such as the class inclusion statement which map 
in a relatively intuitive way onto the underlying operations of class 
logic but not until formal operations can he deal with propositional 
logic statements. 
Experiment 3 involved a procedural variation of the verification task 
2if)5- 
in which subjects were required to say whether a particular class 
inclusion/ implication statement was true or false with respect to 
four different empirical instantiations of an inclusion/implication 
relationship. Levels of correct response on. the different statement 
types were essentially similar to those found in experiment 2. 
CIiAPTI:It 4 
VERIFICATION I!ITII DIFFERENT LINGUISTIC VARIANTS 
OF THE UNIVERSAL QUANTIFIER. 
In experiments 2 and 3 subjects up to and including first year 
secondary (12 years) were found to perform better on a verification 
task with class statements of the type "All A are B" than with the 
logically equivalent general conditional statements of the type "if p 
then q ". The superior performance on class statements indicated that 
propositionally based models of sentence verification which propose 
that errors in verification are a function of propositional 
representation were inadequate as explanations of the errors of 
primary school subjects since the propositional representations of 
class and conditional statements are identical. The superior 
performance on class statements was mainly clue to superior performance 
on E and B type statements. The results of the statement type 
analysis, along with the response pattern data, indicated that while 
primary school subjects interpreted the class statements correctly they 
tended to interpret the general conditional as a conjunction. 
Kuhn argued that the difficulty the younger subjects had in verifying 
the conditional reflected the fact that they had not yet acquired 
formal operational thinking which provides the operations necessary 
for interpreting empirical data in terms of propositional 
relationships. It was suggested that an alternative explanation of the 
younger subjects' difficulties with the conditional was that the 
younger subjects dici not understand the linguistic device of the 
conditional plus the indefinite article as corresponding to universal 
quantification. In experiments 2 and 3 class and conditional 
statements were presented in a between subjects design. It was 
267 
considered possible that, if the difficulty of the younger subjects in 
interpreting; the general conditional was due to their inability to 
understand the ¿general conditional as corresponding to the universal 
quantification, a within subjects presentation of class and 
conditional statements would bring out the similarity in meaning for 
the young subjects. On the other hand if the difficulty of the younger 
subjects in verifying the general conditional reflected the absence of 
the relevant cognitive structures a within subjects design would not 
be expected to improve performance on conditional verification. In 
experiment 4 class and conditional statements were presented in a 
within subjects design in order to see whether this led to an 
improvement in performance of the younger subjects in verifying E and 
?; type conditional statements. 
There are many natural language translations of universal 
quantification - "all ", "every ", "each ", "any" "everything" the 
general conditional and even "a /an" (Quire, 1941/80) although these 
different natural language variants have differences in meaning which 
the quantificational form alone does not capture (Cresswell, 1973; 
Fodor, 1982). Although "any" is considered as a natural language 
translation of universal quantification it also has much in common 
with the existential quantifier "some ". Unlike "all ", for example, 
which takes a plural verb "any" takes a singular verb. It is possible 
that young children would be liable to misinterpret "any" in the same 
kind of way as they misinterpret the general conditional. The 
quantifier. "every" is like "any" in that it takes a singular verb but, 
although apparently similar in meaning "any" and "all" have different 
scope properties in certain circumstances or different "accepta'bli'ty 
principles" (Cresswell, 1973). It was thought that "every" might be 
intermediate in difficulty between "any" and "all" since it seems to 
have properties of both. It was decided to look at how the quantifiers 
"any" and "every" are verified as well as "all" and "if then ". In 
experiment 4 subjects were required to verify universally quantified 
statements expressed with the linguistic quantifiers "all ", "every ", 
"any" and the general conditional "if- then ". 
In a study of the development of understanding of the logical 
connectives using a type of verification task Neimark and Slotnick 
(1970) found that younger subjects (around 8 years) produce more 
ií ! 
correct responses when pictorial elements were to be verified while 
older subjects (up to 13 years) produced more correct responses on 
verbal items. In experiment 4 half the subjects were presented with a 
pictorial representation of the elements as in the previous 
verification studies while the other half were presented with a 
verbal description of the elements e.g. red squares, blue squares, red 
circles. 
EXPERIMENT 4 
VERIFICATION WITH VARIOUS UNIVERSALLY QUANTIFIED EXPRESSIONS 
i ïI;TI-IOD 
Sub jects 
32 subjects from primary 1, primary 3 and primary 5 of an Edinburgh 
primary school took part. Paean ages (and age ranges) were 6 years 0 
months (5 years 6 months to 6 years 3 months), 7 years 11 months (7 
years 4 months to 8 years 3 months) and 9 years 11 months (9 years 5 
months to 10 yr5.7oorths). 
Procedure 
The task was essentially similar to the sentence verification task of 
experiment 2. In experiment 4 however the subject was required to 
verify 32 statements altogether comprising the eight possible 
quantified inclusion or implication relationships for four different 
linguistic expressions of the implication relationship: these were "if 
then" "every" "all" and "any ". 
Two different content areas were used - shapes and insects. Half the 
subjects verified statements with respect to pictures depicting an 
inclusion /implication relationship while the other half verified 
statements with respect to verbal descriptions of the pictures 
e.g. "RED SQUARES, BLUE SQUARES, REI) CIRCLES ". Content and mode 
(verbal /pictorial) were combined factorially so that eight subjects at 
each grade received a particular content and mode. 
qa 
Presentation of the different statement types was blocked by 
quantifier and a different picture (or verbal description) was used 
with every quantifier for any particular subject. For any particular 
quantifier the four different verbal/pictorial representations were 
presented four times. The order of presentation of quantifier was 
random as was the order of presentation of the different statement 
types, T, 11, E and N. 
In order to provide a context for the problem a short story was read. 
For shape content the problem was as follows (The story for insect 
content is in Appendix C): 
"Fred's teacher was giving his class a lesson on shapes. The teacher 
gave every child a card with coloured shapes on it. This is the card 
that Fred had. On Fred's card there were....(DESCRIPTION OF SHAPES ON 
CAIN)) Later on the teacher was trying to find out how much the 
children. remembered. about the lesson. She picked up Fred's card and 
asked the children to say which of the following sentences were true 
about the shapes on. Fred's card. Can you do it?" 
The child was presented with a pictorial or verbal representation of 
the shapes. His task was to say for each sentence whether it was true 
or false with respect to the verbal/pictorial representation of 
shapes. 
RESULTS 
Table 4.1 shows percent correct response to the 4 different statement 
types for the four different linguistic forms for subjects at 
different grades. A 3 (grade) x 4 (linguistic form) X 4 (statement 
type) analysis of variance with repeated measures on linguistic form 
TABLE 4.1 
MEAN PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSE AS A FUNCTION 
OF GRADE, QUANTIFIER AND STATEMENT TYPE 
TOT 
IF THEN 
P1 P3 P5 
T 73 73 73 73 
B 29 48 56 44 
E 48 48 69 60 
N 81 100 98 93 
TOT 58 71 74 68 
ALL 
P1 P3 P5 TOT 
_..__ 
T 73 75 71 73 
B 44 52 67 54 
E 65 77 85 76 
N 88 93 98 94 
TOT 67 75 80 74 
EVERY 
P1 P3 P5 TOT 
T 60 
, 
77 71 69 
B 48 63 65 58 
E 77 77 83 79 
N 90 100 94 94 
TOT 69 79 78 75 
ANY 
P1 P3 P5 TOT 
_
T 75 71 75 74 
B 35 50 65 50 
E 49 52 71 56 
N 81 96 94 90 
TOT 59 67 76 67 
TOT 
P1 P3 P5 TOT 
T 70 74 72 72 
B 39 53 63 52 
E 58 67 77 68 
N 85 98 96 93 
TOT 63 73 77 71 
2/Z, 
and statement type was carried out on correct response. The results of 
this analysis are shown in Table 4.2. The significant main effect of 
grade, F(2,69) =8.77, p4Ú.001, reflected the general increase in 
correct response with increasing age. A significant main effect was 
also found for type of quantifier, F(3,207) =7.02, p(0.001, reflecting 
different levels of correct response with different quantifiers. The 
significant main effect of statement type F(3,207)= 46.04, p40..001, 
showed that performance on some statement types was better than that 
on others: specifically performance on N (93% correct) was better than 
that on T (72% correct) which was better than that on E (68% correct) 
which was better than that on B (52% correct). The significant 
quantifier X statement ,type interaction, F(9,621) =3.22, p <0.005 
indicated that this level of correct response on the different 
statement types did not hold for all four quantifiers. 
Comparisons between means for grade were calculated using Tukey's HSD 
test (Table 4.2a). The tests showed that primary 3 subjects (73% 
correct overall) scored significantly better than primary 1 subjects 
(63% correct overall), but the difference between primary 3 and 
primary 5 subjects (77% correct overall) was not significant (Table 
4.2a). Since grade did not interact significantly with statement type 
or quantifier it can be presumed that the effects of statement type 
and quantifier held across grade. 
The significant main effect of type of quantifier indicated that 
subjects performed better with some quantifiers than others: 
specifically subjects had more correct responses with "all" (74% 
correct overall) and "every" (75% correct overall) than they did with 
"if-then" (68% correct overall) and "any" (67% correct overall). 











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































DIFFERENCES BETWEEN MEANS 
TABLE 4.2a 
FOR BETWEEN GRADE COMPARISONS 
GRADE P1 P3 P5 
1.263 1.463 1.542 
Pl - 0.200 0.279 
1.263 o'r ** 
P3 - 0.079 
1.463 ns 
ERROR TERM FOR TUKEY'S RATIO FOR COMPARISONS BETWEEN GRADES = 
(MS(subjects within groups) /nqr) _ (.905/(24 x 4 x 4)) = 0.048 
Tukey's HSD = q(0.05)(3,69) X ERROR = 3.69 X 0.048 = 0.163 
q(0.01)(3,69) X ERROR = 4.27 X 0.048 = 0.205 
215 
quantifiers collapsed across statement type (Table 4.2b). Comparisons 
between all quantifiers except between 'if then' and 'any' and between 
'all' and 'every' were significant. 
The significant quantifier X statement type interaction however showed 
that the difference between quantifiers was only true for particular 
statement types. Tests of simple main effects of quantifier for the 
different statement types showed that significantly different levels 
of correct response across quantifier were found only for statement 
type B, F(3,736) =3.27, p40.05 and statement type E, 
F(7,736) =12.59,p(0.0O1 (Table 4.2e). 
Following Kirk (1968) post hoc comparisons between quantifiers for 
statement types B and E were tested against the pooled error term 
derived from the F ratio denominator used for testing FS(B) at c(i) 
(Kirk, 1968, p.306) (see Table 4.2d). Following Kirk (p.269) an 
approximation of the Critical value of q' for calculating Tukey's HSD 
when pooled error terms are involved was calculated (see Table 4.2d). 
Tukey's HSD test on comparisons between quantifiers for statement type 
B showed that only the comparison between 'if then' (44% correct) and 
'every' (58% correct) was significant at the 0.05 level. Post hoc 
comparisons between quantifier for statement type E showed significant 
differences between all comparisons except between 'if then' and 'any' 
and between 'every' and 'all'. 
Analysis of simple main effects of statement type showed that the 
effect of statement type was significant for all quantifiers (Table 
4.2e). Tukey's HS) tests on comparisons between statement types were 
carried out for each quantifier using the pooled error term derived 
from the F ratio denominator for testing 11S(C) at b(i) (see Table 
4.2f). An approximation of the critical value of q' for pooled error 
2(6 
TABLE 4.2b 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN MEANS FOR QUANTIFIERs 
ANY IF THEN ALL EVERY 
t 347 1.354 r.4 X36 ï. sco7 
ANY - 0.004 0.1 3 0. Ì bc) 
I .347 ns * *:. 
IF THEN - 0.1'35 O. Ì -56 
(.35i ** 
ALL - 0.62 
I. 486 ns 
ERROR TERM FOR TUKEY'S RATIO FOR COMARISONS BETWEEN QUANTIFIERS 
= =(MS(B X subjects within groups) /npr (0.301/24 x 3 x 4)L-= 0.032 
Tukey's HSD = q(0.05)(4,207) X ERROR = 3.65 X 0.032 = 0.117 








































































































































































































































































COMPARISONS BETWEEN MEANS FOR QUANTIFIERS AT STATEMENT TYPE(i) 
An approximation of the critical value of q for the comparison between 
quantifiers at statement type (i) is calculated by: 
q(0.05) = q(4,207)MS(B x subj.within groups) + q(4,621)US(BC x subj. 
within groups)(r- I) /MS(B x subj. within groups) + MS(BC x subj. within 
groups) (r -1) = 3.67(0.301) +3.66(.312)(4- 1)/0.301 + (0.312)(4 -1) =3.66 
q(0.01) = 4.46(0.301) + 4.44(0.312)(4- 1)/0.301 + (0.312)(4 -1) = 4.44 
Error term for calculating Tukey's HSD for comparisons between 
quantifiers: _ (JIS(B x o}bjects within g oups) + MS(BC x subjects 
within groups)(r- 1) /rpn7Z (.309/24 x 3)`- 0.065 
Tukey's HSD = q(0.05) x ERROR = 3.66 X 0.065 = 0.238 
q(0.01) x ERROR = 4.44 X 0.065 = 0.289 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN MEANS FOR QUANTIFIER FOR E TYPE STATEMENTS 
ANY IF THEN ALL EVERY 
1.111 1.194 1.514 1.583 
ANY - 0,083 0.403 0.472 
1.111 ' ns ** 
IF TIíEN - 0.320 0.389 
1.194 .r* 
ALL - 0.069 
1.514 ns 
COMPARISONS BETWEEN MEANS FOR QUANTIFIER FOR B TYPE STATEMENTS 
IF THEN ANY ALL EVERY 
0.889 1.000 1.083 1.167 
IF THEN - 0.111 0.194 0.278 
0.889 ns ns 
ANY - 0.083 0.167 
1.000 ns ns 






































































































































































































































































































terres was calculated (see Table 4.2f). 
For 'if then') comparisons between all statement types except T and E 
were significant and order of difficulty was N T E B. 
For 'all'1 comparisons between all statement types except T and F were 
significant. The order of difficulty was N E T B. 
For 'every', comparisons between all statement types except between T 
and B and between T and E were significant and order of difficulty was 
as for 'all', N E T B. 
For 'any' all comparisons except the B/E comparison were significant. 
Order of difficulty was as for 'if then', N T E B. 
In order to establish whether either content or presentation mode 
influenced response two further analyses were carried out. To simplify 
analysis the data were collapsed across statement type and a 3 (grade) 
X 2 (mode) X 4 (quantifier) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on quantifier type was carried out on correct response (Table 
4.3). The results show the expected significant effects of grade and 
quantifier type. However neither the effect of presentation mode nor 
any of the interactions of this factor were significant. 
A 3 (grade) X 2 (content) X 4 (quantifier) analysis of variance was 
carried out on the data (Table 4.4). Significant effects were found 
for grade and quantifier type. The main effect of content was not 
significant but the grade X quantifier type X content interaction just 
reached significance at the 0.05 level. This seemed largely 
attributable to superior performance by P3 subjects on shape content 
and superior performance on insect content by P5 subjects for the 
quantifier "any" but little difference in performance on the two 
TABLE 4.2f 
COMPARISONS BETITEN NEARS FOR STATEMENT TYPES AT QUANTIFIER (i) 
An approximation of the critical value of q for the comparison between 
different statement types at quantifier (i) is calculated by* 
q(0.05) = q(4,207)tS(C x subj.within groups) + q(4,621)t1S(F3C x subj. 
within groups)(r- 1) /MS(C x subj. within. groups) + tS(BC x subj. within 
groups) (r -1) = 3.67(0.727) + 3.66(.312)(4 -1)/0.727 + (0.312)(4 -1) _ 
3.66 
q(0.01) = 4.46(0.727) +.4.44(0.312)(4 -1)/0.727 + (0.312)(4 -1) = 4.45 
Error term for calculating Tukey's USE for comparisons between 
quantifiers: = (?s(1 x subjects within (c3roups) + MS(BC x subjects 
within groups)(r- 1.) /rpnj = (.416/24 x 3) 0.076 
Tukey's USE = q(0.05) x ERROR = 3.66 X 0.076 = 0.278 





B E T. N 
0.889 1.194 p 1.458 1.889 i 
ß 
0.305 0.569 1.000 




^ í E N 
1.083 1.458 1.514 1.889 
0.375 0.431 0.806 
1.083 ** :* 
T - 0.056 0.431 





TABLE 4.2f cont. 
ANY 
t N 
1,000 1.111 1.472 1.806 
ß - 0.111 0.472 0.806 
1.000 ns 





B T E N 
1.167 1.3v9 1.583 1.889 
B 0.222 ,r 0.416 0.722 
1.167 ns ** ** 
T 0.194 0.500 












































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































different content areas with other quantifiers. 
CI.ASSIFICATION OF RL;SPOPISE. PATTERNS 
As in experiments 2 and 3 data were also classified in terms of 
response patterns. The response pattern classifications for each 
quantifier are shown in table 4.5. The predominant classification for 
subjects at all (;rades and on all quantifiers was inconsistent. Of the 
consistent response patterns the majority at P1 were conjunctive; for 
P3 subjects there were around the same number of conjunctive and 
inclusion interpretations and by P5 the majority of consistent 
response patterns were class inclusion /implication interpretations. 
Comparisons of response pattern distributions between P1 and P3, 
^4'3)=14.872, p 0,01, P3 and P5, 3)= 7.83, p O.05, and between PI and 
ti 
PS, )43)= 2O.436,PQa0.O01, were all significant. The distribution of 
response patterns was Similar for all the quantifiers. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of experiment 4 showed that, as in experiment 2, primary 
school subjects found it significantly easier to verify universally 
a,.iantified statements expressed with the quantifier 'all' (74 
correct) than with the general conditional 'if then' (6% correct). 
Significant F ratios on tests of simple main effects of quantifier for 
P and E type statements oñly)showed that differences in performance 
between quantifiers were due to differences in performance on these 
statement types. Post hoc comparisons between quantifiers for 
statement types F3 and E showed that the comparison between 'if then' 
00/ 
and 'all' was significanttfor E type statements. 
TABLE 4.5 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS 
EVERY 
GRADE CONJ. BICOND. COND. INCONSISTENT 
P1 1 1 0 22 
P3 4 0 6 14 
P5 2 0 4 18 
TOT 7 1 10 54 
ALL 
GRADE CONJ. BICOND. COND. INCONSISTENT 
P1 4 3 2 15 
P3 3 0 4 17 
P5 0 0 6 18 
TOT 7 3 12 50 
IF THEN 
GRADE CONJ. BICOND. COND. INCONSISTENT 
P1 5 1 0 18 
P3 4 0 3 17 
P5 2 1 6 15 
TOT 11 .r 2 9 50 
ANY 
GRADE CONJ. BICOND. COND. INCONSISTENT 
P1 5 1 1 17 
P3 7 0 2 15 
P5 2 0 3 19 
TOT 14 1 6 51 
TOTAL 
GRADE CONJ. BICOND. COND. INCONSISTENT 
P1 15 6 3 72 
P3 18 0 15 63 
P5 6 1 19 70 
TOT 39 7 37 205 
Post hoc comparisons between mean correct response on different 
quantifiers (Table 4.2b) showed that performance on quantifiers 'all' 
(74% correct) and 'every' (75% correct) was not significantly 
different and neither was the comparison between performance on 'if 
then' (60% correct) and 'any' (67% correct) but all other comparisons 
were significant. In addition comparisons of mean correct response 
between 'all and. 'every° and between 'any' and 'if then' for 
statement types L and B were not significant (Table 4.2d). These 
results suggest that 'any' is interpreted in a similar way to 'if 
then' by 6 to 10 year olds while 'every' is interpreted in the same 
way as 'all', at least in this experiment. 
COMPARISON WITH PREVIOUS EXPERIMENTS 
For the purposes of comparing the results of experiment 4 with the 
results of the primary children in experiment 2, correct response on 
different statement types by primary subjects in experiment 2 for 
quantifiers 'all' and 'if then° are shown in Table 4.6. Although 
primary subjects in experiment 2 were from prindries 2, 4 and 6 they 
were only on average 6 months older than the primary 1, 3 and 5 
subjects in experiment 4. 
Although in experiment 4 verification of class statements with the 
quantifier 'all' (74% correct) was still significantly better than 
that on the general conditional (68% correct) the difference between 
the levels of correct response on class and general conditional 
statements in experiment 4 was much smaller than in experiment 2 whore 
81% of primary subjects' responses on 'all' and 58% of responses on 
'if then' were correct. The predicted improvement in performance on 
conditional statements by presentation of quantifiers in a within 
subjects design was found - W, of responses in experiment 4 were 
correct compared with only 58% in experiment 2. This difference in 
correct response between experinents 2 and 4 was significant on a test 
for the difference between two proportions, Z=2.254, p4D.05. The 
superior performance of primary children in verifying class statements 
compared with general conditionals in experiment 2 was entirely due to 
difficulty with 15 and E type conditional statements. Performance on 
both E and 13 type conditional statements in experiment 4 was 
significantly better than that in experiment 2 accordinn, to tests for 
the difference between two proportions; for E type statements Z=3.549, 
p40.05, and for 13 type statements Z=2.591, p0.05. The higher level of 
correct response on both these statement types connared with 
experiment 2 indicated that presentation of the task in a within 
subjects design did seem to alert subjects to the interpretation of 
the general conditional as a universal quantifier. The significantly 
higher level of correct response to L type conditional statements 
compared with B type conditional statements in experiment 4 contrasted 
with the similar levels of correct response on these statement types 
in experiment 2 and was a further indication that subjects were 
adopting a more sophisticated interpretation of the general 
conditional. Despite the predominance of the inconsistent response the 
response pattern analysis also shows a higher incidence of correct 
response with 9 inclusion/implication response patterns in experiment 
4 compared with only 1 for primary subjects in experiment 2. Although 
the lower level of correct response on T type statements in experiment 
4 compared with experiment 2 was not significant, Z=1.688, it was a 
further indication that subjects attempted to interpret the general 
conditional, as an inclusion/implication relation rather than a 
conjunction since while conjunctive interpretation produces good 
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TABLE 4.6 
MEAN PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSE AS A FUNCTION OF GRADE, 
LINGUISTIC FORM AND STATEMENT TYPE FOR PRIMARY SUBJECTS ON EXPERIMENT 2 
IF THEN 
P2 P4 P6 TOT 
T 88 91 78 86 
B 22 22 19 21 
E 22 28 31 27 
N 100 97 97 98 
TOT 58 60 56 58 
ALL 
P2 P4 PG TOT 
T 94 '78 88 87 
B 63 56 72 64 
E 72 72 88 77 
N 94 100 94 96 
TOT 81 77 86 81 
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performance on T type statements the asymmetry of inclusion leads to 
errors on T type statements. The relatively poor performance on i? type 
stater:tenta was a further indication of the difficulty in dealing grit!, 
the asymmetry of inclusion. The higher error rate on Es type over T 
type statements indicates that subjects are more likely to evaluate a 
Fs type (superset) statement as true than they are to evaluate a T type 
(subset) statement as false. Although problems in dealing with the 
asymmetry of the inclusion /implication relation would lead to a 
similar error rate on f> and T type statements there are still some 
"conjuncture" errors on B type statements, in addition the lower 
probability of a 'true' statement compared with a 'false' statement 
possibly produced a bias to evaluating B type statements as true. 
Hhilo performance on the general conditional in experiment 4 was 
better than that in experiment 2, performance in verifying statements 
with the universal quantifier 'all' was worse in experiment 4 (74° 
correct) compared with experiment 2 (8l: correct) although the 
difference did not quite reach significance, Z =1.8(), p(0.l. The 
statement type data showed that the trend towards poorer performance 
on class statements in experiment 4 was caused by difficulty with the 
asymmetry of the inclusion relation as the poorer performance in 
verifying only T and î type statements indicated; however the 
differences in performance on T and B type statements between the two 
studies was not significant. Smith (1979) reported that children from 
4 to 7 years who were required to verify a block of questions 
involving the existential quantifier prior to verifying a block of 
universally quantified questions performed substantially worse than a 
control group who answered the universally quantified statements 
first. Although no existentially quantified statements were included 
in experiment 4 as we have seen 'any' and 'if then' are liable to 
misinterpretation as such and probably the presentation of the 
quantifiers in the within subjects design of experiment 4 caused the 
subjects a degree of confusion in dealing with the asymmetry with the 
universal quantifiers 'all' and 'every'. 
Apart from the small decrease in correct response on T and B type 
statements the results of experiment 4 are similar to those of 
experiment 2. While there was no difference in correct response on J 
and T type class statements by 6 and 11 year olds in experiment 1 
performance on T type statements expressed with the linguistic 
quantifier "all" in experiment 4 was significantly better than 
performance on B type statements. It is interesting to note that these 
results, like those of experiments 2 and 3, are contrary to Bucci's 
prediction of an increase in correct response on T type statements 
with increasing age and no difference in performance on B type or E 
type statements across grade. A possible reason for the lower error 
rate on T type over B type statements was the lower incidence of true 
statements comparedwitk.Ccaie statements and a consequent trend to 
evaluating B (superset) relations as true. 
The non-significant comparison between E type statements for 'any' 
and'if then' and the significant differences between these two 
quantifiers and 'all' and 'every' indicated that 'any' and 'if then' 
are significantly more likely to be interpreted as conjunction. 
Although it was thought that 'every' might also be liable to 
interpretation as conjunction performance on 'every' was more like 
that on 'all'. 
The improvement in performance in verifying the general conditional in 
experiment 4 was due to the realisation that the general conditional 
corresponded to class inclusion. Presumably this realisation enabled 
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the subjects to map the general conditional onto the concrete 
operational classification operations although the significant 
difference in performance between verification of "all" statements and 
"if then" statements indicated that subjects still had difficulty with 
this mapping. 
According to Piaget the ability of subjects at the stage of concrete 
operations to verify class statements like "All A are B" was 
attributable to their comprehension of the logic of inclusion. If 
subjects at concrete operations understand the logic of inclusion they 
should be able to understand the logical consequences of inclusion. 
The fact that performance on the verification tasks of experiments 1, 
2, 3 and 4 was influenced by content (experiment 1) and factors 
associated with the presentation of the tasks including changes in the 
stimulus and response probabilities, indicated that logical 
considerations alone did not account for performance on these tasks. 
If correct response on the class verification task is mediated by 
understanding of the logic of inclusion performance by concrete 
subjects on other tasks requiring an understanding of the logic of 
inclusion should also be good. In Chapters 5 and 6 two inference 
tasks - the evaluation and syllogistic reasoning tasks - which require 
subjects to work out the logical consequences of the 
inclusion /implication relation are examined. 
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SUPII tAï;`f 
Experiment 4 was an extension of the sentence verification task of 
experiment 2 to include universal quantifiers 'every' and 'all'. The 
univerally quantified expressions were presented in a within subjects 
design. Improvement in performance on E and B type general conditional 
statements indicated that at least part of the difficulty that primary 
school subjects had in interpreting conditional statements was due to 
the fact that subjects did not understand that the general conditional 
corresponds to universal quantification. Presenting the conditional 
verification task along with other universally quantified expressions 
in a within subjects design significantly facilitated this 
understanding although performance on the conditional verification 
task was still not as good as that on the class verification task. 
Universal quantifiers 'every' and 'any' were interpreted as similar in 
meaning to 'all' and 'i, then ' respectively. 
CHAPTER 5 
EVALUATION OF CONDITIONAL AND UNIVERSALLY OUANTIFIED SENTENCES 
Another paradise:, which purports to test how the conditional is 
comprehended is the conditional evaluation task. Johnson-Laird and 
Tagart (1969) developed this task as a means of determining under what 
circumstances a conditional is judged as true. In the evaluation task 
subjects were presented with a conditional sentence like: 
(5.1) "If there is an A on the left side of the card, then there is 
3 on the right side." 
They were then presented with a set of test cards and asked to decide 
for each card whether it indicated that the conditional was true or 
false or was irrelevant to the truth of the card. Four different test 
cards were used like those in Figure 5.1a. The cards were constructed 
as exemplars of the four different combinations of truth value of the 
antecedent and consequent of the conditional. 
Subjects interpreting sentence 5.1a as a propositional conditional 
would have classified only P-Q cards as indicating that the sentence 
was false, with PQ, -PQ and -P-Q classifted as indicating the truth of 
the sentence (see Table 5.1). A biconditional interpretation of the 
statement would have led subjects to classify PC? and -P-0 as 
indicating the truth and -PQ and P-O as indicating the falsity of the 
statement. 
Johnson-Laird and Tagart found that only 4% of their adult subjects 
interpreted the conditional as a conditional while most subjects 
adopted what they called a partial or defective truth table, 
classifying PQ cards as indicating the truth of the statement, P-Q its 
Figure 5.1 
Cards used in Johnson -Laird and Tagart's conditional evaluation 
paradigm for sentence: 






B 3 4 
Fñ 
Figure 5.2 
Cards used in Ward's propositional reasoning task. 
p: Butch robbed the bank. 










RESPONSE PATTERNS FOR PROPOSITIONAL INTERPRETATIONS 
EXEMPLARS TRUTH TABLE IIxTZ.RPï'1E^'ATIO2W:? 




P-Q r F F r- 
-P(3 I:' .' T IRRELEVANT 
-P-Q T T IRRELEVANT 
ABLE 5.1b 
RESPONSE PATTERNS FOR GENERAL RULES 
EXEMPLARS S I'r,OPf)SI i.I()T9AI., INTERPRETATIONS 
Oc>..<<7. BICOï,D. COND. PARTI 7,/DEFEc:rI 
PQ PROVES TRUE PROVES TRUE ?tt(? Z'?iGpF PROVES TR9JF, 
P-Q PROVES FALSE PROVES FALSE PROVES FALSE PROVES FALSE 
-PO PROVES FALSE PROVES FALSE NG PROOF NO PROOF 
-P-O PROVES FALSE PROVES TRUE NO PROOF NO PROOF 
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falsity and classifying -PQ and. -P-Q as irrelevant to the truth of the 
statement (Table 5.1). 
Given the poor performance of adults on the conditional evaluation 
task it would be surprising if children performed well on a task of 
this kind. Peel(1967), Ward (1972), Paris (1973), Shine. and Walsh 
(1971) and Sternberg (1979) report developmental studies using a task 
similar to the evaluation task to assess the development of 
comprehension of various logical connectives including the 
conditional. 
Ward (1972) reports a study of the development of the ability of 
children ages 7 to 14 years to perform a propositional reasoning task 
called "Butch and Slim" which was being developed as an item for 
inclusion in the Operational Thinking Subscale of the British 
Intelligence Scale (B.I.S). The task consisted of four cards each of 
which depicted two criminals - "Butch" and "Slim". Under the picture 
of each criminal on each card was written either "YES, I did rob the 
bank" or "NO, I did not rob the bank". The four cards comprised the 
four different combinations of Butch and Slim's affirmations and 
denials concerning the bank robbery (see Figure 5.2). The subject was 
then presented with various statements which Butch might have made to 
the police concerning the roles of Butch and Slim in the bank robbery. 
There were sixteen different statements based on the sixteen possible 
combinations of Butch and Slim's assertions e.g. the statement "Slim 
and I robbed the bank together" was based on propositional 
conjunction, (p.q). There were four possible implication relations 
corresponding to 0(4, -n3q and n7-(1. These were expressed using 
the conditional connective e.g. "If Slim robbed the bank, I robbed the 
bank." (rDq). The subject's task was to say whether "Butch and Slim's 
2_Sg 
^.A.svar, on, the cards could be true or not. You are looking for cards 
which could agree with what Butch said." The test was intended as a 
test of the development of the understanding of the sixteen 
combinations of propositional logic which Piaget claimed were acquired 
at the stage of formal operations. 
The test was found to be useful as a developmental test since some 
statements were easier to verify than others and some items showed 
clear developmental trends e.g. conjunction was easy for most subjects 
at all ages tested (8-14 years) but performance on disjunction 
improved with increasing age. Performance on implication items was 
very poor with 0% of 8 year olds and still only 17% of 14 year olds 
correct on these items. These results are in general agreement with 
the results of several other developmental studies showing that 
conjunctive statements are understood even by the youngest groups 
studied (Suppes and Feldman, 1971; Paris, 1973; Neimark and Slotnick, 
1970; Sternberg, 1979). These studies also showed that comprehension 
of disjunction improved with increasing age. Sternberg found an 
interesting, crossover in interpretation of disjunction with younger 
subjects (7.5-9.5 years) tending to use an inclusive interpretation 
and older subjects tending to adopt an exclusive interpretation of 
disjunction. Implication is difficult to understand at all ages but is 
seldom understood before 12-13 years, Shine and Walsh (1971), Paris 
(1973), Sternberg (1979). 
Although Ward did not discuss the specific nature of errors on the 
implication items he indicated that subjects seemed to ignore the word 
"if" and treat the sentence as a conjunction saying that only the card 
corresponding to the truth of the antecedent and consequent was true. 
We can assume from this that most subjects classified only PQ as true 
of the conditional. 
Paris (1973) also reports very poor comprehension of the conditional 
by subjects from 7 years up to 19 years in a kind of evaluation task. 
Subjects were required to say whether a conditional sentence such as: 
(5.2) "If the bird is in the nest then the shoe is on the foot." 
was a true or a false description of a picture. The pictures 
corresponded to the four different exemplars of the combinations of 
the truth and falsity of the antecedent and consequent of the 
conditional; for instance the picture corresponding to the truth of 
the antecedent and the falsity of the consequent would depict "a bird 
in a nest" and "a shoe which was not on a foot". 
Paris reports correct response by subjects on particular exemplars 
rather than response patterns of individual subjects. He found that 
subjects make few errors on PQ exemplars (only 6% error rate overall) 
and P-Q exemplars (only 4.5% error rate overall) but that 93% of 
responses to -PQ exemplars and 58.5% of responses to -P-Q exemplars 
were incorrect. The high error rate on -PQ exemplars indicates thdt 
virtually no subjects correctly interpreted the conditional as a 
conditional. The older subjects were, If anything, more consistently 
incorrect with 100% of 13 and 16 year olds and 957 of 19 year olds 
responding incorrectly to the -PQ exemplars compared with 75% of 
year olds. Although the high error rates on -P-Q exemplars (95% 
errors) and -PQ exemplars (95%errors) indicated that most 7 year olds 
adopted a conjunctive interpretation of the conditional, there was an 
increase in correct response on -P-with increasing age up to 13 years 
(57.5% errors) consistent with an increasing tendency to respond 
biconditionally. There was no further increase in correct response by 
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16 and 19 year olds. 
Because children readily accept arbitrary rules in the context of 
games, Peel (1967) hit upon the idea of testing comprehension of 
statements containing logical connectives in this context. The child 
and the experimenter played a game in which the experimenter had a 
collection of coloured beads (red, yellow, blue and green) and the 
child had a collection of counters of the same colours. The child had 
to pick a counter to go into a box following the experimenter's choice 
of a bead according to a rule e.g. "If and whenever I draw a red bead, 
you must also draw a red counter.". Peel looked at childrens' 
comprehension of three different rules - implication, incompatibility 
and disjunction. 
The game was played both with the experimenter stating the rule and 
the child making the appropriate response and with the child stating 
ne 
the rule and judging whether the experimenter's choice was 
appropriate. In the first condition with the implication rule most 
subjects (ages 5 to 11) drew a red counter (r) when a red bead (R) was 
drawn (Rr) and drew a non-red counter (-r) when a non-red bead (-R) 
was drawn (-R-r). Peel understood from this that the children 
understood the rule as a biconditional. 
If this response pattern was adopted in the second condition subjects 
would accept the experimenter's Rr response and -R-r and reject the 
R-r response (non-red counter following red bead) and the -Rr response 
(red counter following non-red bead). Although this was indeed the 
predominant response pattern for 5 year olds there was a developmental 
trend observed in acceptance of -Rr responses wih 24% of 5 year olds, 
50% of 3 year olds and 32% of 11 year olds correctly accepting a red 
counter following a non-red bead. This response pattern (the 
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acceptance of Fr, -P-r and -.1r) is the pattern which would be expected 
from an implication interpretation of the rule. Although children do 
not initiate an -Rr response, presumably because they do not want to 
go beyond the rules of the game, over half the 6 year olds and the 
majority t4f 11 year olds judged this response as acceptable when 
produced by the experimenter. 
While 13 and 14 year olds in Ward's study, 13, 16 and 19 year olds in 
Paris's study and adults in Johnson-Laird and Tagart's study 
apparently fall to understand implication, 58% of Peel's 8 year olds 
and 82% of 11 year olds accepted responses consistent with an 
implication interpretation of the conditional and most 5 year olds 
accepted responses consistent with a biconditional interpretation of 
the conditional. 
The comparison between performance on Peel's task and Paris's, Ward's 
and johnson-Laird's tasks however is unrealistic. Although all these 
tasks purport to study comprehension of implication it is evident that 
it is not only the subject's understanding or misunderstanding of the 
implication relation which determines performance on the task: rather 
factors associated with the structure, presentation and content of the 
task very largely determine response on the task. These factors can be 
categorised in terms of those relating to: 
(a) Presuppositions concerning the nature of the task which constrain 
the interpretation of the rule. 
(b) The response required and the nature of the conditional. 
(c) The content of the task. 
(d) Concrete/verbal presentation of the task. 
(a) The majority of subjects in Paris's task were inferred to 
interpret the conditional as a conjunction. A similar interpretation 
of the conditional rule in Peel's task would mean that subjects would 
classify only Fr responses as acceptable. However the game was set up 
in such a way that a conjunctive response pattern was extremely 
unlikely. The subject was told prior to the game in Peel's study that 
"we may each pick any colour we like". Given this statement the 
subject is very unlikely to say that any move by the experimenter in 
which he chooses a non-red bead (i.e a -R move) is unacceptable. In 
other words the presuppositions of the task make a conjunctive 
response unlikely. 
(b) From the responses that the majority of Johnson-Laird and Tagart's 
subjects gave on the conditional evaluation task - the partial truth 
table responses - it is clear that most subjects did not construe the 
conditional as true when its antecedent was false. In other words the 
subjects did not construe the conditional truth-functionally. This 
however is possibly not as surprising as Johnson-Laird and Tagart seem 
to think since their "propositional conditional" is really a general 
conditional (Quine 1944/80) , a general rule concerning a number of 
cards rather than a propositional conditional which would concern only 
one card. That the conditional is intended as a general rule is 
evident from Johnson-Laird and Tagart's assertion that the conditional 
statement (5.1) is synonomous with (5.2) 
(5.2) "There is never a letter 'A' on the leftjrand side without there 
being a number '3' on the right hand side." 
The correct response pattern for exemplars in the evaluation task 
involving a general conditional is different to that for a material 
conditional. It is never possible to verify a general 
ceeltelet51 veAy 
conditionallbut only to falsify it. Only a P-Q exemplar can falsify a 
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general conditional and the other exemplars, PQ, -PQ and -P-Q, offer 
no proof of the rule (See Table 5.1b). If subjects understand that the 
rule cannot be verified then the "irrelevant" responses to -PQ 
and -P-Q exemplars are probably the most appropriate responses they 
could give, given the choice between "True", "False" and "Irrelevant". 
"True" responses to PQ exemplars are incorrect if the statement is 
understood as a general rule. It has been established that subjeCts do 
erroneously regard PQ exemplars as verifying a general rule, (Noshman, 
1979, O'Brien and Overton, 1982) 
In order to judge whether a subject is responding correctly in an 
evaluation task it is necessary to be clear about whether the 
statement is a propositional (material) conditional or a general 
conditional. If the evaluation task concerned a general conditional 
and subjects adopted the "partial" response pattern of Table 5.1b they 
would be regarded as responding incorrectly to PQ exemplars but 
correctly to -PQ and-P-Q exmplars whereas if they adopted the same 
response pattern with a propositional conditional they would be 
regarded as responding correctly to PQ exemplars and incorrectly 
to -PQ and -P-Q exemplars. 
Another related point here concerns whether the exemplars are 
presented for evaluation simultaneously or consecutively. In the 
original task of Johnson-Laird and Tagart exemplars were presented 
consecutively. Although the statement used was a general conditional 
it could be construed as a propositional conditional which was to be 
evaluated afresh for each card (exemplar). In some studies involving 
tasks similar to the evaluation task (Ward 1972; Shine and Walsh, 
1971; Neimark and Slotnick, 1970) sets of exemplars were presented for 
evaluation simultaneously. Shine and Walsh for example presented their 
subjects with a statement for evaluation and a. picture of several 
shapes and instructed the subjects to "cross out figures for which the 
statement is true ". The subject effectively has to consider each shape 
with respect to the statement just as he has to consider each exemplar 
with respect to the rule in the evaluation task. However it seems 
likely that presentation of exemplars simultaneously will increase the 
likiihood of subjects focusing their attention on the most salient 
exemplars at the expense of the others and the most salient exemplars 
will be those mentioned in the rule. Response on the evaluation task 
is thus likely to be influenced by whether exemplars are presented 
consecutively or simultaneously. 
Looking at the evaluation task in this way brings out the similarity 
between the evaluation task and the verification task. In the 
verification task the conditional has to be judged as true or false 
with respect to a set of exemplars. In the evaluation task the 
conditional is judged as true or false with respect to one exemplar at 
a time: the evaluation task is not the same as the verification task 
even in the case where the exemplars are presented at the same time 
since even in this case the evaluation of the truth or falsity of the 
rule is made for each exemplar individually. 
Ist Chapter 1 it was mentioned that according to Ennis's interpretation 
of Piagetian theory a propositional combination can be verified only 
if all elements relevant to that combination can be shown to be 
present and all other elements shown not to be present. Thus an 
implication can be verified only if PQ, -PQ and -P--Q elements are 
present and P -Q elements absent. It is possible to verify an 
implication in terms of Piaget's theory but it would not be possible 
to (lo so within the context of the evaluation task since the truth of 
an implication can only be established by consideration of all 
exemplars simultaneously. In the evaluation task the subject is 
required to say whether one element at a time makes the conditional 
true or false, Even when exemplars sre presented simultaneously they 
are presumed to be judged independently. In order to say whether an 
implication is true or false in terms of Piaget's theory a judgerient 
would have to be nade about the set of exePlplars. This was the 
judgement required in the conditional verification task. 
(e) Another factor which affects response on the evaluation task is 
the content of the statement to be evaluated. It seems likely that 
exemplars are more likely to he evaluated correctly when the empirical 
relationship between the content of the antecedent and consequent is 
obviously an implication relationship. l!accus and Rips (1979) showed a 
significantly higher number of biconditional response patterns in both 
an evaluation task and a syllogistic reasoning task when the content 
of the problem concerned an empirical situation in which the 
relationship between the event described in the antecedent and that in 
the consequent was likely to be understood as a biconditional 
relationship rather than a conditional relationship. The 
"biconditional" problem concerned an apparatus in which a ball rolled 
into a hole and lit a coloured light. Subjects tended to interpret a 
statement like: "If the ball rolls left the red light flashes" as a 
biconditional (i.e. as false in the ease were the ball does not roll 
left and the red light flashes as well as in the case where che hall 
rolls left and the light does not flash) more often than a statement 
where the relationship between the antecedent and consequent was not 
likely to be interpreted as a biconditional e.g. "If a fish is striped 
it is red." or a statement, like that used by Johnson-Laird and 
Tagart, concerning the relationship between letters and numbers on 
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cards. The empirical relationships between the antecedent and 
consequent in the latter two problems is what might be termed 
contingent but plausible. Although many researchers into reasoning 
with natural language premises regard the effect of the content of the 
premises on the inferences made as a factor to be examined in a 
complete account of reasoning with natural language premises, 
contingent but plausible premises seem to be the ideal to test 
comprehension of logical relationships since it is as close to 
"neutral" as can be achieved. In Paris's task the content used was 
contingent but not very plausible. Most people would find it difficult 
to imagine how the fact that "a bird is in the tree" is related to the 
fact that "the shoe is on the foot ". 
(d) Another factor relating to the presentation of the evaluation task 
which may influence subjects' responses on the task is whether the 
data for evaluation are presented linguistically or 
non -linguistically. In Johnson -Laird and Tagart's original conditional 
evaluation experiment the data were presented non -linguistically: 
cards were presented rather than descriptions of cards. Marcus and 
Rips (1979) on the other hand presented their subjects with verbal 
descriptions of the relevant attributes of the exemplars to be 
evaluated although they had also shown their subjects the relevant 
task materials in the initial description of the task. Marcus and Rips 
found little difference between the response patterns of their 
subjects with linguistically presented problems and those of 
Johnson -Laird and Tagart with non -linguistic presentation: 81% of 
responses were consistent with a conditional interpretation compared 
with 83.3Z of conditional or partial truth table responses (considered 
as equivalent to the conditional) in Johnson- Laird and Tagart's task. 
.2(f6 
It is not clear however that children would find linguistic and. 
non-linguistic information equally easy to deal with. In experiment 
exemplars were presented verbally since performance on the evaluation 
task was to be compared with that on the syllogistic reasoning task. 
The studies discussed so far have looked at how adults (Johnson-Laird 
and Tagart, Marcus and Rips) and children (Paris, Peel, Ward, 
Sternberg) comprehend conditional statements in the evaluation 
paradigm. There have been few studies concerned with the evaluation of 
universally quantified statements. Given the logical equivalence of 
the general conditional and universally quantified statements this 
omission is surprising. 
One of the few studies using the evaluation paradigm to assess how 
universally quantified statements are understood is a developmental 
study by Moshman (1979). Moshman presented his subjects with a 
hypothesis or generár rule of the form "If p then q", "If p then not 
q", "All P are Q" and "No P are Q". Subjects were then presented with 
eight different data descriptions pertinent to the rule and they were 
required to say for each data description whether it proved the rule 
true or false or offered no proof of the rule. The correct implication 
interpretation of course was that p-q exemplars proved the rule false 
while pq, -pq and -p-q exemplars offered no proof of the rule. 
npshman looked at the response patterns subjects gave in their 
evaluations of the data rather than reporting correct responses on 
specific exemplars. he found an increase in correct implication 
interpretation with increasing age from 18.75% correct at grade 7 (12 
years 10 months) to 42.75% correct at grade 10 (15 years 9 months) to 
60.5% correct by college students (19 years 4 months). This increase 
in correct conditional interpretation was accompanied by a decrease in 
1(47 
conditional and inconsistent response. In contrast to other studies 
using the evaluation (or hypotheeis testing) task with children, 
:oshman did not identify any conjunctive interpretations of the 
general rule. rowever this was probably due to the inclusion in his 
task of three response categories rather than the two used in other 
studies. Logically a subject adopting a conjunctive interpretation 
would evaluate pq instances as proving the rule true and -p-q, -pq qnd 
p-q as proving the rule false. Inclusion of a third response category 
probably introduces complexity into the task and makes subjects unsure 
as to whether "proVe5, false" or "offers no proof" is the correct 
response on -p-q, -pq and p-q exemplars. rany subjects who respond 
according to a conjunctive interpretation with two response categories 
would probably be classified as responding inconsistently with three 
response categories. 
The significant effect of logical form which loshman found was 
entirely attributable to the greater number of implication 
interpretations for negative rules, "No P are Q" and "If p then 
net-q", than for affirmative rules, "All P are Q" and "If p then q". 
Subjects apparently found it no easier to evaluate exemplars with 
respect to the universally quantified statement "All P are Q" than to 
evaluate exemplars with reeect to the conditional "If p then q". 
Given the large difference in response on class and conditional 
statements in the verification task of experiment 2 the absence of a 
significant effect of linguistic form in roshman's task is surprising 
since both the verification task and the evaluation task (hypothesis 
testing task) purport to test comprehension of implication. However 
the main effect of linguistic form in the verification task was 
attributable to the difference in performance by subjects up to first 
Iyg 
year secondary. Since the mean age of Hoshman's youngest croup was 12 
years 10 months it is possible that a younger group of subjects in an 
evaluation/hypothesis testing task like Noshman's would have shown a 
significant effect of linguistic form. 
An alternative explanation of the absence of an effect of linguistic 
form is that the evaluation task using both class and conditional 
statements requires formal operational thinking. Although the good 
performance of primary school subjects with class statements in the 
verification task might be taken as an indication that subjects at 
this age can understand logical class inclusion and should therefore 
be able to respond correctly on any task involving the comprehension 
of class inclusion, it seems likely that subjects will he able to 
solve extensional tasks like the verification task at a younger age 
than purely linguistic tasks like the evaluation task. In a task like 
the evaluation task the subject effectively has to use the structure 
or the sentence to work out the kinds cf empirical elements which are 
compatible with that sentence whereas in the verification task the 
elements are physically present, or if the sentence is false, any one 
falsifying instance is sufficient to falsify the sentence. 
In experiment 5 subjects from 6 to 17 years were presented with an 
evaluation task involving the evaluation of pq, peq, epq and -p-q 
exemplars with respect to either a class or conditional general rule. 
The suitability of the consistency/inconsistency response requirement 
rather than a proves true/proves false/no proof response requirement 
has been discussed. Uowever this kind of judgement is obviously not 
very useful in presenting the task to children since they are unlikely 
to understand the terms consistent/inconsistent or 
coeTatible/incompatible. The task was presented by describing to the 
child a certain domain. e.g. 'insects in a garden' for which it. could 
he said that a certain rule was true e.g. "In my garden all the big 
insects are striped.". The subject's task was to say whether exemplars 
with particular attributes, pq, p-q, -pq and -p-q, (insects of a 
particular size and colour) could belong to this domain. The judgement 
concerning whether an exemplar is a possible element of a domain is 
apparently the same type of judgement as the consistency/inconsistency 
of an exemplar with a general rule but framed in terms that the young 
child can understand. 
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TITT, EVALUATION TASK 
METHOD 
The general procedure and subjects were as described in Chapter 3. 
The evaluation task was similar to that developed by Johnson -Laird and 
Tagart as a means of studying the comprehension of implication. Since 
the children probably would not understand what words like proof, 
consistent and compatible mean the task was presented in the manner 
described below. Two different content vehicles were used in the 
presentation of the task - insects and shapes. The instructions for 
the insect problem are presented below (those for the shape problem 
are presented in Appendix0). 
The child was told that the problem was about the insects in Hi: Jones' 
garden and he was read the following story which described the problem 
and contained the instructions: 
"One day when Hr. Jones was in his garden he noticed lots of insects. 
He watched carefully and saw three different kinds of insect. We don't 
have a picture of the insects but we do know that FIr. Jones saidthis 
about the insects in his garden. He said: "In my garden all the big 
insects are striped. ". We know too that this sentence is true. 
Remember there are three different kinds of insect in Mr. Jones' 
garden; Nr. Jones said that in his garden all the big insects Are 
striped and this is true. What I'd like you to do now is to say 
whether you think, Mr. Jones could have insects like this in his 
garden: "This insect is big and it is striped." So we have here an 
insect which is big and striped and you have to say whether you think 
D31 
Jones could have an insect like this in his garden, YES or NO. Now 
we have here another insect...etc." 
The question was repeated eight times for the eight different kinds of 
exemplar formed by combining positive and negative values of the 
attribute mentioned in the rule. These are shown in Table 5.2. There 
are of course only four different kinds of exemplar (insect) but each 
was presented twice, the order of presentation of the attributes being 
different in the two cases. 
The story was read aloud to the child and the rule and exemplars were 
also presented on separate written cards, with the exemplars presented 
in random. order. For half the subjects the rule was a universally 
quantified statement and for the other half it was a general 
conditional. 
It was emphasised to the subject that there were three different types 
of insect in Mr. Jones' garden to try and minimise the liklihood that 
the subject would consider that only exemplars with the attributes 
mentioned in the rule were relevant. It was also emphasised that he 
should say whether an insect might be in Mr. Jones garden not whether 
it definitely was in the garden. 
RESULTS 
Mean percent correct response to the four different exemplars, foqp, 
P-1, -ipTand -p-qt, for the two different linguistic forms 
for subjects 
ît different grades are shown in Table 5.3 and represented graphically 
in Figures 5.3a and 5.3b. A 6 (grade) X 2 (linguistic form) X 4 (type 
of exemplar) analysis of variance with grade and linguistic form as 




In my garden all the big insects are striped 
(1) This insect is big 
and it is striped. 
(2) This insect is big 
and it is not striped. 
(3) This insect is not big 
and it is striped. 
(4) This insect is not big 
and it is not striped. 
(5) This insect is striped 
and it is big. 
(6) This insect is striped 
and it is not big. 
(7) This insect is not striped 
and it is big,;. 
(8) This insect is not striped 




























































































































































































































































































































































































PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSES TO DIFFERENT INSTANCES (PQ,P- Q, -P -Q, & -PQ) 
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PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSES TO DIFFERENT INSTANCES (PQ,P- Q, -P -Q, & -PQ) 
FOR CONDITIONAL RULE PLOTTED AGAINST GRADE 
251, 
was carried out on correct response. The results of this analysis are 
shown in Table 5.4. 
There was a highly significant main effect ot grade, F(5,180)=28.49, 
»40.001, reflecting mainly the superior performance of the secondary 
subjects. The main effect of linguistic form was not significant but 
the grade by linguistic form interaction was significant, 
F(5,180)=2.41, T.40.05. The highly significant nain effect of exemplar, 
F(3,540)=106.40, p(0.001, confirmed that some instances are easier to 
evaluate than others: specifically 93 of pq, 83% of p-T, 55 of 
and 41% of -pee exemplars were correctly evaluated. The highly 
significant grade by exemplar interaction, F(I5, 540)=6.47, p<0.001, 
reflected the similar levels of correct response on pq and p-q, 
exemplars for subjects at all ages in contrast with the increase in 
correct response on -nand 4141 exemplars with increasing age. 
An analysis of the simple main effects of linguistic form at different 
Grades showed that linguistic form was only significant for subjects 
at third year secondary, F(1,180)=7.87, p<1).01 (see Table 5.4a). 
Although the Grade X Linguistic form X Exemplar type interaction was 
not significant the superior performance by S3 subjects on class 
statements did seem to be largely attributable to performance on one 
statement type (-p4)1 78% of evaluations of Ilexemplars with respect 
to a class statement were correct compared with only 41';:, for 
conditional statements. Because of the significant difference in 
performance with grade in evaluating exemplars with respect to class 
and conditional statements it was decided to perform further analyses 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rVLALJATIOii OF EXEMPLARS WITI{ F{I,SPF:CT TO A CLASS F:ULF. 
A 6 (grade) X 4 (type of exemplar ) analysis of variance with 
grade as a between -subjects factor and exemplar type as a 
within- subjects factor was carried out on correct response to the 
class statement exemplars as a preliminary to calculating simple 
effects (see Table 5.5). Both factors, grade, F(5,90)= 28.90, p40.001, 
and exemplar, F(3,270)= 50.00, p4 0.001, and the grade by exemplar 
interaction, F(15,270) =4.63, p(0.001, were significant. 
Tests of simple interactions were carried out in the first place on 
adjacent grades and significant differences were found between P6 and 
Si, F(3,270) =4.91, p40.005, and between S1 and S3, F(3,270) =4.57, 
p<0.0O5. No other tests between adjacent grades were significant but 
all tests of simple interactions between primary and secondary grades 
were significant (see Table 5.5a). 
Tests of simple main effects of type of exemplar revealed significant 
F ratios for all primary grades and for S1 but not for S3 and S5 (see 
Table 5.5b) suggesting that performance on this task was mature by 
third year secondary. 
Tests of simple main effects pf grade for different exemplars showed 
that the F ratios for pq and p -q exemplars were not significant while 
F ratios for -p -q, F(3,357) =24.37, p(0.001, and -pq exemplars, 
F(3,357)= 11.19, F40.001, were significant (see Table 5.5c). This 
indicates that improvement in performance with increasing age was 
entirely due to improvement in performance on -pq and -p -q exemplars. 
Newman Keuls comparisons of exemplar means revealed significant 























































































































































































































































































































TESTS OF SIUPLE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GRADES FOR CLASS STATEMENTS 
F RATIOS AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
P2 P4 P6 S1 S3 S5 
P2 0.362 1.990 2.610 5.810 3.335 
ns ns 1)40.05 p40.001 1140.05 
P4 0.955 4.625 8.395 5.246 
T1S p40.005 1140.001 p40.005 
P6 4.911 12.892 9.770 
p0.005 p'.0.001 1)40.001 





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































FVALPATION OF EXEMTARS WIT} RESPECT TO A GL=AL CONDITIONAL 
The results of a 6 (grade) X. 4 (exemplar type) analysis of variance on 
correct response on the conditional evaluation task are shown in Table 
5.6. Significant F ratios were found for grade, F(5,90)=7.33, p<0.001, 
exemplar, F(3,270)=98.81, p(0.001, and the grade exemplar 
interaction, F(15,270)=2.06, 
Tests of simple interactions on adjacent grades revealed a significant 
F ratio only for the P6/S1 comparison, F(3,270)=3.3$, p<h.05 (see 
Table 5.6a). Tests on simple interactions for all primary/secondary 
comparisons were significant but no primary/primary or 
secondary/secondary comparisons were significant. 
Tests of simple nain effect of exemplar revealed significant F ratios 
at all grades (see Table 5.6b). Tests of simple main effects of grade 
showed that only the F ratios associated with p-fp exemplars, 
F(5,360)=2.73, p4.025, and -p-vexemplars, F(5,360)=14.78, p(0.001, 
were significant (see Table 5.6). 
Newman Neuls comparisons between exemplars revealed significant 
differences between all exemplars (see Table 5.6d). 
To establish whether there was an effect of the order of presentation 
of tasks on response on the evaluation task an analysis of order 
effects was carried out. Nall the subjects responded to the 
verification tasks first while for the other half the evaluation and 
syllogism tasks preceded the verification tasks. It was thought 
possible that the concrete content of the verification tasks would 


































































































































































































































































































































































TESTS OF SIPíPLE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN GRADES FOR C.C. l 1 tDNti4L STAMMENtS 
F RATIOS AND SIGräIFICA.t3CE LI;VT'LS 
P2 P4 P6 81 83 S5 
P2 - 0.486 1.295 7.483 5.420 5.960 
ns ns . pG0.001 p<0.005 pU0.001 
P4 - 0.636 6.568 5.468 6.794 
ns p40.001 p40.005 1340.001 
P6 - 3.383 2.574 3.842 
/40.05 ns pU0.O25 
S1 - 1.187 1.468 
ns ns 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































subjects who received the verification tasks first since the 
verification tasks involved a pictorial representation of elements 
compatible with the class and conditional rules. Those subjects who 
responded to the verification tasks with class statements received 
conditional statements on the inference tasks. Since primary subjects 
performed much better on class verification than on conditional 
verification it was possible that any benefits of prior presentation 
of the verification tasks would be greater when the verification tasks 
concerned class statements, i.e. when the evaluation task concerned 
conditional statements. To establish whether there were any effects of 
presentation order a 6 (grade) X 2 ( linguistic form) X. order (2) 
analysis of variance was carried out on correct response. The results 
are shown in Table 5.7. Only the main effect of grade, F(5,168)= 30.52, 
pGD.O01, and the grade X linguistic form interaction, F(5,168) =2.87, 
p40.025, were significant. The absence of a main effect of 
presentation order or any interaction of presentation order with other 
factors indicated that response on the evaluation task was not 
affected by prior presentation of the verification tasks. 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS 
Table 5.$ shows the number of subjects at each grade who responded 
according to one of the consistent response patterns - conjunctive, 
biconditional or conditional. There was no difference in the overall 
distribution of response patterns between class and conditional 
statements,3) =6.09, p 0.2 and consequently analysis on response 
patterns was performed on the data collapsed across statement form. 
The number of response patterns classified as consistent increased 
with increasing age from 19% at P2 to 72% at S5. This increase in 










































































































































































































































































































































































































CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE PATTERNS 
CLASS RULE 
CONJ. BICOND. COND. INCONSIST. 
P2 2 1 0 13 
84 5 0 0 11 
P6 8 0 0 é 
81 3 4 3 6 
S3 0 2 8 6 
85 1 0 9 6 
TOTAL 19 7 20 50 
CONDITIONAL RULE 
CONJ. BICOTdD. COND. INCONSIST. 
P2 3 O 0 13 
P4 4 2 1 9 
P6 5 ` 1 0 10 
S1 2 7 2 5 
S3 3 3 4 6 
85 1 5 7 3 
TOTAL 18 18 14 46 
TOTAI. 
CONJ. T3ICOND. COND. INCONSIST. 
P2 5 1 0 26 
P4 9 2 1 20 
P6 1-3 1 0 18 
S1 5 11 5 11 
83 3 5 12 12 
S5 2 5 16 9 
TOTAL 37 25 34 96 
The predominant consistent response pattern for primary school 
children was a conjunctive /structure neutral interpretation although 
the majority of primary school response patterns were inconsistent. 
Meld 
This changed to a bicondition.al /equivalence interpretation at Sl'to a 
conditional interpretation at S3. The only significant adjacent grade 
comparison was between P6 and Si, "3) =1£3.55, pe.D.001. All 
non -adjacent comparisons were significant except the P2 /P6 comparison, 
a further indication that improvement in performance only occurred for 
secondary subjects. 
DISCUSSION 
The evaluation task is like a hypothesis testing task although as 
presented here the "hypothesis" is a domain specific rule which is 
known to be true and the data are presented as exemplars (elements 
whose attributes have specific relationships with respect to the rule) 
to he evaluated as possible or not possible elements of the domain. 
The judgement is thus similar to a compatibility or consistency 
judgement. Although subjects at all aces seemed to understand what was 
required of them in the task the younger children did not perform very 
well. The rule has the effect of restricting the kinds of element 
which are possible elements of the domain by excluding p -q exemplars. 
Primary school children, however seemed to think that only those 
instances with the attributes mentioned in the rule were possible 
elements of the domain. This interpretation of a class rule leads to 
what has been called a structure neutral type of response pattern 
while for the conditional rule a conjunctive response pattern results. 
The significance of the comparison between P6 and Sl on the tests of 
2:73 
sinple interactions on the exemplar analysis for both class and 
conditional rules reflects the improvement in performance between the 
ages of 10.5 to 12.5 years in accepting as possible elements of the 
domain exemplars other than those possessing the attributes mentioned 
in the rule. Overall 78% of -p-q exemplars were accepted by first 
year secondary subjects compared with only 29% by primary six 
subjects. There was a corresponding increase in correct rejection of 
n-q exemplars from 737, at P6 to 97% at Si (collapsed across class and 
conditional statements) but subjects at Si still had difficulty 
with -pq exemplars with only 31% of the responses by Si subjects on 
this exemplar correct compared with 23% of P6 responses. The 
significant comparison between SI and S3 on the tests of simple 
interactions for class statements reflects the increase in acceptance 
of -pq exemplars between Si and 53 as well as a further small increase 
in correct acceptance of -p-q exemplars in contrast with the 
relatively stable performance on pq and p-q exemplars. Py third year 
secondary there was RO significant difference in performance on the 
four different exemplars for class statements as shown by the non- 
significance of the F ratio for tests on simple rain effects of 
statement type at 53. Although subjects at Si realized that exemplars 
other than pq exemplars were possible elements of the domain this 
realization appeared before the ability to work out exactly which 
exemplars were possible. The difficulty Si subjects still had with 
the -pq exemplar compared with their good performance in 
accepting -p-q exemplars indicated that the main difficulty was with 
the asymmetry of the class statements in allowing -pq but not p-q 
exemplars. This was confirmed by the classification of response 
patterns which showed several hiconditional interpretations at 51 and 
fewer conjunctive interpretations, in contrast with the prevalent 
conjunctive interpretation for primary subjects. The change in the 
response pattern classification from P6 to 51 was significant. Only 
the modified classification for the 51/53 comparison was significant 
but the 51/S5 comparison for the standard response pattern 
classification was significant reflectin a gradual change to the 
correct response. 
Only the P6/51 comparison for tests of simple interactions was 
significant for the conditional statenent analysis. In addition the F 
ratios for the tests of simple main effects of statenent type for the 
conditional statement were significant at all grades: the significance 
of the tests of simple nain effects of statement type for 53 and 55 
subjects on the conditional statement contrasted with their 
non-significance on class statements. The difference was mainly due to 
the superior performance by S3 and 55 subjects in evaluating -pq 
instances with respect to a class rule as opposed to a conditional 
rule. The significance of the comparison between -pq and -p-q 
exemplars on the Newman Keuls comparisons for conditional statements 
but not for class statements (see Tables 5.5d and 5.6d) was further 
evidence of the difficulty that subjects had in evaluating -pq with 
respect to a conditional rule. Although Si subjects also had problems 
in evaluating -pq exemplars with the class rule, by 53 subjects could 
cope with this exemplar. Analysis of simple nain effects of grade for 
conditional statements showed that significant F ratios were found 
for -p-q and p-q exemplars but not for pq and -pq exemplars. 'This also 
contrasted with the class statement analysis which showed significant 
F ratios for-pq and -p-q exemplars. There was a significant 
improvement with age in evaluating -p-q exemplars for both class and 
conditional rules but only for the class rule was the improvement in 
evaluating -pq significant and only for the conditional rule was the 
increase in correct rejection of p-q exemplars significant although it 
was a trend for the class statements. 
The results of experiment 5 are compatible with the view that correct 
evaluation of exemplars with respect to a universally quantified or 
general conditional statement requires formal operational thinking. 
The insight that exemplars other than those mentioned in the rule are 
possible elements of the domain seems to occur around the age of 12 
years, the age regarded by Piaget as the advent of formal operational 
thinking. This insight is very like that described by Piaget as an 
identifying feature of formal thought: 
"There is no doubt that the most distinctive feature of formal thought 
stens from the role playdiby statements about possibility relative to 
statements about empirical reality." (Inhelder and Piaget, 1958, p. 
245.) 
"The most distinctive feature of formal operational thought is this 
reversal in direction between reality and possibility." (Inhelder and 
Piaget, 1958, p. 251) 
According to Piaget the concrete operational child is limited to 
structuring reality and his understanding of language reflects this 
fundamental limitation. lie regards statements such as the class and 
conditional general rules as "direct mappings" of reality and cannot 
use the structure of the sentence to work out the different possible 
elements which are compatible with the rule. The formal operational 
subject on the other hand can understand the hypothetical or higher 
order nature of the general rule and can understand that the general 
rule is compatible with different possible empirical situations. 
The concrete operational subject's grasp of additive classification 
should enable him to understand that "All A are B" entails the 
possibility of b which are not -a since A + A' _ B. It might be 
predicted that this ability should enable the concrete operational 
subject to understand from the statement "All A are B" that ab and -ab 
elements are possible elements of a domain for which "All A are B" is 
true. however as the evaluation task demonstrated subjects did not 
accept -ab elements as possible domain elements until adolescence. It 
is not clear whether the concrete operational subject would also be 
expected to be able to accept -a -b elements as compatible with the 
inclusion relation AGrj, although it seems likely that they would not 
since the structures of the concrete operational subject are not 
integrated into a complete system. The evaluation task showed that 
subjects cannot accept -a -b elements until around adolescence when he 
understands that elements other than those mentioned in the rule are 
compatible with it. 
Although Piaget talks of the groupings of concrete operations as 
logical groupings they are not logical in the standard sense of being 
independent of content and constituting complete systems. The concrete 
operational subject's comprehension of the inclusion of one class in 
another is initially based upon an understanding of concrete classes 
which are neighours in a classification scheme: e.g. dogs + dogs which 
are not mammals _ mammals. Given a statement such as "All dogs are 
mammals" the concrete subject knows that there may be mammals which 
are not -dogs. An evaluation task based on comprehension of class 
inclusion between neighbours in a hierarchical classification scheme 
would be like this: 
"All dogs are mammals. Is it possible that there are things which are: 
a) both dogs and mammals (ab) 
2:17 
b) things which are not -dogs but are mammals ( -ab) 
c) things which are dogs but are not-mammals (a -b) 
d) things which are not -dogs and not -mammals (- a-b) ?" 
Response in a task such as this could be generated independently 
of the class inclusion statement and would constitute a test of 
the subject's semantic memory representation, which is an interesting 
study in its own right as Smith (1979) has shown. Indeed, as mentioned 
in Chapter 3, Smith showed that even 4 year old children responded 
well on a task similar to this. However the aim of the evaluation task 
was to establish. to what extent the subject can use the linguistic 
structure of the class inclusion and implication expressions to work 
out the inferential properties of these expressions in the absence of 
semantic (as in the task above) or empirical (as in the verification 
task), support. 
Although comprehension of "All A are B" is said to depend upon an 
understanding of ,additive classification, when the inclusion 
relationship concerns an inclusion relationship which is contingent 
rather than logically necessary (i.e. an inclusion relationship which 
is empirically true rather logically necessary) theoretically 
comprehension of the logical consequences of the linguistic expression 
of class inclusion seems to depend. in a more obvious way on the 
logical multiplication of classes rather than on their logical 
addition since it depends upon recognition that class inclusion 
corresponds with logical implication and logical implication is a 
propositional operation which can only be generated from the products 
of the logical multiplication of two classes. Logical multiplication 
seems to be related to understanding of "All A are B" in the following 
way: the concrete operational subject can logically multiply (A + A') 
ri 
and (P B') to generate the products of this logical multiplication, 
AB A-B -AB 4- -A-B. According to Piaget the concrete subject does 
not understand the specific combination of elements from classes 
AB, -AB and -A-B and the absence of A-B elements as corresponding to 
class inclusion since this combinatorial ability is one of the 
abilities defined by Piaget as specifically formal operational. 
Multiplicative classification does not nor se lead to understanding of 
"All A are P" but it is a necessary precursor for understanding "All A 
are B". 
The difficulties in trying to understand exactly what the distinction 
is between the abilities of the concrete and formal operational 
subject in understanding class inclusion and implication were 
mentioned in Chapter 1. Piaget's claim in "Traite de Logique" (1949) 
that implication corresponds with inclusion P.0 and his illustration 
of implication in terms of class inclusion made the distinction 
particularly unclear, It seems however that Piaget's contention is 
that, although class inclusion and implication are logically 
equivalent, the formal operational subject has a more complex 
representation of the logical properties of inclusion and implication. 
Class inclusion can be understood at the concrete level provided the 
classes are obviously hierachically related or, as in the verification 
task, the class inclusion. statement refers to an empirical inclusion 
relationship. 
One of the most interesting results of the evaluation task was the 
poor performance by primary school subjects with class statements. The 
non-significance of the simple effects of linguistic form for the 
younger children for the grade by linguistic form interaction 
contrasts with the sizeable difference in correct response on class 
z7q 
and conditional statements by primary subjects in the verification 
task - 53% of class evaluations and 56% of conditional evaluations by 
primary children were correct compared with 79ió of class verifications 
and 5n of conditional. verifications. The significant grade by 
linguistic form interaction reflected the superior performance of 33 
subjects only for the class rule compared with the conditional rule. 
Comprehension of a universally quantified statement: "All A ar6 B" in 
an extensional task like the verification task does not guarantee that 
the statement is understood in the absence of appropriate concrete 
support. The primary school- children apparently cannot use the 
linguistic structure of the universally quantified statement to work 
out what the statement entails at least in the operationalization of 
the evaluation task used here. Although some (e.g. Ennis) would 
understand the poor performance of the primary school subjects in the 
evaluation task as evidence against Piaget's claim that concrete 
operational children can reason in terms of classes it would seem 
that, on the contrary, the results of the verification and evaluation 
tasks with class statements are entirely congruent with Piaget's 
theory in showing that subjects at the stage of concrete operations 
can deal with the quantification of classification when the problem 
concerns an extensional situation as in the verification task but when 
the problem requires the subject to work out logical consequences of 
the inclusion relationship in the absence of empirical or semantic 
support the concrete subject has difficulties. The relationship 
between the terms in the class rule in the evaluation task was 
contingent but plausible i.e. there was no necessary relationship 
between the size and markings of insect or between the shape and 
colour of shapes but it was not implausible that within a specific 
domain a certain relationship should hold. In order to solve the 
2_f 
problem the subject had to rely solely on the logical structure of the 
class inclusion relationship. 
NENTAL NODELS 
Johnson-Laird's theory of mental models has been mainly used to 
explain errors in syllogistic reasoning tasks and spatial inference 
tasks. If it is intended as a more general theory of inferential 
ability it should also be able to explain errors on a wide variety of 
inference tasks including the evaluation task. It is interesting to 
consider whether the mental model theory can account for the errors in 
the evaluation task. 
Johnson-Laird argues that in making, propositional inferences subjects 
do not need to have knowledge of inference rules because once they 
have learned the truth conditions for the propositional connectives 
they can make inferences by considering these truth conditions in 
conjunction with tht conditions under which the other premises are 
true or false and working out from there what must be true by 
excluding contingencies which cannot be true. Johnson-Laird underlines 
the difference between this method of making inferences and making 
inferences with inference rules. The former method is semantically 
based relying on knowledge of the meaning of the connective: knowledge 
of the logical properties of a connective emerge from the subject's 
comprehension of the meaning of that connective. The latter method 
relies on knowledge of formal rules of inference. However although it 
is possible that subjects make propositional inferences by considering 
truth functional properties of connectives Johnson-Laird argues that 
this method of inference would apply to a very limited number of 
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inferences. In order to account for the wider variety of natural 
language inferences which people find acceptable Johnson- Laird 
proposed the mental model theory as a More general theory of 
inference. According to Johnson -Laird, in understanding the meaning of 
a sentence a mental model of the sentence is constructed which 
corresponds to the states cf affairs which the premises describe and 
this model depends on general knowledge and knowledge of context. 
The model can be used as a basis for making inferences. 
In comprehending a quantified sentence such as "All A are B" the 
reasoner constructs a mental model of the sentence by representing 
prototypical exemplars of the terms A and B and the relationship 
between the terms. The model which the subject constructs consists of 
an arbitrary number of 'as' and 'bs'; each 'a' is identified with a 
'b' but there are possibly some 'bs' which are not 'as' (see Fig. 
5.4a). Johnson -Laird claims that mental models can also cope with the 
minor differences in meaning between natural language quantifiers Itke 
'every' and 'all' which are treated in standard logic as meaning the 
same. It is not clear how the general conditional would be represented 
in terms of mental models but if the general conditional is understood 
as a universal quantifier it would presumably be represented in a 
similar way to the quantifier "all ". 
From the model of "All A. are B" in Figure 5.4a the subject would 
readily be able to verify that ab elements were possible elements of 
the domain and also that -ab elements were possible domain elements. 
gowever consideration of the model would apparently lead subjects to 
deny that -a -b and a -b elements were possible since no such elements 
are represented in the model. The problem with this is that although 
a -b elements are not compatible with the statement -a -b elements are 
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Mental model representations of "All A are B." 
Figure 5.4a 
a = b 
a = b 
(b) 
Figure 5.4b 
a = b 
a = b 




compatible with the statement. Since the mental model theory of 
inference is primarily intended as a psychological account of 
inferential ability rather than a theory of how valid logical 
inferences can be derived this problem might not be important if the 
rodel made predictions which were psychologically correct i.e. if 
subjects did accept only ab and -ab elements as compatible with the 
model. However this response pattern was not one which was obserVed in 
the evaluation task in experiment 5 and it is not one which is 
typically found in evaluation tasks. The results of experiment 5 
showed that the response patterns which any theory would have to 
account for are the conjunctive/structure neutral, 
equivalence/biconditional and conditional/class inclusion response 
patterns. 
The mental model theory can readily account for the 
conjunctive/structure neutral response pattern on the evaluation task 
if it is assumed that the kinds of models subjects initially construct 
are like that in Figure (5.4b). Only ab elements are represented in 
the model and consequently the predictions from the model would be 
that only ab elements are compatible with the rule. Experiment 5 
showed that subjects gradually come to realize that -a-b elements are 
compatible with the rule. -a-b elements are not explicitly represented 
in the model and. the model does not seem to distinguish between the 
status of -a-b elements which are compatible with a biconditional 
interpretation of the rule and -ab and a-b elements which are not, 
since none of these elements are explicitly represented in the model. 
Problems concerning the difference in status between a-b and -a-h 
elements also arise for the model in Figure (5.4a) as well as the 
model in Figure (5.4b). 
It is useful at this point to consider how the difference in status 
between -a-b elements and a-b elements is established in other 
theories of reasoning. It has been mentioned that Piaget's theory 
would propose that not until the level of formal operations is a 
definite distinction made between -ab and -a-b elements which are 
compatible with an inclusion/implication relationship and a-b which 
are not, since only at this stage are the lopical properties of 
implication understood. The elements comprising the combinations of 
formal operations represent negation explicitly so that an element -ab 
explicitly represents an entity which possesses attribute 'b' but does 
not possess attribute 'a'. This contrasts with the mental model 
representation in which it has to be inferred that the parenthetical 
'b' element is not-a. In the Piagetian representation no distinction 
is made between the elements which make up a combination, for instance 
no distinction in status is made between the elements ab, -ab and -a-b 
which must be all "present" in order for an implication to be true. 
This is different from the distinction made in the mental model 
representation between the status of ab elements which are explicitly 
represented, -a-b elements which are not represented at all and -ab 
elements for which the attribute 'b' is explicitly represented but 
'not-a' is only implied. 
Theories of reasoning based upon Filler circles (Erickson, 1974) 
propose that in comprehending quantified statements subjects construct 
models of the statements which are isomorphic to the appropriate Euler 
circle representations of the statement. The Euler circle 
representation of "All A are 11" would be represented by the two 
diagrams in Figure (5.5a) and Figure (5.5b). Figures (5.5a) and (5.5b) 
correspond (approximately) to the mental models in Figures (5.4a) and 
(5.4b) respectively. Elements outwith the perimeter of a. circle in the 
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Euler diagram representation are members of the complement of the 
class represented by that cicle e.g. elements outwith the perimeter of 
the circle in Figure (5.5b) are members of not-A and not-B i.e. -a-b 
elements. The difference in status between -a-b elements and a-b 
and. -ab elements in Figure (5.5b) is represented in terms of the 
existence of an area for -a-b elements but not for a-b or -ah 
elements. 
The Euler circle model does not distinguish between conjunctive and 
biconditional interpretations of a universally quantified statement in 
terms of explicitly represented elements either: the distinction 
between a conjunctive interpretation and a biconditional 
interpretation in a Puler circle model could be captured by proposing 
that in a conjunctive interpretation the subject was not aware of the 
compatibility of elements outwith the circle in Figure (5.5b) with the 
truth of the statement while in a biconditional interpretation he was. 
The change from a conjunctive interpretation to a biconditional would 
presumably be captured by arguing that there is an increasing 
awareness of the logical properties of the representation. This 
increasing awareness of the logical properties of the representation 
could also account for different interpretations in the mental model 
theory although there does not seem to be a "zone" of the mental model 
representation which intuitively represents -p-q elements 
corresponding to the "zone" in the Euler diagram representation which 
represents -p-q elements. flental models do not capture in such an 
intuitive way as Euler diagrams or Piagetian combinations the 
distinction in status between elements which are unacceptable (p-q) 
and elements with negative attributes (-p-q). It seems likely that 
this was what Johnson-Laird intended since he wanted to represent 
directly asserted information rather than implied information. 
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In mental model theory there is a difference between the way in which 
negative information is represented when it is explicitly asserted and 
when it is not explicitly asserted. Negative attributes which are not 
explicitly asserted are represented by omission: i.e. if an 'a' 
element for example is not identified with a 'b' element it is assumed 
to be 'not -b'. Thus in Figure (5.4a) the parenthetical 'b' element is 
inferred to be 'not -a'. Johnson -Laird presumably intended the theory 
c;YQÌì G`Ny 
to representlonly asserted information from the sentence 
and that is why parenthetical 'b' elements are not explicitly defined 
as ' -a' and why -a -b elements are not included in the model. Where a 
negative relationship is explicit, as in "No A are B ", the negative 
relationship is represented by "fencing off" (Johnson -Laird's (1983, 
p.96) own term) the A elements from the B elements (Figure 5.6). 
Venn diagrams, which are graphic representations of logical statements, 
similar to but not the saine as Euler diagrams, allow the difference 
between a conjunctive interpretation and a biconditional 
interpretation of a universally quantified statement to be represented 
in an explicit way. Venn diagrams, unlike Euler diagrams or mental 
models, represent the universe of discourse of a problem by enclosing 
the problem space. A conjunctive interpretation of "All A are B" would 
correspond to Figure 5.7a. All elements in the universe of discourse 
would be ab elements. Gradually subjects would realize that -a -b 
elements were also possible discourse elements, Figure 5.7b. With 
time, the asymmetry of the universally quantified statement would be 
understood with the realization that -ab elements are also possible 
discourse elements, Figure 5.7c. This sequence of Venn diagram 













ability to evaluate elements as possible elements of the universe of 
discourse as observed in the evaluation task, While the Venn diagrams 
represent different interpretations of the rule in the development 
sequence explicitly, the mental model theory (and the ruler diagram 
representations) would account for the different interpretations in 
the developmental sequence in terms of the subject's increasing 
awareness of the inferential properties of his representations. 
In his principle of structural identity Johnson-Laird (1983) claims 
that : 
"the structures of mental models are identical to the structures of 
the states of affairs whether perceived or conceived that the models 
represent." 
Johnson-Laird argues that this is not true of other forms of meaning 
representation including truth tables which only capture truth 
functional relations between propositions, nor for Venn diagrams and 
T:uler circles which have artificial structures created by logicians. 
Neither the standard type of propositional representations nor the 
type advocated by Johnson-Laird which is closer to the linguistic form 
of sentences have structures identical to the states of affairs they 
represent, 
Despite Johnson-Laird's claim in the principle of structural identity, 
the inclusion of parenthetical elements in the mental model 
representations involvesa degree of abstraction which would be absent 
from a representation of "states of affairs", The model in Figure 
(5.4a) is like a canonical representation of the universally 
quantified statement "All A are 1i". It is an abstraction from the 
structure common to the models depicted in Figures (5.4b) and 
z$9 
(5.8).The device of parenthetical elements introduces indeterminacy 
into the model. Johnson -Laird presumably introduced the parenthetical 
device into his mental model notation in order to obviate the problem 
of the combinatorial explosion which is a problem for theories of 
reasoning based on Euler diagrams. In combining the Euler diagram 
representations of two premises in a syllogistic reasoning task many 
different combinations of diagram would have to be considered in order 
to draw a valid conclusion: the number of different diagrams which 
would have to be considered would be at least the product of the 
number of diagrams required to represent the premises. Venn diagrams 
introduce indeterminacy into Euler diagram models in the same way as 
parenthetical elements introduce indeterminacy into mental models. In 
the Venn diagram a shaded area indicates that there are no members of 
that set while an area with no shading possibly has members. Figure 
5.9 represents "All A are B ". It is similar to an abstraction of Euler 
diagrams 5.5a and 5.5b in that it could represent either of these 
pd 
models fis thus similar to mental model 5.4a. The Venn diagram 5.9 is 
different from model 5.4a in that ab elements, a -b elements and -ab 
elements have a similar logical status since all three types of 
elements are possible elements while as mentioned previously in the 
mental model representation the status of all three elements is 
different: -ab elements are "asserted" to exist, -ab elements are 
possible and -a -b elements are either absent or inferrable, 
Johnson -Laird does not make clear which. The distinction in status 
between the different entities compatible with the truth of "All A are 
F" entailed by the mental model theory is psychologically compelling 
in that it is obviously much easier for subjects to agree that ab 
elements are compatible with the truth of "All A are " than that -a -b 
or -ab elements are compatible with the statement. 
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Figure 5.8 
a = b 
a = b 
b 
Figure 5.9 
The abstraction implicit in the use of parenthetical items is not 
compatible with Johnson -Laird's claim that reasoning with mental 
models is "reasoning without logic ". Johnson -Laird acknowledged that 
in drawing a conclusion in a syllogistic reasoning task an integrated. 
model of the premises had to be constructed and tested. By systematic 
construction and exhaustive manipulation of the model and abstraction 
of a conclusion common to all constructed models, valid premises would 
emerge. It seems that in a similar way, the logical properties of a 
statement will "emerge" if the structure common to all possible models 
compatible with that statement is abstracted. By incorporating 
parenthetical items in the representations of statements it seems that 
Johnson -Laird is also incorporating the logical properties of these 
statements, i.e. properties which will determine valid inferences, 
into their representations. 
THE EVALUATION AND SYLLOGISTIC REASONING TASKS 
In the developmental literature on syllogistic reasoning it is 
frequently assumed that the 'matching' responses i.e. responses of 
valid to all four argument forms, Modus Ponens, Modus Tollens, 
Affirmation of the Consequent and Denial of the Antecedent, given by 
both children and adolescents are attributable to a biconditional 
interpretation of the major premise. However the results of the 
evaluation task show that primary school children apparently do not 
interpret conditional statements as biconditionals or class inclusion 
statements as class equivalence statements. Only 4% of response 
patterns by primary school children were consistent with such an 
interpretation. The response pattern analysis showed that where 
'2-ctl 
primary school subjects did adopt a consistent interpretation of the 
major premise it was a conjunctive/structure neutral interpretation: 
28% of the consistent response patterns by primary school subjects 
were of this type. In addition primary school subjects were just as 
likely to accept p-q exemplars (29% accepted) as -pq (32% accepted) 
and -p-q (30 accepted) exemplars as compatible with the general rule 
showing that many subjects who did not adopt the conjunctive 
interpretation still had difficulty with these exemplars. 
There is no reason to suppose that children who interpret a 
conditional statement as a conjunction in the evaluation task should 
interpret it any differently in a syllogistic reasoning task. The 
problem with this suggestion is that most syllogistic reasoning 
studies have interpreted the response patterns of children of this age 
as reflecting a biconditional rather than a conjunctive 
interpretation. O'Brien and Shapiro (196S), for instance found that 
6-8 year olds gave biconditional responses when reasoning with items 
like: 
If this is Boom 9 then it is 4th. grade. This is not Room 9. Is it 
4th. grade? (a) YES (b) NO (e) NOT ENOUGH CLUES 
Jost young children responded "NO" on this (D.A.) argument form and 
responded according to the biconditional interpretation on the other 
argument forms too: "YES" to N.P. and A.C. and "NO" to 11.T. 
The close relationship between the conditional evaluation task and the 
conditional syllogism task has been discussed by Marcus and Rips 
(1979) who regard the evaluation task as "a kind of conditional 
syllogism in reverse". They argue that the evaluation task involves an 
inference from the components of the conditional to the conditional 
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itself while in the syllogistic reasoning task an inference is made 
from the conditional to one of is components. When described in this 
way the difference between the evaluation task and the syllogism task 
seems similar to the difference between an inductive reasoning task 
and a deductive reasoning task. However, as has been discussed in the 
introduction to this chapter, the evaluation task is sometimes 
presented as a deductive reasoning task involving the evaluation of a 
specific instance with respect to a general rule and sometimes as an 
inductive reasoning or hypothesis testing task involving the 
evaluation (testing) of a general rule in the light of specific 
instances. 
In view of the similarity between the evaluation and the syllogism 
task, Marcus and Rips expressed some surprise at the difference in the 
relative proportions of conditional and biconditional response 
patterns compared with inconsistent responses which adult subjects 
make in the evaluation task, 83% conditional responses, (Johnson -Laird 
and Tagart, 1969) and the syllogistic reasoning task in which Taplin 
and Staudenmayer (1973) found that only 42% of response patterns were 
conditional. In a within subjects design Marcus and Rips replicated 
the difference in proportions of consistent response patterns on the 
two tasks: 69.8% of responses on the evaluation task. and only 32.1% on 
the syllogism task were conditional, with only 12.3% of responses on 
both tasks biconditional and 17.9% and 52.5% on the respective tasks 
logically contradictory. Marcus and Rips argued that the different 
results for the two tasks cannot be attributed to different 
interpretations of the conditional statement since the statements used 
in the two tasks were the same. Differences in response were 
attributed instead to the different inferential requirements of the 
two tasks: the evaluation task has less complicated inferential 
2qy 
requirements than the syllogistic reasoning task. 
??hile t(arcus and Rips acknowledged that the evaluation task has 
inferential requirements of its own, Sternberg made a more radical 
claim that his "encoding" task, which is similar to an evaluation 
task, involves only linguistic encoding. Sternberg argued that the 
-fhe 
method of partial tasks, one offinethods of task decomposition can be 
applied to the analysis of reasoning tasks to separate logical from 
linguistic factors in the development of reasoning abilities. 
The rationale of the method of partial tasks as it applies to the 
analysis of reasoning problems is this: the whole task, i.e. the 
traditional syllogistic reasoning task, involving both linguistic 
encoding and logical inference, and the partial task, the encoding 
task which requires only linguistic encoding, are both presented to 
the subjects. If the analysis of errors on both tasks reveals that the 
whole task is not much more difficult than the partial task it can be 
concluded that the difficulty in reasoning is primarily one of 
linguistic encod.iiî of the premises; if the whole task is much more 
difficult than the partial task it can be concluded that most of the 
difficulty in reasoning is associated with the logical combination of 
information. 
Sternberg4 presented children from grade 2 (7.5 years) to college 
students (19 years) with either the encoding task or the combination 
task (corresponding to the evaluation and syllogism tasks). The 
premises included conjunctive, disjunctive, biconditional and 
conditional relationships as well as affirmation and negation of 
attributes. Overall subjects made more errors on the combination task 
than on the encoding task: 70% response patterns in the combination 
task and 59% of response patterns in the encoding task did not conform 
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to the correct model pattern for that connective. Although a paired 
t- test on the overall means from the two tasks for each logical 
connective was significant, (t(4) =2.33, p(O.O5), Sternberg concluded 
that most of the errors occur in the initial encoding of the logical 
connectives and consequently that the major difficulty in reasoning is 
the linguistic interpretation of the connective. 
It is interesting to note that had Narcus and Rips analysed their 
evaluation and syllogistic reasoning tasks in terms of the method of 
task decomposition they would have probably concluded, as they 
apparently did anyway, that logical rather than linguistic factors are 
largely responsible for errors in syllogistic reasoning since 30.2% of 
their evaluation responses and 67.9% of their syllogistic reasoning 
responses did not conform to the correct model pattern; in other words 
a large percentage of the errors in the syllogistic reasoning task 
occur at the logical inference stage rather than the linguistic 
interpretation stage. Sternberg would presumably account for the 
ipekwecv 
difference `i his results and those of Narcus and Rips by arguing that 
the difficulty for children is one of linguistic interpretation but 
once they can interpret the statement reasonably well the major 
difficulty becomes one of logical inference. Sternberg concedes that 
"it may be that some logical factors are involved in the encoding 
task" but he claims that these are of minor importance compared with 
the linguistic factors involved. 
According to the logic of the method of partial tasks it would not be 
possible for the subject to respond in the whole task in a 
developmentally more advanced way than on the partial task. However, a 
comparison of the results of the evaluation task of experiment 5 and 
performance by subjects of the same age, between 6 and 11 years, on 
Q-9 
syllogistic reasoning problems indicates that children of this age are 
considered to perform in a syllogistic reasoning task according to a 
developmentally more advanced interpretation, i.e. the biconditional, 
than subjects of the same age in the evaluation task who predominantly 
adopt a conjunctive interpretation. This will be discussed in Chapter 
6. 
SUMMARY 
In this chapter the conditional evaluation paradigm, another technique 
which purports to assess comprehension of the conditional, was 
discussed. The task requires the subject either to evaluate the truth 
of a conditional statement or rule in the light of different instances 
which have specific relationships to the rule (Johnson -Laird and 
Tagart, 1969) or to evaluate the compatibility of the instances with 
the rule (Marcus and Rips, 1979). e, modified version of the task 
including both class and conditional statements (rules) was designed 
so that young children would be able to understand the task 
requirements. Prior to the age of 12 -13 years subjects 
C)vtky 
consistently acceptedinstances with the attributes mentioned in the 
general rule as compatible with that rule even when the rule was 
expressed as a class statement. The young subjects who did not 
or, l 
accept' rq exemplars were just as likely to accept p -q exemplars as 
compatible with the rule as -pq and -p -q exemplars. Significant 
changes in the patterns of exemplars accepted were found between 
primary and secondary school with subjects realising that -p -q 
elements were compatible with the rule. Secondary subjects still had 
difficulty in using the logical structure of the rule to work out 
which exemplars were compatible with the rule and the asymmetry of the 
rule particularly caused difficulty: although by third year secondary 
subjects were just as likely to accept -pci elements as -p -q with the 
class rule, -pq exemplars were still frequently judged as unacceptable 
with the conditional rule. The changes in the pattern of exemplars 
accepted as compatible with the rule at adolescence were regarded as 
consistent with Piaget's proposal that a qualitative change in the 
child's thinking, occurs at adolescence with a "reversal in direction 
between reality and possibility". The primary subjects seem to regard 
the rules as descriptions of a determinate reality while the formal 
operational subjects can appreciate the hypothetical nature of the 
rule. The relevance of Johnson-Laird's mental model theory to the 
evaluation task was also considered. 
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CHAPTER 6 
CONDITIONAL AND CATEGORICAL SYLLOGISTIC REASONING 
It is well established within the literature on the acquisition of 
deductive reasoning abilities that both children and adolescents are 
much better at evaluating conclusions to valid argument forms, e.ç. 
Nodus Ponens (detachment), and Nodus Tollens (particular 
contraposition), than to invalid argument forms, e.g. Affirmation of 
the Consequent (particular conversion), and Denial of the Antecedent 
(particular inversion). Ennis and Paulus (1965), for instance, 
presented their subjects (grades 5, 7, 9 and 11, mean ages 10, 12, 14 
and 16 years) with all four argument forms and found a very low 
incidence of correct reasoning with A.C. and D.A.: only 2î of grade 5 
and 3% of grade 11 subjects, and 3% of grade 5 and 12% of grade 11 
subjects were correct on A.C. and I.A. argument forms compared with 
51% and 62% for .,. z r . and 30/... o and 35% a for N.T. Roberge (1970) found . - 
that his subjects performed better than this on Modus Ponens (grade 4: 
53% correct; ;rade- 10: 100% correct) and Dodus Tollens (grade 4: 35% 
correct; grade 10: 65% correct) but that they were almost as poor as 
Ennis and Paulus' subjects on A.C. (gracie 4: 2% correct; grade 10: 19% 
correct) and D.A. argument forms (grade 4: 2% correct; grade 10: 10% 
correct). 
Although other studies (O'Brien and Shapiro, 1968; Kuhn, 1977) have 
shown better performance by young children on all four argument forms, 
the essential difference in performance between valid and invalid 
argument forms remains. "bat is disputed however is how this 
difference should be interpreted. O'Brien and Shapiro (1963), ifill 
(1960), and Suppes (1965), would agree with Ennis et al (1969) that 
the ability of children between 6 and A years to reason correctly with 
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nocius ronenu and iiodus Tollens argument forms is "counterevidence to 
Piaget's claim that ehildren are incapable of doing:; propositional 
logic" (p.70). Ennis (1975, 1976) argued that the experimental 
evidence which indicates that young children can draw correct 
conclusions with certain propositional logic argument forms indicates 
that it is better not to treat class and propositional logic, as 
Piaget does, as 'unitary wholes' which are attained at a certain. stage 
of development. As was mentioned in the introduction to this thesis 
Ennis proposed. instead an alternative approach to the study of logical 
reasoning in which he proposed that facility with different logical 
arguments was acquired at different stages of development. 
nifong >, (1974), however, did not accept the developmentiii distinction in 
performance on valid and invalid argument forms as incompatible with 
Piagetian theory. Rather, he claimed that Piaget's theory would have 
predicted such results and he gave an account of some of the 
experimental data based upon Piaget's theory. Knifong argues that the 
pattern of responses of young children on the 4 argument forms are 
exactly what Piaget's theory of transductive reasoning would have 
predicted. The distinguishing characteristic of the transductive 
reasoning of the young child is that it is reasoning based on the 
juxtaposition. of elements which "go together ". Although some authors 
(e.g. Taplin et al 1974) have indicated that transductive reasoning is 
initially based on a conjunctive interpretation of the relationship 
between elements, Knifong proposes that the child understands the 
relationship rather as a biconditional: when one element is present, 
the other is also present and when one element is absent, so is the 
other. The difference between this and the conjunctive response 
pattern is that under a conjunctive interpretation, p and q are always 
presumed to co- occur, but the absence of both p and q is not 
So( 
understood to be compatible with the truth of the conjunction. Thus, 
when presented with a conditional statement like: 
"If this is room 9 then it is fourth grade" (Hill, 1960; O'Brien and 
Shapiro, 1968) 
the assertion of a minor premise will lead to the acceptance of the 
conclusion, and the denial of a minor premise will lead to the denial 
of a conclusion: this is a biconditional response pattern. 
I:nifong regards transductive reasoning as reasoning based upon a 
"limited" combinatorial system. 11e proposes that instead of 
understanding a conditional 'If p then q' as equivalent to the 
propositional combination corresponding to implication (p.q) V ( -p.q) 
V ( -p. -q) the transductive reasoner understands the conditional as 
equivalent to the propositional combination (p.q) V (- p. -q), which is 
the propositional combination corresponding to the biconditional or 
equivalence relationship. The major problem with this proposal is that 
biconditional reasoning is also propositional deduction since the 
biconditional is also one of the propositional logical connectives and 
consequently, in Piaget's theory, would also be claimed to he a formal 
operational acquisition. 
Bereiter, I,idi and Dinitroff (1979) argue that transductive reasoning 
and propositional biconditional reasoning generate the same response 
patterns to the 4 argument forms, but that these responses are 
generated by qualitatively different types of reasoning. They argue 
that the transductive reasoner does not understand the logical nature 
of logical connectives, but regards elements as "going together" 
(Flavell, 1963) simply because of their co- occurence in :a statement. 
The young child makes associative "and -connections" (Flavell, 1963) 
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between elements, rather than logical implication, or, for that 
matter, logical equivalence connections. Bereiter et al proposed that 
biconditional deductive, but not transductive, reasoners would be able 
to distinguish logically connected assertions from logically 
unconnected assertions. They devised a task in which subjects were 
presented with a conditional rule, followed by a question, and some 
clues to help them answer the question: 
e.g. RULE: If it is a hot day then Judy will wear her blue skirt. 
CLUES: (1) Blue is Judy's favorite colour. 
(2) It was a sizzingly hot day. 
(3) Judy looked lovely in her blue skirt that day. 
QUESTION: Did Judy wear her blue skirt? 
One of the clues was a critical clue (in this example, 2), from which 
the subject could make a deductively valid inference (if the deduction 
was not made, the following clue asserted the answer as in 3). The 
other clues were informationally relevant, but provided no deductively 
valid answer to the-question. The presentation of the critical clue 
was varied across the 3 positions and the child was required to 
respond only when he was sure of the correct answer. The results 
showed that, as predicted, 7 year -olds were very poor compared with 11 
year -olds at discriminating logically conclusive from logically 
irrelevant evidence with only 25% of 7 year -olds but 81% of 11 
year -olds consistently responding to the critical clue. Bereiter et al 
also noted that 2nd. graders often drew conclusions from the rules 
alone, treating the rule as an affirmative rather than a conditional 
statement. 
Taplin, Staudenmayer and Taddanio (1974), looked at the abilities of 
subjects from 9 years to 17 years to reason with abstract conditional 
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sentences. They presented their subjects with problems lice: 
If there is a Z then there is an R. 
There is a Z. 
There is an N. 
The subject was required to say, given that the first two sentences 
were true, whether the 3rd was always, sometimes, or never true. Both 
affirmative and negative versions of the 4 different argument forms 
were used. Responses to particular argument forms uhich were 
statistically consistent across 12 replications were used to try to 
infer a "truth function" for the major premise. Taplin et al found 
that 3 different truth functions could be inferred. The percentage of 
subjects inferred to have a truth function did not change with grade, 
but the predominance of each truth function changed with grade: for 
gracie 3 subjects (average age 9 years) the conjunctive and 
biconditional interpretations were equally prevalent, but by grade 5 
(average are 11 years), the biconditional was predominant, with few 
response patterns being classified as conjunctive. The biconditional 
response was, in fact, predominant for subjects at grade 5, grade 7 
(average age 13 year 7 months), grade 9, and grade 11 (average age 17 
years), but by gracie 9, some subjects began to respond according to 
the conditional, and the number of conditional response patterns 
increased slightly at grade 11. The predominance of the biconditional 
response pattern has been observed in many studies (Knifong, 1974; 
Bereiter et al, 1979). The conjunctive interpretation by the younger 
subjects had not been observed in previous studies, since most studies 
looked at correct response on particular argument forms, rather than 
considering responses as comprising a response pattern (O'Brien and 
Shapiro, 1963; Ennis et al, 1969). 
Taplin et al found significant differences in the distribution of 
response patterns between gracies 3 (9 years) and 5 (11 years), due to 
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a decrease in conjunctive accompanied by an increase in the 
biconditional response pattern and between grades 7 and 9, due to a 
decrease in biconditional accompanied by the start of conditional 
interpretation. Taplin et al argued that these results could be 
explained in two different ways: 
a) The results could be interpreted as supporting Piaget's theory, 
since reasoning becomes increasingly logical with increasing age, and 
the largest increases occur at the age ranges corresponding to 
Piaget's concrete operational and formal operational stages. It is 
interesting that, whereas most researchers regard changes in 
performance at the transition from one stage to another as compatible 
with Piaget's theory, Taplin et al regard changes in performance 
during the period of a particular stage as consistent with Piagetian 
stage theory. The increasing logicality explanation rests upon the 
assumption that the conjunctive, biconditional and conditional 
interpretations of the conditional are increasingly correct 
approximations to the meaning of the conditional. 
b) Taplin et al also propose an alternative linguistic explanation of 
their results: reasoning at all ages is logical, but the meaning of 
the connective is different for subjects at different grades. The 
rationale for this explanation is that the number of subjects 
responding in a truth- functional way does not change across grade, but 
their consistent response is based upon different interpretations of 
the major premise. This position will be recognised as a rationalist 
position that inference is always carried out in accordance with 
logical principles, and errors in reasoning occur at the stage of 
interpretation of the premises. 
Taplin et al go on to argue that some of Piaget's earlier work (Piaget 
dS 
1926,1928) supports the interpretational change explanation rather 
than the increasing logicality explanation. In his earlier work Piaget 
looked at how children understand causal and implicative connectives 
such as "since" "because" etc. fle found infrequent use of such 
connectives before 7-8 when they were used they were 
used to express co- occurence or juxtaposition of elements rather 
than implication or causality. Taplin et al argue that their results 
support Piap,et's early contention that initially the implicative 
connective is understood as expressing a conjunctive connection 
between events or elements; the biconditional interpretation gradually 
appears as subjects realize that not only do events p and q co -occur 
but the negation5of these events co- occur. 
The difference between Taplin's and i'iaget's (early) accounts of the 
change in meaning of the conditional with increasing age is that 
Taplin, but not Piaget, proposes that the subject is, at all ages, 
responding acccording to a truth -functional interpretation of the 
conditional, albeit an incorrect interpretation. Certainly the 
response patterns are consistent with truth functional interpretations 
but, as Bereiter et al have shown, the same response patterns can be 
produced by subjects who do not have an understanding of the logical 
necessity of the relationship but are merely responding in a 
transductive /intuitive way. 
The increasing logicality explanation is not really an alternative 
explanation of the results in the way that Taplin et al present it; 
rather it is a description of the results and is compatible with both 
the linguistic explanation and Piagetian theory. The increasingly 
complex interpretations of the conditional are necessarily 
increasingly correct when assessed with respect to the normative 
criterion of propositional logic. It does not seen particularly useful 
to say, as Taplin does, that a subject consistently interpreting 
conditional as a conjunction is just as logical as a subject 
consistently interpreting the conditional as a conditional since the 
former interpretation is defined as incorrect and the latter as 
correct. There are two factors which should be considered here - 
logical consistency and logical correctness. Taplin et al considered 
it important that the percentage of subjects classified as consistent 
did not change across grade; however just because a subject is 
consistent does not mean to say that he is correct. 
In arguing that developmental changes in conditional reasoning 
performance are linguistic Taplin et al acknowledge that they do not 
distinguish between linguistic and cognitive development and that 
their results do not allow them to do so. Staudonmayer and Bourne 
(1977) contrast a Piagetian explanation of the developmental changes 
in interpreting connectives with linguistic development theories like 
that of Brown (1973). I'iaget, of course, would attribute changes in 
the interpretation of logical connectives to changes in the kinds of 
cognitive operations available to the child: consistent logical 
interpretations of the propositional connectives would not be found 
until formal operations when the cognitive operations corresponding to 
the combinations of propositional logic are acquired. Brown, on the 
other hand, proposes that chances in the interpretation of the logical 
connectives depend upon the relative frequencies of occurmnce of these 
connectives in the child's experience and also upon the semantic 
complexity of the particular relation. Nore complex relations like the 
conditional will be understood at a later age than simple relations 
like conjunction. 
0-7 
Staudenmayer and Bourne (1977) point out that these two theories 
attribute constraints in reasoning to a) the linguistic interpretation 
of the connectives (Brown) and b) the availabiliy of the cognitive 
operations to make use of this interpretation (Piaget). They argue 
that rather than becoming embroiled in the linguistic/cognitive 
primacy debate it is more instructive to ask: "What cognitive 
operations are necessary to make a particular interpretation'?" (p. 
617). While this does indeed seem to be an appropriate question it 
should he pointed out that Piaget did approach the problem in this 
way. For Piaget as for Staudenmayer and Bourne the cognitive 
operations available determine the linguistic interpretation and hence 
the permissible inferences. 
Previous studies (Shapiro and O'Brien, 1970; Taplin et al, 1974) had 
indicated that children at certain ages have preferred interpretations 
of the conditional connective. Staudenmayer and Bourne asked whether 
there were any fundamental constraints in the cognitive operations 
available to the younger child or whether, as Frown suggests, 
experience with a' particular interpretation of the connective might be 
all that is required to promote comprehension of that connective. 
Staudennayer and Bourne carried out an experiment similar to that of 
Taplin et al but in which the subjects (grade 3: ages 8.5 years, grade 
6: 11.5 years and grade 9: 14,5 years) received feedback after every 
trial that was consistent with one of the three different 
interpretations of the conditional - conjunctive, biconditional and 
conditional. The results showed that, as expected, performance 
improved with increase in age : overall 317, 58 and 73 of 3rd. 6th. 
and 9th. graders responded correctly according to the appropriate 
feedback. However while all subjects performed reasonably well with 
the conjunctive feedback (56.5%, 77.3% and 88.9% correct repectively) 
and grade 6 and grade 9 subjects performed well with biconditional 
feedback (31.0%, 85.7% and 96.4% correct) subjects at all grades 
performed poorly when feedback was in accordance with the correct 
conditional interpretation of the premises (5.3%, 11.1% and 33.3% 
correct). 
Staudenmayer and Bourne argue that these results are not consistent 
with the linguistic experience interpretation since experience with a 
particular interpretation slid not always lead to good performance with 
that interpretation. Of course this analysis rests upon the rather 
dubious assumption that feedback on twelve replications of a 
particular interpretation constitutes the sort of experience which 
would promote a facility with that interpretation. Staudenmayer and 
Bourne claimed that their results suggested that there is a 
fundamental limitation in the cognitive operations available to the 
younger child in his attempts to reason according to the feedback. 
Staudenmayer and Bourne explain the patterns of errors on the 
different forms made by subjects at different stages in terms of the 
information processing strategies that the children use in dealing 
with the problem and in doing so they essentially give an information 
processing interpretation of Piaget's theory. 
Although syllogistic reasoning tasks are usually considered to be 
tasks involving formal operational thinking (Knifong, 1974; 
Staudenmayer and Bourne, 1977) it will be recalled from Chapter 3 that 
Kuhn (1977) regarded concrete operational thinking as the necessary 
and sufficient condition for correct response on a syllogistic 
reasoning task. Kuhn argued that the concrete operational child who 
can comprehend a class statement like "All P are Q" should also be 
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able to understand a conditional statement like "If p then q" because 
of the logical equivalence of "If p then q" and "All P are Q. ". 
Kuhn suggested that the low incidence of correct reasoning found in 
most developmental studies of inference with conditional syllogisms 
might be attributable to the long and tedious nature of the tasks 
( Taplin et al, 1974, Roherge and Paulus, 1971) which may have caused 
subjects to lose. interest and respond according to a simpler 
interpretation of the premises than they would adopt with more 
reflection. However Kuhn's replication of the Taplin et al procedure 
using only four items instead of the 96 used by Taplin et al produced 
similar levels of correct response. 
Kuhn then suggested that a higher incidence of correct response might 
be obtained if the task were presented in a concrete conversational 
format rather than a formal written mode. Kuhn presented her subjects, 
grade 1 (6 years 7 months) to grade 4 (9 years 10 months) with all 
four argument forms with both class and conditional major premises. 
The relationship between the terms p and q was contingent and 
plausible e.g. 
All the people in Tundor are happy. 
Jean does not live in Tundor. 
Is Jean happy? 
Kuhn did find a higher incidence of correct response on H.T. (80% 
correct), D.A. (72% correct) and A.C. (40% correct) argument forms 
which had been poorly answered in previous studies. Kuhn regarded her 
results as supporting her hypothesis that correct conditional 
s ,Abgcds 
reasoning is within the competence of concrete operational f and is 
facilitated by concrete conversational presentation. It was mentioned 
(z) 
in the introduction to the thesis that Piaget acknowledged that 
concrete operational subjects can make correct propositional 
inferences provided that the propositions correspond to "sufficiently 
concrete representations ". Presumably the content of the premises in 
Kuhn's task was of this nature. It is interesting to note that Kuhn 
found relatively k( levels of correct response on the argument forms 
D.A. and A.C.. Rappoport (Ennis, 1976) argued that correct response on 
these argument forms requires consideration of two truth table 
contingencies and would consequently constitute a better test of 
formal reasoning than M.P. and M.T. which. can be answered correctly by 
less sophisticated methods. 
For Piaget it is the concrete content of the premises which enables 
the concrete operational subject to give correct responses on some 
propositional reasoning tasks. Although Kuhn also demonstrated that 
the concrete conversational mode of presentation of the task greatly 
improved performance on the syllogistic reasoning task, she also 
suggested that it was the concrete operational subject's comprehension 
of the logical properties and consequences of class inclusion which 
enabled him to generate correct inferences with the class statement 
and the logically equivalent conditional. However the fact that the 
improvement in performance occurred with the concrete /familiar content 
indicated that correct response was not mediated by an analysis of the 
formal properties of the class statement. The correct response to the 
problem above for example may be generated independently of any 
consideration of the major premise e.g. a subject's reasoning may go: 
"Jean does not live in Tundor. Jean may be happy or maybe not since 
some People are happy and some are not.'" 
The results of the verification task and the evaluation task suggested 
31I 
that primary school subjects understood the quantification of 
class inclusion in an extensional situation: aril that they could not 
work out from the linguistic statement alone the inferential 
properties of the statement. It seems more reasonable to suggest then 
that the ability of concrete operational subjects to respond correctly 
on a syllogistic reasoning task with class and conditional premises is 
as 
due to the subject's abilitytPiaget puts it, to "evoke the situation 
concretely" than to an understanding of the logic of inclusion: an 
understanding of the logic of inclusion however, presumably develops 
through abstraction of the logical properties common to all concrete 
problems. 
In their "feedback" study Staudenmayer and ;Bourne gave their subjects 
feedback according to the conjunctive, biconditional and conditional 
(S212.sc. , 
patterns shown in Table 6.1. In this study both affirmative and 
negative conclusions were presented and the different response 
patterns were clearly differentiated from each other. Traditionally 
the syllogistic reasoning task is presented in question form rather 
than as conclusions-to he evaluated (Taplin et al, 1974; Staudenmayer 
and it)urne, 1977). It is interesting to consider what a conjunctive 
response pattern on the affirmative versions of the four argument 
forms only would be like. The response patterns for the biconditional 
and conditional interpretations are shown in Table 6.2. The response 
pattern for the conjunctive interpretation however is not so 
straightforward. Take the example of Taplin et alt 
If there is a Z, then there is an H. 
According to a propositional conjunctive interpretation this statement 
would be true only when there was a Z and there was a H. In all other 
FclAwvvve.5 fv\c2- 5-16ecA- Pestbov,se- iz-ot cArt. a,ir5L-tvvv2v4-. t^Q-. 
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circumstances, if there was only a Z or only a. H or if there was 
neither a Z nor an P, the statement would be false. The correct 
response to ;f.r. and to A.C. would be YES. Consider though the D.A. 
and N.T. argument forms: for both argument forms the information in 
the minor premise contradicts the information in the major premise. 
For subjects who understand the conditional as a conjunction, 
reasoning with these premises is like reasoninr. with the premises: 
There is Z and there is an H. 
There is not a Z. 
Is there an H? 
Strictly speaking subjects adopting a truth functional conjunctive 
interpretation of the conditional should refuse to respond arguing 
that the information as presented is logically contradictory. In 
practice it seers likely that the logical contradiction will not be 
appreciated particularly since it is the youre-er subjects who are 
presumed to adopt the conjunctive interpretation. The subject is 
trying to understand the problem as a whole and in doing so one of his 
presuppositions will be that a response is expected. 
In many problems involving a conjunctive interpretation it is only 
relevant to the solution of the problem that the conjunction is true 
when both components of the proposition are true. In some inference 
problems though correct response based upon an understanding of the 
logic of the situation would also require an understanding of the 
conditions under which a conjunction is false. 
Bereiter et al (1979) have pointed out that the younger subjects' 
biconditional response pattern is not based upon a truth-functional 
understanding of the problem but is generated by an "intuitive" or 
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"trtinsdI.Ictive" analysis based upon the co-ocC:uren(;4? of the elements in 
the proposition. Although this "transc:ìuctive" interpretation is 
apparently like a conjunctive interpretation in that the proposition 
is only true when both components are true, it should not be 
identified with a truth -functional conjunctive interpretation since 
the transductive reasoner, unlike the truth -functional reasoner, does 
not consider the conditions under which the proposition is false to be 
relevant. The most likely responses to an "intuitive" or "transductive" 
interpretation would be responses in which the polarity of minor 
premise and conclusion were matched and this would produce a 
"biconditional" response pattern. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 5 that the apparently more complex 
inferential requirements of the syllogistic reasoning task compared 
with the evaluation task made it unlikely that response on the 
syllogistic reasoning task would be developmentally more advanced than 
response on the evaluation task. However the predominance of the 
conjunctive response on the evaluation task and the evidence from 
syllogistic reasoning studies that the predominant response of younger 
subjects was biconditional seemed to contradict this view. It seems 
thou!lI that some subjects who would produce a conjunctive response 
pattern on the evaluation task would produce a biconditional pattern 
on the syllogistic reasoning task. Although the response patterns are 
the sane as those generated by truth functional interpretations of the 
premises the response patterns are not necessarily generated from a 
truth functional interpretation of the premises but would in fact be 
very largely a function of the task structure and requirements. 
&?hen the major premise is a universally quantified proposition or a 
general conditional there is another possible response pattern which 
3 I' 
subjects might make to a conjunctive interpretation of the rule. 
Consider: 
All the people in Tundor are happy. 
A "conjunctive" interpretation of this would be like Bucci's 
"structure neutral" interpretation: 
All the people live in Tundor and are happy. 
As before H.P. and A.C. responses would be YES. As with the 
propositional conditional the information in the major and minor 
premises of the A.C. and H.T. argument forms would be contradictory 
for a conjunctive interpretation of the rule: The minor premise "Jean 
does not come from Tundor" contradicts the major premise which is 
understood as saying that everybody comes from Tundor and is happy. 
Given that the subjects presuppose that a response is expected they 
will probably understand the conjunction as domain specific. Only 
within the domain of the problem is it the case that all people live 
in Tundor and are happy. Uhen a minor premise is negative the most 
likely interpretation will be that the negated element exists outwith. 
the domain of the rule: Jean is not happy, therefore Jean must be 
outSic(e the domain of the rule which specifies that everybody is happy 
and lives in Tundor. The most likely response to the negated elements 
is a matching one and consequently the conjunctive response pattern is 
indistinguishable from the biconditional. However a more sophisticated 
type of conjunctive interpretation might be found: since the negated 
elements are outside the domain of the rule the relationship between 
the attributes in the rule does not hold. If "Jean does not come from 
Tundor" she may or may not be happy. The response to D.A. and N.T. 
under such an interpretation would then be HAYBE rather than the 
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matching NO response. It is interesting; to note that Kuhn found a much 
higher rate of MAYBE response to D.A. argument forms (72% correct) 
than to A.C. (40% correct) and also a number of MAYBE responses to 
M.T. It is possible that the some of the correct MAYBE responses on 
D.A. and some of the MAYBE on N.T. were due to this type of 
conjunctive interpretation. 
The evaluation task showed that there was no difference in the ability 
of primary school children to evaluate the compatibility of exemplars 
with a general rule whether this rule was a class statement or a 
conditional statement although at 3rd year secondary, around 15 years, 
subjects did find some exemplars easier to evaluate with respect to a 
class rule. Since performance on the evaluation task and the 
syllogistic reasoning task are related the results of the evaluation 
task suggest that it is unlikely that subjects at the stage of 
concrete operations will perform better on an inference task with 
class statements than with conditional statements, which some authors 
have suggested Piaget's theory entails (Ennis, 1975, 1976; Roberge and 
Paulus, 1971; Osherson, 1975). 
Most studies which have compared the effect of class or conditional 
linguistic form on syllogistic reasoning performance (Pill, 1961; 
O'Brien and Shapiro, 1968; Roberge and Paulus, 1971; Osherson, 1974, 
1975; Kuhn, 1977) have found no systematic effects of linguistic form. 
Hill found. that 6 year olds found it easier to recognize valid 
conclusions (with N.P. and H.T. argument forms) with conditional than 
with class statements but by 8 years this difference had disappeared 
while O'Brien and Shapiro found no significant effect of linguistic 
form in their study in which they included all four argument forms. 
Roberge and Paulus (1971) found a significant main effect of 
linguistic form with class reasoning significantly easier than 
conditional reasoning. However this difference was not consistent 
across all grades as the significant grade by linguistic form (type of 
reasoning) interaction showed: class reasoning was significantly 
easier for 6th. and 10th grade subjects but not for. 4th. or 8th. grade 
subjects. 
Osherson (1974) had subjects evaluate the validity of conclusions of 
fairly complex logical arguments formulated either in the language of 
classes or propositions e.g. 
All the red jars and all the large jars have tacks. 
Can you be sure that every jar that does not have tacks and is not 
large is not red? 
The basic logical structure of all Osherson's problems was (p- +q)-y(r -p 
s). Osherson found no differences in the abilities of either children 
or adults to evaluate the validity of conclusions for class or 
conditional logic problems. 
Kuhn found no significant effect of linguistic form but a significant 
grade by linguistic form interaction in her study of syllogistic 
reasoning. Again however the results were unsystematic with first and 
third graders marginally better on conditional reasoning problems and 
second and fourth graders better on class reasoning problems. 
The results of the evaluation task (experiment 5) showed that the 
predominant response pattern of children under 12 years was the 
conjunctive pattern. It is pertinent to ask how subjects who respond 
according to a conjunctive interpretation on the evaluation task would 
respond on a syllogistic reasoning task like that used by O'Brien and 
Shapiro, Kuhn and others. It has been suggested that 
respond according to a 'conjunctive' interpretation 
subjects who 
in the evaluation 
task will probably respond according to a biconditional 





THE SYLLOGISTIC REASONING TASK 
.ETHOD 
The general procedure and subjects were as described in Chapter 3. 
The syllogistic reasoning task was similar to the syllogistic 
reasoning task used by Kuhn (1977) and by Shapiro and O'Brien (1970). 
The four different argument forms - Modus Ponens (1.1).), Modus Tollens 
(M.T.), Denial of the Antecedent (D.A.) and Affirmation of the 
Consequent (A.C.) were presented. The questions were always 
affirmative. 
Half the subjects were presented with conditional premises and half 
with universally quantified. premises. The problem was presented by 
means of a story. The story for the insect content was as follows; 
that for shape content is in Appendix 41 
"One day when Mr. Jones was in his garden he noticed lots of insects. 
Me do not have a picture of the insects but we do know that Mr. Jones 
said this about the insects in his garden: 
(1) "In my garden all the big insects are black." 
and we know that this sentence is true. We also know that there were 
three different kinds of insect in 1-tr. Jones garden. Mr. Jones picked 
up one of the insects from his garden and he said: 
(2) "This insect is not black. 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Given what you know about the insects in ?r. Jones garden do you think 
the right answer is YES, NO or MAYBE? 
Remember Nr. Jones had three different kinds of insect in his garden 
and he said (1). ne picked up an insect and said (2)(3)." 
The problem was read aloud to the subject and the major premise (1) 
and minor premise and question (2) and (3) were presented on separate 
written cards. The four different argument forms were presented in 
randon order on separate cards. The four different argument forms 
along with the correct responses for biconditional /conjunctive, 
conditional and "alternative conjunctive" interpretations are shown in 
Table 6.3. 
RESULTS 
Preliminary analysis revealed that neither of the main effects of 
content nor linguistic form nor any of the interactions of either 
factor were significant. In further analysis the data were collapsed 
across these factors. 
Percent correct response to each argument type at each grade is shown 
in Table 6.4 and plotted in Figure 6.1. A 6 (grade) X 4 (argument 
form) analysis of variance with repeated measures on argument form was 
carried out on correct response (see Table 6.5). The main effects of 
gracie F(5,186)= 17.62, p40.001, argument form, F(3,558)= 87.69, p<O.001, 
and the grade by argument form interaction, F(15,558) =5.15, pe.0.001, 
were all significant. 
Tests of simple interactions revealed significant F ratios for 
adjacent grade comparisons only for the Sl /S3 comparison, 
523 
TABLE 6.4 
PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSE ON THE FOUR ARGUMENT FORMS ACROSS GRADE 
CONDITIONAL 
MP AC DA MT TOTAL 
P2 56 6 0 50 28 
P4 75 6 6 72 41 
P6 63 38 31 81 53 
Si 100 31 44 94 69 
S3 94 44 44 75 64 
S5 94 63 88 56 75 
TOT 80 31 35 72 55 
CLASS 
MP HT DA AC TOTAL 
P2 81 6 0 75 41 
F4 88 13 13 63 44 
P6 75 31 6 75 47 
Si 97 50 75 91 58 
S3 94 44 56 63 64 
85 100 63 75 56 73 
TOT 88 29 30 70 54 
TOTAL 
MP AC DA MT TOTAL 
P2 69 6 0 63 34 
P4 81 9 9 69 42 
P6 69 34 19 78 50 
Si 97 25 37 91 62 
S3 94 44 50 69 64 
S5 97 62 81 56 74 

























PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSE ON DIFFERENT ARGUMENT FORMS (DA,AC,MP,MT) 












































































































































































































































































































































TESTS OF SIMPLE INTERACTIONS: F VALUES AND SIGNIFICANCE LEVELS 
FOR BETWEEN GRADE COMPARISONS 
P2 P4 P6 S1 S3 S5 
P2 0.162 0.352 0.580 3.438 35.208 
ns ns ns p 0.025 ,p 0.001 
F4 2.348 0.354 3.537 14.105 
ns ns p 0.025 p 0.001 
P6 2.5u8 3.249 11.920 
ns p 0.025 p 0.001 
Si - 3.247 13.115 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3 3 o 
F(3,558)=3.25, p40.025, and the S3/S5 comparison, F(3,558)=3.56, 
p40.0001, (see Table 6.5a). The results of tests of simple 
interactions on non-adjacent grades are also shown. 
Tests of simple nain effects of grade revealed significant F ratios 
for all argument forms (see table 6.5h). Tests of simple main effects 
of argument form were significant at all grades (see Table 6.5c). 
Newman Keuls comparisons between means for argument forms showed that 
all comparisons were significant except that between D.A. and A.C. 
(Table 6.5d). 
The results on the syllogism task were also analysed to discover 
whether there was any effect of the order of task presentation on 
response. As with the evaluation task it was thought possible that 
subjects who had previously answered the verification task would 
benefit from this experience and respond better on the syllogistic 
reasoning task than subjects who responded to the inference tasks 
first. However the absence of any order effects in the evaluation task 
indicated that presentation order would possibly not be important in 
the syllogistic reasoning task either. To establish whether there were 
any significant effects of presentation order was a 6 (grade) X 2 
(linguistic form) X 2104--cor) analysis of variance was carried out on 
correct response. The results are shown in Table 6.6. Only the main 
effect of grade was significant, F(5,168)=16.83, p4.001. Response on 
the syllogistic reasoning task, like that on the evaluation task, was 
not affected by prior presentation of the verification tasks. 
CLASSIFICATION OF RESPONSE )ATTERNS 































































































































































































































































































































































































syllogistic reasoning task were also analysed in terms of response 
patterns. Subjects were classified as adopting a 
biconditional /conjunctive, conditional or "alternative conjunction" 
response pattern if their responses accorded with the model patterns 
shown in Table 6.1. The distribution of response patterns found for 
subjects at each grade are shown in Table 6.7. Since the response 
pattern distributions for class and conditional premises were not 
x 
significantly different, X(3) =.894, the data for class and conditional 
premises were collapsed together. 
The predominant consistent response pattern for primary school 
children was the biconditional /conjunction pattern although for 
primary two subjects most responses were inconsistent. Although the 
comparison of response pattern distributions between primary two and 
primary four was not significant it did tend to significance, 
,(3) =6.78, PLO.1, reflecting a sizeable increase in biconditional and 
decrease in inconsistent response between P2 and P4. The only 
significant comparison between adjacent grades was between first and 
third year secondary, U3) =9.83, p 0.025, and this was due to the 
decrease in biconditional accompanied by an increase again in 
inconsistent reponse. The S3 /S5 comparison approached significance 
X.(3) =7.58, p 0.1 and this reflected the change from inconsistent to 
conditional and "alternative conjunction" response patterns. The 
response pattern described as alternative conjunction was only found 
for 6th. year secondary school subjects. 
DISCUSSION 
The results of the syllogism task show that as in previous 
developmental studies of syllogistic reasoning ability with 
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TABLE 6 . 7 













P6 7 1 - 8 
S1 7 4 - 5 
S3 4 3 1 8 
35 1 6 3 6 
TOT 33 14 4 45 
CONDITIONAL 
P2 
BICOND. GOìJ). ALT. CONJ. INCONSIST. 
5 - - 11 
P4 8 - 1 7 
P6 9 - - 7 
S1 10 2 - 4 
S3 2 3 11 
S5 3 5 3 5 
TOT 37 10 4 45 
TOTAL 
BICOND. COND. ALT, CONJ. INCONSIST. 
P2 9 - - 23 
P4 18 - 1 13 
P6 16 1 - 15 
S1 17 6 - 9 
S3 6 6 1 19 
S5 4 11 6 11 
TOT 70 24 8 90 
categorical and conditional syllorisms primary school age children 
perform well on valid argument forms and poorly on invalid argument 
forms. The significance of the tests of simple main effects of grade 
for all argument forms reflected improvement in performance on M.P, 
D.A. and A.C. with age but for the H.T argument form correct response 
decreased following a peak at 3rd. year secondary. This decrease in 
correct response with Modus Tollens has been reported in previous 
studies (Kuhn, 1977; O'Brien and Overton, 1980). The improvement in 
performance with age on the invalid argument forms contrasted with the 
results of Ennis and Paulus (1965) and Roberge (1970) who found that 
older subjects also performed poorly on D.A. and A.C. If the 
non-significance of 
as an index of mature 
subjects had attained 
the simple main effect of argument form is taken 
performance not even the 5th, year secondary 
this. 
The analysis of response patterns complemented the argument form 
analysis in showing a general increase in correct (implication) 
response with increasing age. The significant comparison between 
response pattern distributions for 1st. and 3rd. year secondary 
subjects whicW reflected. a decrease in biconditional response 
paralleled the significant increases in correct response on the 
invalid argument forms at this age. The predominance of the 
inconsistent response pattern at 3rd. year secondary indicated that 
although subjects were beginning to realise that MAYBE was the correct 
response to some argument forms they still had problems in applying 
the MAYBE response correctly and overgerieralised its use to Modus 
Tollens. The decrease in correct response on N.T. contributed to the 
relatively low number of correct conditional response patterns even 
for 3rd year (19%) and 5th year (34:Z) secondary subjects. 
An analysis of consistency of response across grade in experiment e 
showed a significant difference in the number of response patterns 
which can be classified according to one of the consistent response 
patterns across trade la 5) =17.06, p(0.01. This was not solely due to 
an increase in consistent response, with increasing gracie: rather there 
was an increase in consistent response up to Si followed by an 
decrease in consistent response at S:3 as subjects gradually realised 
that the biconditional response was incorrect. According to Taplin et 
al (1977) one interpretation of this kind of variation in consistent 
response across gracie would be that it reflects a corresponding 
variation in "logicality" across grade. Rather than adopting this 
position it seems more reasonable to argue that there is an increase 
in logically correct response with increasing age but that subjects at 
certain. ages adopt certain strategies which lead to consistent 
although logically incorrect response. 
The predominance of the conjunctive response pattern as the consistent 
response pattern adopted by primary school subjects in the evaluation 
task might lead one to expect the same response pattern in the 
syllogistic reasoning task. It was mentioned in the introduction to 
this chapter that, strictly speaking, a subject who interpreted the 
major premise in the syllogistic reasoning task as a conjunction 
should regard the information in the minor premises for negative 
argument forms MT and DA as contradicting the major premise. For 
example a subject interpreting "In Mr. Jones' garden all the big 
insects are black." as meaning; that in Er.. Jones' garden there are 
only big, black insects should regard the minor premise "This insect 
is not big" as contradicting the major premise since it was specified 
that the insect referred to in the minor premise came from Mr. Jones' 
garden. In fact no subjects claimed that the information presented in 
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the NT and DA argument forms on the syllogistic reasoning task was 
contradictory. 
The exemplar analysis in the evaluation task indicated that those 
primery school subjects who did not respond according to a conjunctive 
interpretation of the rule, accepting only pq exemplars, were just as 
likely to accept p-q (big, not black) exemplars as -pq (not big, 
black) and -p-q (not big, not black) exemplars as possible elements of 
the domain (possible insects in 'tr. Jones' garden). Primary school 
subjects accepted on average 25';; of -p-c; exemplars, 3n of -pq 
exemplars and 27% of p-q exemplars as possible elements of the domain. 
fost subjects who were not classified as adopting a conjunctive 
response pattern on the evaluation task were classified as 
inconsistent. In contrast, on the syllogistic reasoning task primary 
school subjects gave either biconditional or contradictory responses. 
Knifonz (1974), Ennis (1976) and Bereiter et al (1979) have pointed 
out that describing a response pattern as biconditional implies that 
the response pattern has been generated from an understanding (or 
rather a misunderstanding) of the logic of the problem. In the 
syllogism task ,a logical biconditional understanding of the problem 
would require the subject to understand that only pq elements (big 
black insects) and -p-q elements (not big, not black insects) were 
compatible with the truth of the major premise (were possible insects 
in Hr. Jones garden) while -pq (not big, black) and p-q (big, not 
black) elements were not. Only if the subject understood this could he 
make a valid biconditional inference since only if he understood the 
logic of the situation could he draw a conclusion from the information 
in the premises which was necessarily true, 'for example he could infer 
that the insect referred to in the minor premise e.g. "This insect is 
not black" must he "not-big" since the only kind of insect in 
334., 
Jones garden which is "not-black" is "not-big", However the evaluation 
task showed that primary school subjects did not understand the class 
or general conditional statement as equivalence/biconditionals. 
Subjects who were just as likely to accept p-q exemplars as -pq 
or -p-q exemplars as possible elements of the domain could not validly 
infer that an insect which was not-big must be not-black (-p-q) since 
it was just as likely to be black (p-q). It seems that rather than 
being generated from an analysis of the logic of the situation the 
biconditional response patterns of the prinary school subjects were 
generated from an associative, "trasductive" or "matching" response 
like that described by Piaget (1967), Knifong (1974), Evans (1972). 
This response pattern is generated by matching the polarity of the 
attribute in the minor premise and conclusion. The shift in response 
from P2 to P4 from predominantly inconsistent to predominantly 
biconditional probably reflects an increase in the incidence of 
adoption of the matching strategy. It is not clear whether any 
biconditional responses were generated by an analysis of the logic of 
the situation rather than by a "matching" response. Since subjects on 
the evaluation task did not begin to differentiate between -pq, p-q 
and -p-q elements and evaluate them correctly until 1st. year 
secondary it seems unlikely that subjects' biconditional response 
patterns are logical biconditional before this. 
Although the responses on the syllogistic reasoning task for primary 
school subjects did not seem to be predictable from responses on the 
evaluation task it was thought that the significant shift in 
consistent response from a predominantly conjunctive pattern at 1ì'6 to 
a predominantly biconditional pattern at Si on the evaluation task 
reflected a fundamental change in the approach to the proble which 
would also lead to a change in strategy on the syllogistic reasoning 
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task. The significant shift in response on the syllogistic reasoning 
task from 1st to 3rd. year secondary from predominantly biconditional 
to predominantly inconsistent response suggested that subjects at this 
stage realised that the matching strategy was inadequate and adopted a 
different strategy. It seems likely that subjects at this age began to 
realise that correct response depends upon an analysis of the logic of 
the situation but the predominance of the inconsistent response 
indicates that subjects found it difficult to work out exactly what 
the logic of the situation was. The decrease in correct response from 
S1 to S5 on the NT argument form also supports the view that subjects 
at this stage are beginning to appreciate the inadequacy of the 
matching strategy but the adoption of a more sophisticated response 
strategy taking cognisance of the formal properties of the argument 
would not be expected to lead to a decrement in performance. Although 
the older subjects are aware that the formal properties of the 
premises should be considered in making inferences the asymmetry of 
the inclusion /implication relation and negation still cause the 
subjects problems in actually making these inferences. 
r 
The distribution of response patterns at 5th year secondary indicates 
that there was still much uncertainty about correct response. Only at 
5th year secondary was the response pattern described in the 
introduction as alternative conjunction adopted by a number of 
subjects. Subjects adopting this response pattern seem to interpret 
the major premise as meaning that everything within the prescribed 
domain is "a and b" but there are no constraints on the relationship 
between the attributes of elements outwith the domain of the major 
premise (outside Mr. Jones' garden). With this response pattern 
subjects respond YES to MP and AC is YES and MAYBE to MT and DA. 
SS S 
The absence of a significant effect of linguistic form in the 
evaluation and syllogistic reasoning tasks indicated that, as in the 
evaluation task, the ability to work out logical consequences of the 
inclusion relation in the absence of empirical or semantic support, 
like the ability to deal with the formal properties of implication, 
requires formal operational thinking. 
Considering only the response patterns produced in a reasoning task 
rather than the abilities underlying the responses may lead to 
subjects who respond correctly on certain reasoning problems being 
inappropriately attributed with formal competence because their use of 
a less mature strategy leads to correct response (Bereiter et al, 
1977; Staudenmayer and Bourne, 1979). There is, in other words, a 
danger of a false positive assessment of formal reasoning competence, 
as Wildman (1979) and O'Brien and Overton (1982) argue. The 
difficulties in distinguishing the reasoning abilities of the concrete 
and formal subject are described by O'Brien and Overton (1982) who 
point out the classification operations of the concrete operational 
subject can lead to correct response on some conditional reasoning 
problems and subjects at concrete operations may consequently be 
incorrectly credited with competence in reasoning. 
The ability of young subjects to respond correctly on valid arguments 
in the syllogistic reasoning task is not regarded as evidence against 
Piaget's theory or, as Kuhn proposes, as evidence that concrete 
operations are the necessary and sufficient condition for syllogistic 
reasoning but, considered in conjunction with the responses on the 
evaluation task, is regarded as evidence of the use of a less 
sophisticated response strategy which leads to correct response only 
on some items. The significant changes in the exemplars accepted as 
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compatible with the rule in the evaluation task in conjunction with 
the changes in response pattern on the syllogistic reasoning task at 
adolescence can also be accounted for in terms of different "means of 
reasoning" and are compatible with Piagetian theory. 
It is relevant to recall Marcus and Rips's (1979) finding that their 
adult subjects produced a higher incidence of conditional response on 
the evaluation task (69.8 %) than on the syllogistic reasoning task. 
(32.1 %). It seems that even when subjects can perform well on the 
evaluation task they still have difficulty in responding correctly to 
all four exemplars on the syllogistic reasoning task. Marcus and Rips 
attributed this to the greater difficulty of the syllogism task 
compared with the evaluation task. As in Marcus and Rips' study 
performance on the evaluation task was better than that on the 
syllogistic reasoning task with overall 68-, of responses on the 
evaluation task correct and only 55% of responses on the syllogistic 
reasoning task correct. Following the method Sternberg (1978) used in 
assessing the relative difficulty of his encoding task (similar to the 
evaluation task) and his combination task (similar to the syllogistic 
reasoning task,), correct response on the evaluation and syllogistic 
reasoning tasks was compared using a t -test for related measures on 
mean correct response collapsed across linguistic form for subjects at 
each grade. The significance of the t -test, t(5) =7.39, 12(0.0005 on a 
one tailed test, showed that subjects performed significantly better 
on the evaluation task than on the syllogistic reasoning task. 
The significant increases in reasoning ability on both the evaluation 
and syllogistic inference tasks at adolescence are compatible with the 
Piagetian view that there is a qualitative change in ability to reason 
with such problems around this age because of the acquisition of the 
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combinatorial structure of propositional logic but the difference in 
levels of correct response on the evaluation and syllogistic reasoning 
tasks indicates that the inferential requirements of the tasks as well 
as their formal logical structure need to be considered in accounting 
for performance on the tasks and Piaget's model should be regarded as 
a model of logical competence rather than a model of performance. 
It is interesting; to consider. how Johanson- Laird's mental model theory 
would account for the responses given in the syllogistic reasoning 
task. According to mental model theory, in comprehending the major 
premise "All A are B" the subject sets up a model like that in Figure 
6.2a. Pe would then add on the information from the minor premise to 
this model. Uith the F!odus Ponens argument form there is only one 
possible type of model which can be formed from the combined 
information from the major and minor premises (Figure 6.3a) and the 
conclusion which follows given "x is A" is "x is B ". Subjects adopting 
the simpler representation of the major premise (Figure 6.2b) in which 
parenthetical. "b" elements were not included would also respond 
correctly on Nodus Panons (Figure 6.3b). 
There are two f!ifferent types of model which are compatible with the 
A. C argument "x is B" (Figures 6.4a and 6.40. The conclusion. which 
follows from 6.40 is "x is A" and from 6.4Q is "X is not -A ". 
Consideration of both models compatible with the premises would lead 
to the correct response that no valid conclusion follows since x may 
be A or not -A. Johnson -Laird states a principle of mental model 
construction that in constructing mental models one is trying to 
establish as many identities as possible: according to this principle 
the model in Figure (.4b would be established first. Subjects who 
failed to consider other models would be likely to conclude "x is A ". 
MENTAL MODELS OF THE SYLLOGISTIC ARGUMENT mans 
Figure 6.2a Figure 6.2b 
a = b 
a = b 
(b) 
Figure 6.3a Figure 6.3b 
a = b 
x = a = b 
(b) 
a = b 
a=b 
a = 
= a = b 
Figure 6.4a Figure 6.4b 
a = b a = h 
a = b a. = b = x 
(b) = x (D) 
Figure 6.5a Figure 6.5b 
a = b a = b 
a = b a = b 
(b) = x (b) 
Figure 6.6a 
a = b 
a = b 
(b) 
X 
Figure 6.6b Figure 6.6c 
a = b a = b 
a = b a = h 
(a) = x 
3qt 
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This was indeed the conclusion drawn by the majority of younger 
subjects. The results of the evaluation task suggest an alternative 
explanation of this conclusion. The results of the evaluation task 
indicated that it is more likely that subjects initially construct 
models of the major premise like that in Figure 6.2 than that in 
Figure 6.2q For younger subjects at least it seems likely that it is 
failure to construct an appropriate model of the premises rather than 
a failure to consider all alternative models which are true of the 
statement which leads to error with A.C. The correct inference, which 
was made by more subjects with increasing age, could only be generated 
from consideration of both models compatible with the truth of the 
statement. 
Consider now the D.A. argument form "x is not -A. ". Since the only 
elements represented in the model which are not -A are the 
parenthetical b elements it appears that the mental model theory would 
predict that the correct conclusion to D.A. is "x is B" (Figure 6.5a). 
This is clearly implausible since subjects rarely make errors of this 
kind. However Johnson -Laird builds into the model construction process 
the corollary of the principle that as many identities as possible 
should be established and that is that with negated elements as few 
identities as possible should be established. Thus the initial 
integrated model for D.A. would be as in Figure 6.5b and the 
conclusion would follow that "x is not -B ". The simpler model of the 
major premise (Figure 6.2_i4 would also predict that this conclusion 
would be drawn. It is necessary to consider both models in Figures 6.7 
and 6.8 in making the correct response. 
Given the model construction principles stated above the Hodus Tollens 
inference follows from the model in Figure 6.6a and the simpler model 
of the major premise, (Figure 6.6a) which the younger subjects 
q3 
construct would also predict the correct inference, "X is not -A ". 
Consequently no change in response with age would be predicted for 
this argument form. However correct response on N.T. peaks at Si and 
falls off again after this with an increase in the number of incorrect 
MAYBE responses. This decrease in correct response by the older 
subjects is difficult to explain in terms of mental model theory since 
the theory proposes that the model of the major premise is established 
first and the information from the minor premise added on. The MAYBE 
response on IT indicates that in making UT inferences subjects 
mistakenly suppose that there are parenthetical a elements which are 
not -b (Figure 6.6c) and they will consequently argue that if "x is 
not -b it may be a or not -a ". Such errors would not be made by the 
younger subjects since they do not include parenthetical elements in 
their representations of the major premise but the errors suggest that 
subjects are still unsure about the constraints on the construction 
and manipulation of models. The inclusion of the parenthetical a 
elements would presumably only occur in contructing the integrated 
model of both premises since otherwise it would be incorporated into 
the models of other argument forms and this indicates that the 
interpretation of the major premise is influenced by the minor 
premise. 
The mental model theory has not been explicitly addressed to 
developmental problems but can account for the relative ease of 
correct inference with valid argument forms and incorrect inference 
with invalid argument forms by younger subjects and the increase in 
correct response on invalid argument forms with increasing age in 
terms of the initial construction of oversimplistic models of the 
premises and the construction of more complex models with increasing 
age. The mental model account is similar to the Piagetian account in 
proposing that inferential ability is determined by the subject's 
ability to construct representations of the problem. 
The mental model theory does not make any predictions about the age at 
which the increase in ability to deal with invalid argument forms 
would occur but there seems to he no reason why the evidence of 
qualitative changes in the ability to deal with the precise and 
flexible manipulation of language at adolescence should not be 
incorporated into mental model theory. 
SUMMARY 
In Chapter 6 categorical and conditional syllogistic reasoning studies 
were discussed. In experiment 6 subjects from 6 to 17 years were 
required to say whether conclusions to the four class or conditional 
syllogistic argument forms followed from the premises. As in previous 
studies no systematic differences in performance on categorical and 
conditional syllogisms were found and the poor performance of younger 
subjects on the invalid argument forms DA and AC contrasted with the 
good performance on the valid argument forms MP and MT. There were 
significant increases in correct response on both invalid argument 
forms and also on MP with increasing age but the indeterminate 
response was overgeneralised to the MT argument form by the older 
subjects. 
The ability of young subjects to respond correctly on valid argument 
forms, the absence of a differentiation in performance on class and 
conditional logic problems, the relatively poor performance found on 
the invalid argument forms by older subjects and the decrease in 
correct response on PIT have been found in other studies and have been 
regarded as evidence against Piaget's claims about the logical 
abilities of subjects at concrete and formal operations. 
However it was argued that these results can also be given a Piagetian 
interpretation since Piaget proposes that the distinction between 
concrete and formal operational thinking should be drawn in terms of 
different means of reasoning. It was proposed that consideration of 
performance on different tasks could elucidate the different means of 
reasoning of subjects at different operational levels. The results of 
the evaluation task indicated that subjects understood that only 
3(1b 
elements with the attributes mentioned in the rule were compatible 
with the rule. Given. this interpretation of the rule on the evaluation 
task it seems likely that the biconditional response pattern of 
younger subjects in the syllogistic reasoning task was not logically 
determined, since a logical biconditional response would be generated 
from an understanding that -p. -q as well as pq elements are compatible 
with the major premise, but instead reflected a less mature 
"transductive" or "matching" response pattern. The increase in correct 
response on the evaluation task was accompanied by a realisation that 
the matching strategy was inadequate on the syllogistic reasoning 
task, and an increase in correct response on the invalid arguments 
brought about by a more effective strategy. The decrease in correct 
response on MT with increasing age also suggests a change in strategy. 
CHAPTER 7 
AH ATT.EI:PT TO I?;nt,ct. CC)Rg.f.:CT. SYLLOGISTIC REASONING 
The significant improvements in reasoning ability on both experi ments 
5 and 6 at around 12 - 13 years, the stage identified by Piaget as the 
advent of formal operational thinking, were compatible with the 
general claims of Piaget's theory of the development of logical 
reasoning abilities. Certainly around adolescence individuals seem to 
have a more sophisticated understanding of the language of reasoning 
in that they seem to understand that many different states of affairs 
are compatible with a statement whereas younger subjects tend to 
regard statements as descriptions of a single reality. Adolescents 
seen to be able to cope much better than younger subjects with 
handling information which does not specify a unique state of affairs. 
Although the performance of the 15 and 17 year olds on the syllogistic 
reasoning task was, in fact, superior to that found in many other 
studies they still made errors on 36% and 27% of items respectively. 
It was mentioned in Chapter 1 that poor performance by adolescents and 
adults on a variety of tasks which are regarded as formal operational 
has been understood by some (Neimark, 1975; Riegel, 1973; i ason, 1977; 
Mason and Johnson -Laird, 1972) to indicate that formal operational 
thinking is not achieved as universally as Piaget suggests. Studies 
which have compared performance on a variety of different formal 
operational tasks, including propositional reasoning tasks, have 
provided equivocal evidence regarding the interrelationships between 
performance on these tasks. Roberge and Flexer (1930) note that 
despite the observations in many studies of propositional logic 
abilities emerging during adolescence (Kuhn, 1977; Roberge, 1976; 
Taplin et al, 1974; Roberge and Flexer, 1979, 1980; Roberge and 
Paulus, 1971; Staudenmayer and Bourne, 1977) analysis of 
interrelationships between performance on propositional logic tasks 
and other formal operations tashs have produced varying results (Bart, 
1971; Kuhn, 1977; Roberge, 1976). If, as ,Piaget suggests, perforMance 
on formal operational tasks is mediated by an organized underlying 
structure there should be consistency in performance on these. tasks. 
Danner and flay (1977) have recently suggested that the poor 
performance of adolescents and adults on a variety of formal 
operational tasks (Blasi and Uoeffel, 1974; Papalia and Bielby, 1974; 
Tomlinson-Keasey, 1972) should not necessarily be seen as 
counterevidence to Piaget's proposals concerning the age of onset and 
universality of formal operations. They argued that frequently the 
requirellents of the tasks used to assess forinal operational thinking 
are ambiguous and because they are unclear atout the aims of tie tasks 
subjects do not perform on these tasks as well they could. Fanner and 
Day argued that formal operational thinking could be regarded as 
"latent" and could he elicited simply by clarifying the task demands. 
Danner and Day and Stone and Day (1978) showed that by introducing a 
series of simple prompts performance by adolescents on several formal 
tasks could be significantly improved. 
Oerien and Overton (1930) have shown that "latent" formal thinking 
can also be demonstrated in conditional reasoning tasks but only for 
young adults (mean age 22 years 5 months) who should be well into the 
formal operations stage and not for adolescents (mean age 13 years 5 
months) who are presumably just entering the formal operations stage. 
This is of interest because previous attempts to elicit successful 
conditional reasoning had generally been unsuccessful (Lunzer, 
Yct 
Harrison and Davey, 1972; Staudennayer and Bourne, 1979; Wason, 1968). 
Attempts to induce successful solutions to reasoning problems with 
abstract content by having subjects solve problems with the same 
logical structure but concrete content had also been unsuccessful 
since the ability to solve the concrete task did not transfer to 
abstract tasks (Johnson-Laird et al, 1972; hason and Johnson-Laird 
1972). 
O'Brien and Overton used a method of "contradiction training", which 
had previously been found 'by hfason (1964) to be relatively effective 
in making the subjects aware of their self-contradictions, to improve 
conditional reasoning performance. Wason found that in certain 
circumstances subjects refrain from making incorrect inferences 
following the presentation of information which contradicts an 
incorrect inference previously made. In Dason's "contradiction 
training" paradigm subjects were presented with an incomplete 
conditional rule relating ages and salaries of employees of a 
hypothetical firm, (..? r:, "Any employee aged - years or more will 
receive a salary of at least $1900 a year." The subject was then 
presented with ten trials each consisting of a hypothetical employee 
of a particular age receiving a certain salary (see Table 7.1). The 
subject's task was to say for each example whether an inference could 
be made about the missing age in the rule. ]or exemplar (1), for 
example, it can be inferred that the age in the rule is greater than 
26 years. This is because the salary in the exemplar is less than 
$1900. In order for the conditional rule to be true the age in the 
rule must be greater than the age in the exemplar, i.e. 26 years. rany 
subjects infer from exemplar (2) that the age in the rule must he less 
than 36 years: they reason that since the salary in the exemplar is 
more than that in the rule, the age in the rule must be less than that 
aso 
TABLE 7.1 
INFERENCES Itd THE CONTRADICTION TASK ABOUT UNKNOWN AGI, 
TRIALS SALARY($) CONTRADICTION CONTROL 
(EMPLOYEES) CROUP GROUP 
AGE AND INFERENCE 
1 1300 726(V) j2Ei(V) 
2 2400 '36(F) ,t36(F) 
3 1400 727(V) 727(V) 
4 2300 10,35(F) 1,35(F) 
5 1500 ?37(V) 728(V) 
6 2200 )738(F) ),34(F) 
7 1600 740(V) 729(V) 
8 2100 e1(F) r33(F) 
9 1700 743(V) >30(V) 
10 2000 t45(F) )32(F) 
Column 1 shows the salary earned by an ernplcyee at each trial. Columns 
2 and 3 show the age of the employee, combined with the inference 
about unknown age. 
V : Vat, d (.-y(e-e`.o ce- 
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in the exemplar. This inference is incorrect however since both pq 
exemplars (employees aged - years or more and earning at least S1900) 
and -pq (not aged - years or more and earning at least $1900) types of 
exemplar are compatible with the truth of the rule. When the salary in 
the exemplar makes the consequent of the conditional true no valid 
inference follows about the age in the antecedent of the rule. 
In Wason's task adult subjects were given a sequence of trials and 
asked what could be said about the age in the rule. For ,subjects who 
made the invalid inferences on trials (2) and (4) that the age in the 
rule was less than 36 years and 35 years respectively, an 
inconsistency was introduced into the task on trial 5 where the valid 
inference could be Made that the age in the rule would be greater than 
that in the exemplar. Wason found that when this "contradiction" (it 
is a contradiction only in sense that it contradicts an invalid 
inference that the subject has made) was introduced subjects were 
significantly better at withholding subsequent invalid inferences 
compared with a croup who had not had the contradiction training. 
Wason argued that 
"knowledge of fallaciousness lies within the individual's logical 
competence and the function of contradiction is merely to act as a 
prompt or cue." (Vason and Johnson-Laird 1977, p. 119). 
The contradiction training seems to act as a hint to subject about the 
level of analysis which is appropriate for the problem: it alerts the 
subject to the fact that it is the formal properties of the rule which 
are important. 
O'Brien and Overton (1930) used the "contradiction training" task to 
assess developmental differences in the effectiveness of 
contradiction. They were also interested in whether the effect of 
contradiction training generalised to performance on other conditional 
reasoning tasks - the selection task and the evaluation task. They 
found that the contradiction training was effective for their college 
student group (mean age 21 year 5 months) but not for their younger 
subjects (mean ages 9 years 9 months and. 13 years 5 months). 
Given the ineffectiveness of the contradiction training for the 
younger subjects it would have been surprising if these groups had 
shown any improvement on the selection and evaluation tasks and indeed 
contradiction training led to a significant improvement in performance 
on both the selection and evaluation tasks only for the college 
subjects. O'Brien and Overton interpret their results as indicating 
that young adults have the competence to understand the conditional 
relationship and that the appropriate formal operational strategies 
for the solution of particular tasks involving the conditional 
relationship can be invoked by the presentation of "prompts" in a 
similar way to that described by Danner and Day. In this case the 
"prompt" consisted of information which contradicted previous invalid 
inferences and this seemed to alert subjects to the asymmetry of the 
conditional and specifically to the invalidity of inferring p from q 
(Affirming the Consequent). 
O'Brien and Overton (1982) extended their study to consider the 
transfer of the effectiveness of contradiction training to performance 
on the syllogistic reasoning task. The results of their 19P0 study 
showing the effectiveness of contradiction training and transfer to 
performance on the evaluation task only for the older subjects (18 
years 2 months) was replicated. Although O'Brien and Overton claimed 
that the effectiveness of contradiction generalised to the syllogistic 
reasoning task their results are not as clear-cut for this task. 
Performance of the contradiction training group on Todus Ponens and 
3 s -3 
Denial of the Antecedent was not significantly different from that of 
the control group at any grade. Only at 12th. grade was performance of 
the contradiction group significantly better than. the control group on 
both Affirmation of the Consequent and dodus Tollens. The 
contradiction training was effective in improving performance 
specifically on the A.C. and H.T. argument forms, the argument forms 
which involve reversal of the order of the constituent S of the 
conditional. 
Using a different procedure fromO'Brien and Overton*Fal-erne (1980) 
found that subjects from 2nd. through 5th. grade (presumably about 7 
to 12 years) could benefit from training and learn to make 
propositional inferences, in this case Nodus Tollens inferences. 
Falmagne et al (1977) used a concept-lam-ling paradigm in which their 
subjects were presented with a number of instances of a !:odus Tollens 
inference e.g. 
"If it is Tuesday, then Mary has gym today. Nary doesn't have gym 
today. Is it Tuesday? " 
followed by feedback about the correct response. Two days later the 
subject was given more problems of the same kind in order to establish 
whether he had abstracted the logical form of the argument. Falnagne 
et al found that following training subjects who had received training 
on the Modus Tollens inference performed significantly better than a 
control group. In addition the improvement in performance by the 
"training" group was greatest for nonsense problems such as "If Paul 
fibbles then he thabbles" which provided no clues from the content 
about inferential properties of the sentence. 
The results of training studies are rather difficult to interpret 
since it is not always clear exactly at abilities the training tasks 
train. The training in Falmagne's task is more explicit, is of more 
obvious relevance to and is more specific to the acquisition of the 
rodus Tollens inference than the contradiction training in O'Brien and 
Overton's study is to performance on the syllogistic reasoning task. 
ljhat is of interest in Falrerne's study is that the younger subjects 
can learn to abstract the logical form of the inference at all. It 
only 
seems that the younger subjects can benefit from training I'. when 
the training is directly relevant to the ability being tested and 
sometimes not even then, as the ineffectiveness of the contradiction 
training for the younger subjects in O'Brien and Overton's (1980, 
1982) studies shoved. 
Although ralnagne claimed to have shown that subjects who had not yet 
attained the formal operational stage could be trained to abstract the 
logical forn of a Modus Tollens inference her results could be 
interpreted in another way. Falnaene included both positive and 
negative forms of locius Tollens and presumably the correct response to 
the ,7P argument form was always either YES or NO. It was argued in 
Chapter 6 that correct response on Modus Tollens does not necessarily 
require an understanding of the formal properties of the inference and 
can be generated by a strategy of natchine the nolarity of the minor 
premise and the conclusion. This strategy would also be effective in 
generating correct response on Falmagne's task since the matching 
response is always correct on this argument form. Since ralraene 
included only the -odus Tenons inference it seems probable that the 
feedback about correct response would reinforce the use of this 
successful strategy and consequently lead to higher levels of correct 
response than the control group who received no such feedback. JOst as 
Rappoport (l%7) and Staudenmayer and Bourne (1'..)79) argued that the 
invalid argument. forms constituted critical tests of formal 
operational thinking, so too in a training task it seems that a more 
convincing demonstration of the training of formal reasoning ability 
would be the training of correct response on invalid argument forms. 
Training like r"almagnc's in which the subject is given feedback 
concerning the correct response would be likely to lead to consistent 
adoption of a correct MAYBE responses a demonstration of the training 
of a formal understanding of the problem would require that the 
subject could respond correctly to both valid and invalid argument 
forms. 
The success of training obviously depends upon the complexity of the 
ability being trained. In Falmagne's task for instance it was argued 
that subjects at the stage of concrete operations had the ability to 
respond correctly on Modus Tollens anyway although not necessarily on 
the basis of a formal understanding of this inference. The lack of 
success of many studies attempting to induce correct reasoning with 
adults in the selection task for instance indicates that some 
abilities are difficult to train even in adults who are presumably 
well into the formal operational stage. Although adults also have 
difficulty with syllogistic reasoning, O'Brien and Overton showed that 
performance on specific argument forms on a syllogistic reasoning task 
could be improved by contradiction training. 
Experiment 6 showed that one of the main problems which children and 
adolescents have with syllogistic reasoning problems is in responding 
correctly to the invalid argument forms. According to the competence 
model subjects at the stage of formal operations have the competence 
to understand the conditional but may fail to demonstrate optimum 
performance in a reasoning task for a variety of reasons. In the light 
3S 
of Piaget °s claims about the stages of development of logical thinking 
it was thought that subjects at the stage of formal operations could 
be induced to solve syllogistic reasoning problems, and particularly 
invalid arguments, by having the subjects solve a concretized version 
of the problems in which they were presented with a pictorial 
representation of the major premise. It was predicted that formal 
operational subjects should have the competence to appreciate the 
significance of the concrete presentation and the concrete task would 
act as a prompt to successful solution on the abstract task. Since 
subjects atteoncrete operations are presumed to be able to solve 
reasoning problems when the problem is tied to concrete objects and 
relations it was argued that concrete subjects would be able to solve 
syllogistic reasoning problems when presented with a concrete 
representation of the premises but that concrete subjects would not 
have the underlying competence to appreciate the significance of the 
concrete task for solution of the abstract problems in the standard 
syllogistic reasoning task. 
The verification studies had shown that, although primary school 
subjects make errors in verifying conditional statements, even the 
youngest subjects performed well in verifying true conditional 
statements (83%3` correct overall in experiment 2 and 73 correct in 
experiment 4). In an informal observation primary children were 
presented with syllogistic reasoning problems to solve with the aid of 
a pictorial representation of the major premise. The children 
apparently found the problems easy to solve. It was decided to use 
a 
this "empirical syllogistic reasoning task" astmeans of trying to 
teach children to respond correctly on the syllogistic reasoning task 
without actually giving them explicit feedback about the correctness 
of their responses as Falmagne had done. 
3sß 
EXPERIr°tENT 7 
THE TRAINING TASK 
METHOD 
Materials 
Four different eight -page booklets were prepared. Each booklet was to 
he answered in four "sessions" of two pages each with one problem per 
page. The four content areas for the problems were CLOCKS, TINS, FISH 
and BOOKS. The problems for the first and second sessions were 
identical except for the fact that session two was the "learning 
session" in which subjects answered the questions with the aid of a 
pictorial representation of the problem content which was consistent 
V -o y eCT 
with the truth of the general rule. Althoughtthe content areas for 
-v-to .v,1jr 
session 3+were similar to those of sessions 1 and 2 the attributes of 
c - 3QSStc. "), 
the elements in the rules were changed fso that the subject had to work 
out the correct answer and could not simply remember or copy the 
correct answers from sessions 1 and 2; for instance, if the general 
rule in sessions 1 and 2 was: "In Fred's shop if a clock has a round 
face it is at six o'clock." the rule for session 3 would be changed 
to: " In Fred's shop if a clock has a square face it is at twelve 
o'clock.". The content areas for session 4 problems were different to 
those of sessions 1, 2 and 3 so that, for example, if the two problems 
in sessions 1, 2 and 3 concerned FISH and BOOKS the two problems in 
session 4 concerned CLOCKS and TINS. The change of content on session 
4 was to see whether any learning which occurred during session 2 
generalised to problems with a different content. 
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On each page of the booklet tore was one proble m with eight examples. 
At the top of each page there was a description of the problem content 
followed by a general rule which the subject was told was always true 
for that problem. The general rule was expressed either as a general 
conditional or as a universally quantified statement using the 
quantifier "all". kl eac/k0V-ttli), 
5ai5 wcis oiQ 
teiv 
Following the general rule there were eight different examples which 
were affirmative and negative versions of the M.P., h.T., D.A. and 
argument forms. The examples for the general rules "In John's 
fishtank if a fish is green it has spots." are shown in Table 7.2. The 
Modus Ponens argument form with affirmative conclusion would be: 
(A) Fish A is green. 
Is this true? Fish A has spots. 
(A) (1)YES (2)NO (3)MAYBE 
The subject was required to evaluate whether the conclusion, which was 
underlined, was true given that both the general rule and the minor 
premises were true. Possible responses were YES, meaning, that the 
conclusion must be true, O, meaning that the conclusion could not be 
true and MAYBE, meaning that the conclusion might be true or might be 
false, there was not enough information to say. The eight instances 
were presented in different random orders for different problems 
v-1,5±0,./102.5 v- 
except that thcfProblems in sessions 1 and 2 were presented in the 
same order. 
Denial used in negating the minor premise and conclusion was explicit 
negation rather than implicit or lexical negation, i.e. a particular 
element was described as either having or not having a specific 
S 
Table 7.2 
Example of the problems used in Experiment 7 
showing the eight different argument forms 
This problem is about the fish in John's fishtank. In John's fishtanR 
there are GREEN fish and YELLOV fish. Some of the fish have SPOTS on 
then and some have STRIPES. The rule for this problem is: 
In John's fishtabk, if a fish is green it has spots. 
Remember this rule is always true. 
Given that you know the rule and you know that: 
(A) Fish A is not green. 
Is this true? Fish A has spots. 
ZA)(1)YES (2)NO (3)IIAYBE 
(B) Fish r is green. 
Is this true? Fish 11 has spots. 
(A)(1)YES (2)NO MIAYBE 
(Ç) Fish C does not have spots. 
Is this true? Fish C is green. 
(A)(1)YES (2)NC' (3)hAYBE 
(u) Fish D has spots. 
Is this true? Fish D is not green. 
(A)(1)YES (2)NO (3)MAYBE 
(E) Fish E is not green. 
Is this true? Fish E does not have spots. 
(A)(lY/TS (2)No (3)MAYBE 
(F) Fish F is green. 
Is this true? Fish F does not have spots. 
(A)(1)YES (2)NO (3)ilAYPT 
(G) Fish G does not have spots. 
Is this true? Fish G is not green. 
(A)(1)YES (2)NO (3)hAYBE 
(H) Fish h has spots. 
Is this true? Fish H is green. 
775-(17)77*-7.5.NO (3)MAYBE 
attribute. 
In previous syllogistic reasoning studies the individual in the minor 
premise and conclusion was referred to either by naming the individual 
e.g. "Jean lives in Tundor." or by using the determiner "this" to 
refer to the individual as in "This cat" or "This shape ". It had been 
noticed in the previous study that some of the younger children were 
confused about whether "This shape" in the minor premise was the same 
as "This shape" in the conclusion. Obviously unless identity of 
reference is established between the individual in the minor premise 
and the conclusion valid deductions cannot be made. Using names is a 
good way of establishing identity of reference but was not very useful 
in this study since the learning session involved a pictorial 
representation of an inclusion /implication relationship and this would 
have to be relatively easy to depict. In addition there is a rather 
limited range of content for problems concerning attributes of people 
(or animals or other objects with names) which can be represented 
pictorially. In this study the device of referring to an individual as 
"Fish A ", "Fish B" etc. was used to make it clear that the individual 
in the minor premise and conclusion of any argument was the same 
individual and that individuals in different arguments were probably, 
though not necessarily, different. While acknowledging that this 
departs from normal linguistic usage it was felt that subjects would 
be familiar with the use of variables from problems in maths. 
Since subjects were tested in groups of five, four different booklets 
were prepared. These differed in whether the first problem in each 
session involved a class or a conditional rule and also in the content 
of the problems in the different sessions. For half the subjects the 
content of the problems in sessions 1 2 and 3 was CLOCKS and TINS and 
for the other half the content was BOOKS and FISH. Subjects receiving 
CLOCKS and TINS in sessions 1, 2 and 3 received BOOKS and FISH in 
session 4 and vice versa. 
Examples of problems from the different content areas are shown in 
Appendix F. Also shown are the corresponding pictures of these content 
areas which were used in the empirical reasoning task of session 2. 
The pictures can be seen to be consistent with the truth of the 
relevant general rule. 
Design 
In many training studies the effectiveness of training is measured by 
comparing; the performance of the experimental group with that of a 
control group who do not receive the intervening training (O'Brien and 
Overton, 1980, 1982; Falmagne, 1980; Barratt, 1975). Another way of 
assessing the effectiveness of training is to have the subjects act as 
their own controls and compare performance after training with that 
before training. In a study designed to elicit formal operational 
thinking,. Danner and Day (1977) examined the effectiveness of prompts 
by comparing performance on a task before prompting with performance 
on another related task after prompting. This method of assessing the 
effectiveness of training, by comparing performance before and after 
training, was used in experiment 7. 
In experiment 7 performance on session 1, prior to any training, was 
examined, since this was interesting in its own right as an index of 
performance on standard class and conditional syllogisms. A 5 (grade) 
x 2 (linguistic form) x S (argument form) analysis of variance with 
repeated measures on linguistic form and argument form was carried out 
on. correct responses to the different argument forms on session. 1. 
Performance on session 1 was also compared with performance on 
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previous syllogistic reasoning studies. 
Performance on the empirical reasoning task of session. 2 was also of 
interest, since training was not likely to be effective unless 
performance on session 2 was significantly better than that on session 
1. In order to compare performance on sessions 1 and. 2, a 5 (grade) x 
2 (session) x 8 (argument form) analysis of variance with repeated 
measures on session and argument form was carried out on correct 
responses to the different argument forms on sessions 1 and 2. 
The major comparisons of interest in experiment 7 were those between 
session 1, whicb served as a measure of baseline performance, and the 
post-training sessions, session 3 and 4. A 5 (grade) x 2 (session) x 8 
(argument form) analysis of variance with repeated measures on. session 
and argument for was carried out on correct responses to the 
different argument forms on sessions 1 and 3 in order to establish 
whether there was any improvement in response following training for 
problems with a similar content to the original problems and, if so, 
whether it differed for the different argument forms and for subjects 
at different grades. A similar analysis of session 4 responses was 
carried out in order to show whether any improvement following 
training generalised to problems from different content areas. 
T.)ifferences in performance on the different sessions in experiment 7 
were also examined in terms of changes in response patterns. 
Sublects and Procedure 
Twenty children from primary five and primary seven of an Edinburgh 
primary school and twenty children from the second, fourth and sixth 
years of an Edinburgh secondary school took part in the experiment. 
Their average ages and age ranges were as follows 9 years 4 months (6 
years months to 9 years 9 months), 11 years 3 months (10 years 
months to 11 years 10 months), 13 years 5 months (12 years 11 months 
to 14 years 0 months), 15 years 7 months (15 years 1 month Co 16 years 
2 months), 17 years 6 months ( 17 years i month to 18 years 1 month). 
The primary school was a feeder primary for the secondary. 
Subjects were tested in group& of five and all subjects in any group 
received the sane test booklet. The experimenter read the instructions 
aloud referring to the first page of the booklet to explain the layout 
of the problems. The general instructions were as follows (the problem 
referred to in the instructions is that sholm in Table 7.2): 
"I am interested in how children of different ages think and today I 
am going to give you some problems which require you to think very 
carefully but which are quite good fun to do. 
In the booklet in front of you there are eight pages and each page has 
a problem on it with different examples. At the top of each page you 
are told what the problem is about, for instance, the problem on the 
first page is about the fish in John's fishtank. You are told that in 
John's iishtank there are GPEEN fish and YELLOW fish. Some of the fish 
have SPOTS on them and some hava STRIPES. 
You are then given a eneral rule for the problem, which is 
underlined. The general rule is true for the whole problem, that is 
for all the examples on that page. In this problem the general rule is 
"In John's fishtank, if a fish is green it has spots.". 
You are then given some examples labeled A to H. Given that you know 
that the general rule is true and you know that "Fish A is not green." 
is true, you have to say whether the underlined sentence "Fish A has 
spots." is true, YES, NO or MAYBE. So using the general rule "In 
36.3 
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John's fî.shtank, if a fish is green it has spots." and knowing that 
"Fish A Is not green." you have to say whether you think the sentence 
"Fish A has spots." must be true, cannot he true or might be true. If 
you think the sentence must be true you answer YES, if you think it 
cannot be true you answer NO and if you think it right be true or it 
might not be true, there is not enough information to say, you answer 
nAY]E . " 
The experimenter read through the examples from the first problem with 
the children asking them to mark their responses on the test booklet 
as the examples were read. ïlost subjects quickly understood what was 
required and preferred to work at their own pace. However they were 
told to wait for further instructions after completing the two 
problems from any session. 
?hen all subjects had answered the two problems from session 1 they 
were handed out the appropriate pictures of the problem content for 
the empirical reasoning problems of session 2. The subjects were told 
that the picture demonstrated that the general rule was true. They 
were then asked whether they agreed that the general rule was true 
with respect to the relevant picture. Most subjects quickly agreed 
that it was although some argued that certain, elements in the picture 
were counterexamples to the truth of the rule. Mien this happened the 
experimenter explained that the particular elements were in fact 
compatible with the truth of the rule and did not actually make the 
rule false. The subjects appeared to understand and accept this. The 
subjects were told that they had to answer the examples from the 
problems in session 1 again but this time they were to use the picture 
to help them.. The subjects were told that they might find that their 
responses to the session 2 examples differed from their responses to 
the session 1 examples even although the problems were the same, since 
using the pictures would probably make the problems easier to answer. 
However the subjects were instructed not to look back at their session 
I. responses. The experimenter then read through the examples of the 
first problem of session 2 along with the children who then carried on 
to complete the second problem of session 2. 
when the subjects had answeredboth session 2 problems the pictures 
were talen away. Subjects were then instructed to answer the session 3 
problems. They were told that, as in session 1, they had to answer the 
problems without a picture to help. However in responding to the 
session 3 examples they were asked to try to apply any insight that 
they had gained from answering the session 2 examples. 
Subjects were told that the content of the problems in session 4 was 
different from that of the previous sessions and that once again the 
problems were to be answered without the help of a picture. 
The experimenter remained present throughout the experiment in case of 
any difficulties but even the youngest subjects seemed to understand 
the instructions. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
SESSION 
Since session I was prior to the training session performance on this 
session was predicted to be comparable to that found in previous class 
and conditional reasoning studies. Table 7.3 shows percent correct 
response for the different argument forms 
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TABLE 7.3 
PERCENT CORRECT RESPONSE TO DIFFERENT ARGUMENT 
FORMS FOR GRADE AND SESSION 
P5 P7 S2 
SESSION 1 
TOT S4 S6 
pq 92.5 97.5 97.5 100 97.5 97 
p-q 87.5 87.5 90 85 90 88 
-q-p 75 72.5 82.5 95 82.5 81.5 
-qp 82.5 92.5 85 95 92.5 89.5 
-pq 27.5 17.5 27.5 25 50 29.5 
-p-q 17.5 22.5 20 27.5 35 24.5 
qp 10 15 7.5 17.5 45 19 
q-p 20 25 10 30 37.5 24.5 
TOT 51.6 53.8 52.5 59.38 66.3 56.7 
P5 P7 S2 
SESSION 2 
TOT S4 56 
pq 97.5 92.5 87.5 92.5 92.5 92.5 
p-q 85 90 95 92.5 92.5 91 
-q-p 77.5 70 75 85 77.5 77 
-qp 85 92.5 82.5 82.5 95 85.5 
-pq 60 80 67.5 67.5 80 74.5 
-p-q 58 80 85 67.5 80 60 
qp 42.5 70 62.5 60 85 64 
q-p 52.5 72.5 65 57.5 82.5 66 
TOT 67.8 79.1 77.8 72.5 85.6 76.6 
P5 P7 S2 
SESSION 3 
TOT S4 S6 
pq 95 97.5 90 97.5 90 94 
p-q 82.5 82.5 80 92.5 90 85.5 
-q-p 72.5 52.5 42.5 85 82.5 67 
-qp 77.5 82.5 72.5 87.5 77.5 79.5 
-pq 42.5 72.5 82.5 60 87.5 69 
-p-q 30 62.5 67.5 52.5 77.5 58 
qp 30 32.5 40 35 67.5 41 
q-p 42.5 55 70 60 70 59.5 
TOT 59.1 67.2 68.1 71.3 80.3 69.2 
3 
TABLE 7. 3 (CONT.) 
SESSION 4 
P5 P7 S2 84 S6 TOT 
pg 95 97.5 87.5 92.5 85 91.5 
p-g 70 85 62.5 80 77.5 75 
-q-p 72.5 52.5 40 70 77.5 62.5 
-qp 70 77.5 55 72.5 80 71 
-pq 25 67.5 57.5 42.5 70 52.5 
-p-q 32.5 52.5 5`Q 30 65 46 
qp 17.5 35 27.5 25 65 34 
q-p 35 62.5 50 40 65 50.5 
TOT 52.2 66.3 53.8 56.6 73.1 60.4 
366 
for subjects at different grades (also 
shown are percent correct responses on sessions 2, 3 and 4). A 5 
(grade) X 2 (linguistic form) X 8 (argument form) analysis of variance 
was carried out on correct response and Table 7.4 shows the results of 
this analysis. Since neither linguistic form nor any of the 
interactions of linguistic form with other factors were significant a 
further analysis was carried out on the data excluding linguistic form 
in order to simplify tests of simple main effects. The results are 
shown in Table 7.4a. The main effect of grade was significant, 
F(4,95) =2.95, p40.05. Although S4 and S6 subjects performed better 
than P5, P7 and S1 subjects Newman Keuls tests on comparisons between 
means for grade (Table 7.4b) showed that only the comparisons of the 
6th. year subjects (66.3% correct) with P5 (51.6% correct), P7 (53.8% 
correct) and S2 (52.5% correct) were significant. 
The highly significant main effect of argument form, F(7,665)= 161.39, 
p <0.001, was largely due to the good performance on determinate 
argument forms, for which 89% of responses overall were correct, 
compared with the poor perfomance on indeterminate argument forms for 
which only 24% of responses were correct. Newman Keuls test on 
comparisons between argument form means (Table 7.4c) showed that, as 
expected, all comparisons between valid and invalid argument forms 
were highly significant. In addition comparisons between valid 
argument forms pq (Modus Ponens) and -q -p (modus Tollens) and between 
invalid argument forms -pq and qp were significant. 
The absence of a grade by argument form interaction contrasted with 
experiment 6 and the results of Kuhn (1977) and Taplin et al (1974) in 
showing that there was no differential improvement in performance for 



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































In order to establish whether subjects responded according to a 
particular interpretation of the major premise the data for session 1 
were also analysed in terms of correspondence of the responses by 
individual subjects to model response patterns. The model response 
patterns for different interpretations of the rule are shown in Table 
7.5. When affirmative and negative versions of the arguments are used 
conjunctive and biconditional responses can be distinguished, as was 
mentioned in Chapter 6. However, in contrast to Taplin et al, very few 
conjunctive response patterns were found and consequently only 
conditional and biconditional response patterns were considered in the 
analysis. A criterion of 7 responses out of 8 correct according to a 
particular model pattern was used as a measure of response according 
to a particular pattern since this criterion determined a unique 
response pattern. 
The classification of response patterns (Table 7.6) complemented the 
argument form analysis in showing that the low levels of correct 
response on the indeterminate argument forms were largely attributable 
to subjects adopting the biconditional response pattern: 60.5% of 
responses overall were biconditional compared with only 15.5% 
conditional and the remainder (24%) inconsistent. The biconditional 
interpretation was predominant at all grades from P5 through to 6th 
year secondary with a peak at second year secondary (75% biconditional 
response patterns). 
The procedure of riarcus and lips (1979) was used in order to establish 
whether the distribution of response patterns changed across grade. 
Conditional responses were scored as +1, biconditional as -1 and 
unclassifiable as 0. The resulting figures were subjected to an 
analysis of variance the results of which are shown in Table 7.7. The 
3'71, 
TABLE 7.5 
POSSIBLE MODEL RESPONSE PATTERNS FOR DIFFT'RENT 
INTERPI;ETATIONS OF THE CONDITIONAL 
ARGUMENT CONJ. }JICO1dD. COND. 
FORM 
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TABLE 7.6 
RESPONSE PATTERNS FOR SESSIONS 1 TO 4 ACROSS GRADE 
SESSION 1 
CLASS CONDITIONAL TOTAL 
B C U B C U B C U 
3-7,3 
U = utiGjasSi f ia61 
Co 
cß z5i Se 4 
P5 14 1 5 11 1 8 25 2 13 
P7 12 5 3 14 1 5 26 6 8 
S2 15 1 4 15 1 4 30 2 8 
S4 10 5 5 13 3 4 23 8 9 
S6 7 7 6 10 6 4 17 13 10 
TOT 58 19 23 63 12 25 121 31 48 
SESSION 2 
P5 4 7 9 2 7 11 6 14 20 
P7 2 10 8 1 11 8 3 21 16 
S2 0 8 12 0 12 8 0 20 20 
S4 1 7 12 1 6 13 2 13 25 
S6 0 12 8 0 15 5 0 27 13 
TOT 7 44 49 4 51 45 11 95 94 
SESSION 3 
P5 8 6 6 7 3 10 15 9 16 
P7 4 5 11 3 6 11 7 11 22 
S2 0 6 14 0 8 12 0 14 26 
S4 5 9 6 5 7 8 10 16 14 
S6 1 13 6 1 9 10 2 22 16 
TOT 18 39 43 16 33 51 34 72 94 
SESSION 4 
P5 8 3 9 9 3 8 17 6 17 
P7 3 8 9 4 7 9 7 15 18 
S2 3 5 12 4 3 13 7 8 25 
S4 9 4 7 6 5 9 15 9 16 
S6 3 11 6 1 13 6 4 24 12 
TOT 26 31 43 24 31 45 50 62 88 
effect of grade was significant, F(4,95) =2.57, p<,0.05 showing that the 
distribution of response patterns did change with grade but Newman 
Keels comparisons showed that only the comparison between S2 and 56 
was significant (Table 7.7a). It should be pointed out however that 
other methods of scoring might lead to more significant comparisons 
between grades. A chi -square test on distribution of response patterns 
between grade, for instance gives a significant P3 /S6 comparison 
) =9.98, p(0.01. 
Comparison with other studies 
In order to make a fair comparison between experiments 6 and 7 
responses of P4 to S5 subjects from experiment 6 were compared with 
the responses of the P5 to S6 subjects in experiment 7. 57% of session 
1 responses were correct in experiment 7 compared with 59% of 
responses in experiment 6. Overall more responses to valid argument 
were correct in session 1 (89%) than in experiment 6 (77.5 %) and fewer 
responses to invalid argument forms (24.4% compared with 31.5 %). There 
was a larger increase in correct response across grade in experiment 6 
(42% to 74 %), than experiment 7 (52% to 66 %) which was not due to a 
wider age range since the age range being considered was the same 
although the subjects in experiment 6 were from P4 to S5 while those 
in experiment 7 were P5 to S6. The steeper rise in correct response 
with increasing age in experiment 6 seemed to be due to the very poor 
performance in experiment 6 by primary children on invalid argument 
forms (only 9i of P4 and 26.5% of P6 responses were correct), which 
improved dramatically with increasing age up to 71.5% correct at S5 
compared with the relatively gradual increase in session 1 from 13.8% 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































of the older subjects but not the younger subjects on invalid argument 
forms in experiment 6 compared with experiment 7 was due to some 
benefit derived by the older subjects from preceding the syllogism 
task by the evaluation task. 
In terms of response patterns the percentage of conditional responses 
by 6th. year secondary subjects (33 %) was comparable to that found for 
5th. year secondary subjects in experiment 6 (347) and is also 
comparable to that found for adults in Nereus and raps study (32.3 %) 
although 6th year subjects gave more biconditional responses (43%) 
than 3larcus and Rip's subjects (14) or 5th year secondary subjects in 
experiment 6 (13:x:). The larger number of biconditional response 
patterns reflected the relatively poor performance on the 
indeterminate argument forms in session I compared with experiment 6. 
It is probable that the complexity introduced by the inclusion of both 
affirmative and negative versions of the arguments in experiment 7 
makes many subjects resort to the immature biconditional response 
pattern. It is also possible that the content of the problems in 
experiment 7 was more conducive than that in experiment 6 to 
biconditional interpretation. '.arcus and nips found that problem 
content can significantly influence the response pattern adopted in a 
syllogistic reasoning task. They found that the incidence of 
biconditional response varied from 6.5% to 25% depending on the 
problem content. A further possible reason for the difference between 
experiments 6 and 7 in the incidence of biconditional response has 
already been suggested - the fact that the syllogism task in 
experiment 6 is preceded by the evaluation task possibly makes the 




RRSUhTS AND DISCU:iSI(11d 
Percent correct response to the different argument fords in session 2 
for class and conditional premises for subjects at different grades 
are shown in Table 7.3. The results of a 5 (grade) X 2 (linguistic 
form) X 8 (argument type) analysis of variance are shown in Table 7.S. 
As in session 1 there was no effect of linguistic form and neither 
were any interactions of linguistic form significant. In order to 
simplify the tests of simple effects a further analysis was performed 
excluding the effects of linguistic form (see Table 7.8a). Significant 
main effects were found for grade, F(4, 95) =2.79, xp.05 and argument 
form, F(7,665) =21.60, pe40.001 and the grade by argument form 
interaction was significant F(28, 665) =1.91, p <0.01. Newman Kouls 
comparisons between grades revealed significant differences between 
means only for the comparison between P5 and S6 (Table 7.Sb). The 
significant grade X argument form interaction indicated that the 
levels of correct response to different argument forms changed across 
grade. The simple main effect of argument form was significant at all 
grades (Table 7.5e) except 6th. year secondary indicating that only 
for subjects at this grade was there no difference in correct response 
on determinate and indeterminate argument forms. Simple main effects 
analysis of grade showed that performance on determinate argument 
forms did not change significantly across grade (Table 7.8d) while 
performance on all indeterminate argument forms except -pq did change 
across grade. 






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































that in contrast with session 1 there were very few biconditional 
response patterns (only 5.5 overall) and this was true for subjects 
at all grades. The predominant response pattern was the conditional 
response pattern (47.5 %) although there were almost as many 
unclassifiable response patterns (47 %). As in session 1 an analysis of 
variance was carried out on the response pattern data in session 2 
(Table 7.9). The significant main effect of grade, F(4,95) =3.28, 
p4).05, showed that there was a significant difference in the 
distribution of response patterns across grade. Newman Keuls 
comparisons between grades (Table 7.9a) revealed that only the 
comparisons between P5 and S6 subjects and between S4 and S6 subjects 
were significant reflecting the higher number of conditional responses 
on S6 (67.5 %) compared with 54 (32.5%) and P2 (35 %). 
Since the training session was specifically designed to help subjects 
respond correctly on the invalid argument forms performance on session 
1 was compared with that on session 2 in order to establish whether 
there was a significant change in performance from session 1 to 
session 2 only for invalid argument forms. As expected overall 
performance on the empirical task of session 2 (77% correct) was 
superior to performance on session 1 (57% correct). A 5 (grade) X 2 
(session) X 8 (argform) analysis of variance was carried out in order 
to compare performance on sessions 1 and 2 (Table 7.10) Significant 
main effects were found for grade, F(4,95) =4.27, pß0.005, session, 
F(1,45) =73.75, p<0.001 and argument form, F(7,665)= 124.24, p1.0.001. 
Significant interactions were found for grade X argument form, F(28, 
665) =4.40, p(0.001, and session X argument form, F(28, 665) =1.22, 
p<0.001. 


































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































in performance from session 1 to session 2 was largely due to 
improvement in performance on invalid argument forms (from 24.4`: 
correct on session 1 to 66.1% correct on session 2). Although correct 
response on valid argument forms actually decreased from session 1 
(89% correct) to session 2 (86.5% correct) tests of simple effects of 
session at argument form(i) (Table 7.10a) showed that only the 
increases in correct response on invalid argument forms were 
significant. The grade X argument form interaction reflected the fact 
that the differentiation in response to valid and invalid argument 
forms was greater at some gracies than others. 
In order to compare the distribution of response patterns on sessions 
1 and 2 a 5 (grade) X 2 (session) analysis of variance was carried out 
on the response pattern data with grade as a between subjects factor 
and session as a within subjects factor. As Table 7.11 shows 
significant main effects were found for both grade, F(4,95) =3.14, 
p40.05, and session F(1,95) =181.29, pí,0.001, but the grade by session 
interaction was not significant. The significant effect of session 
reflected a change in response from a predominantly biconditional 
response on session 1 (61% biconditional), with only 15.5% correct 
conditional response, to predominantly conditional response on session 
2 (47.5% conditional responses) with only 5.5% biconditional. 
The absence of a significant grade X session interaction in both the 
argument form and response pattern analyses indicated that the 
improvement in performance from session 1 to session 2 was similar 
across all grades. The significant effect of argument form in the 
session 2 analysis fleeted the fact that even in the concretised 
task invalid argument forms are more difficult to evaluate than valid 
















































































































































































































































































































of a significant effect of argument form is taken as an index of 
mature performance only 6th. year subjects on session 2 performed 
maturely on the task. Insofar as response on the invalid argument 
forms on session 2 was superior to that on session 1 for subjects at 
all grades the training task was potentially effective. 
In view of the significant effects of linguistic form in the 
verification tasks which are also empirical tasks the absence of an 
effect of linguistic form in the "empirical reasoning" task of session 
2 is perhaps surprising. However consideration of the "empirical 
reasoning" task shows that it is not actually necessary in solving 
this task to consider the major premise at all and the task could in 
fact be solved in the absence of the major premise. The major premise 
is simply a true description of the empirical situation although 
presumably if the description were false subjects might notice the 
contradiction. Successful solution of the empirical reasoning task 
depends upon the subject being able to establish whether the minor 
premise identifies a unique set of elements or not. In the former case 
the inference is valid and in the latter case invalid. Successful 
solution of the syllogistic reasoning task would require that the 
insight gained in the concrete task transferred to the abstract 
linguistic condition. This insight would be that correct response 
depends upon whether the minor premise determines a unique type of 
element and the realisation that this information can be recovered 
from the relationship expressed in the major premise. The predictions 
of a competence model would be that the insight would transfer only 
for those subjects who had the competence to understand the 
inferential properties of the implication relationship. 
SESSIW í 3 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSI(;N 
Performance on session 3 was to be compared with performance on 
session 1 in order to establish whether the intervening "training, 
session" was effective in promoting correct response on invalid 
argument forms on the linguistic reasoning task. Percent correct 
response to each argument form for subjects at different grades on 
Session 3 are shown in Table 7.3. As in the previous sessions 
preliminary analysis of correct response on session 3 revealed that 
neither the main effect of linguistic form nor any of the interactions 
of linguistic form were significant and consequently this factor was 
excluded from further analyses. A 5 (;rade) X 2 (session) X 8 
(argument forma) analysis of variance was carried out on correct 
response on sessions 1 and 3 (Table 7.12). Significant main effects 
were found for grade, F(4,95)=3.6, p4Q.0i, session, F(1,95)= 50.81, 
p4O.001, and argument form, F(7,665)= 122.09, plÜ.001. Significant 
interactions were found for grade X argument form, F(28,665) =2.29, 
P(0.05, argument form X session, F(7,665) =33.69, p<. 0.001, and grade 
X session X argument form., F(28,665)= 1.94, p(O.01. 
The main effect of session showed that performance on session 3 was 
significantly better than performance on session 1 with 69.2% of 
session 3 responses correct overall compared with only 56.7% of 
session 1 responses. Although the increase in correct response from 
session 1 to session 3 was greater at some grades than others (the 
smallest increase was 7.5% for primary 5 subjects and the. largest 14;> 
for primary 7 subjects) the F ratio associated with the session X 

























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































the increase between sessions for different grades was not 
significant. 
The argument form X session interaction indicated that the change in 
performance from session 1 to session 3 was not the same for all 
argument forms. In fact examination of Table 7.3 shows that there was 
not only an Increase in correct response on invalid argument forms 
(i.e. affirmative and negative versions of PA and AC) from session i 
(24.5% correct) to session 3 (56.9% correct) but there was also a 
decrease in correct response on determinate argument forms from 
session 1 (89% correct) to session 3 (81.5% correct). Tests on simple 
effects of session for the session X argument form interaction showed 
that (Table 12a) the increases in correct response on all invalid 
were, 
argument forms/ significant as were the decreases in correct response 
on both affirmative and negative versions of Ilodus Tollens. The 
session X argument form X grade interaction indicated that the changes 
in response on the different argument forms from session 1 to session 
3 were not the same for all grades. An analysis of simple interaction 
effects showed that the session X argument form interaction was 
significant at all grades except primary 5 (Table 7.12b). 
The distribution of response patterns for session 3 (Table 7.6) showed 
that the predominant response pattern was unclassifiable: overall 
of response patterns were unclassifiable with 18% of response patterns 
biconditional and 35% conditional. An analysis of change in response 
pattern across grade on session 3 (Table 7.13) revealed a significant 
main effect of grade, F(4,95)=3.26, p(0.025, reflecting a general 
increase in correct conditional response with grade from 22.5% at 
primary 5 to 552 at 6th. year secondary and a variation in the 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































response patterns were biconditional with 0% at S2 but 25% at S4. 
Newman Keuls tests on comparisons between grade means (Table 7.13a) 
showed that only the comparison between Primary 5 and 6th. year 
secondary was significant. The significance of the P5 /S6 comparison 
reflected the large decrease in biconditional and increase in 
conditional response pattens from P5 to S6 and the same was true for 
the P5 /S2 comparison. 
In order to compare distributions of response patterns between 
sessions 1 and 3 a 5 (grade) X 2 (session) analysis of variance was 
carried out on response patterns (Table 7.14). Significant main 
effects were found for grade, F(4,95) =3.21, p4S).025, and session 
F(1,95) =93.41, p<0.001, and the grade X session interaction was 
significant, F(4,95)=6.49, 140.001. 
Simple effects analysis showed that session was significant at all 
gracies (Table 7.14a). The significance of the difference in the 
distribution of response patterns between Sl and 53 for P5 subjects 
contrasts with the non -significance of the session x argument form 
interaction for P5 subjects. 
The significant main effect of session showed that there was a net 
increase in correct response from session 1 to session 3. This 
indicated that the training session was moderately successful in 
facilitating correct response on the invalid argument forms although 
the overgeneralisation of the indeterminate response to Modus Tollens 
detracted from the success of the training. The non- significance of 
the grade X session interaction indicated that the effectivenes of 
training held for subjects at all grades although the non -significance 
of the simple interaction of session X argument form at primary 5 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































increase in correct response on invalid argument forms was not as 
large as at other grades. The response pattern data supported the 
demonstration of the effectivenes of training found for the argument 
form data in showing a significant reduction in the incidence of 
biconditional response and an increase in conditional response but 
also in inconsistent ¡5A5 
SESSION 4 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
In order to assess whether the effectiveness of training generalised 
to problems from a different content area performance on session 1 was 
compared with that on session 4. Percent correct response for each 
argument form for subjects at each grade on session 4 are shown in 
Table 7.3. A 5 (grade) X 2 (session) X 8 (argument form) analysis of 
variance was carried out on correct response on sessions 1 and 4 
(Table 7.15). Significant main effects were found for grade 
F(4,95)=3.48, 1)49.05, and argument form, F(7,665)=138.77, p<0.001. The 
argument form X grade interaction, i'(28, 665)=2.22, p4.005, was 
significant as was the argument form X session interaction, F(7, 
665)=34.38, p443.001,and the argument form X session X grade 
interaction, F(28, 665)=2.42, p<0.001. 
Overall only 60.4% of session 4 responses were correct compared with 
56.7% on session 1 and the main effect of session did not quite reach 
significance, F(1,95)=3.92, p.1. There was very little difference in 
correct response betweens..01s icyrciit for subjects at P5, S2 and 54 (S4 
subjects actually made fewer correct responses overall on session 4 








































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































had more correct responses on session 4 than session 1. The session x 
grade interaction was not significant however. 
The argument form X grade interaction reflected different levels of 
correct response to different argument forms at different grades. The 
argument form X session interaction as in the session 3 analysis, 
reflected not just a general increase in correct response on valid 
argument forms from session 1 (24.4% correct) to session 4 (45.7% 
correct) but also a general decrease in correct response on invalid 
argument forms from session 1 (89% correct) to session 4 (75% 
correct). Tests of simple effects of session on the argument form X 
session interaction revealed significant effects of session for all 
argument forms except the affirmative version of Modus Ponens (Table 
7.15a). Performance on all invalid argument forms increased from 
session 1 to session 4 while that on the valid argument forms 
decreased from sessimq 1 to session 4. The argument form X session X 
grade interaction indicated that the changes in response on different 
argument forms from session 1 to session 4 were not the same for 
subjects at all grades. An analysis of simple interaction effects 
showed that the session x argument form interaction was significant at 
all grades (Table7.15b). 
Table 7.6 shows the distribution of response patterns across grade for 
session 4. As in session 3 the predominant response was unclassifiable 
(44 %). Of the consistent response patterns there were more conditional 
response patterns (31%) than biconditional (25 %). An analysis of 
variance was carried out on session 4 response patterns (Table 7.16) 
and a significant effect of grade was found, F(4,95) =4.49, pes0.005. 
Newman Keule tests on comparisons between grade means (Table 7.16a) 


























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































A 5 (grade) X 2 (session) analysis of variance was carried out on the 
response pattern data from sessions 1 and 4. The results of the 
analysis (Table 7.17) revealed significant main effects of grade, 
F(4.95) =3.92, pC0.01, and session F(1,95)= 60.00, p<0.001 and a 
significant gradecnsa interaction, F(4,95) =2.49, p0.05. An analysis 
of simple main effects of session revealed that the effect of session 
was significant at all grades except 4th. year secondary (Table 
7.17a). 
The non -significance of the main effect of session and the grade by 
session interaction indicated that the effectiveness of the training 
session did not generalise to performance on problems from a different 
content area. The significant overall improvement in performance on 
session 3 for all grades except primary 5 but the non -significant 
increase in correct response on session 4 suggested that the increase 
in correct response on session 3 was not attributable to a strictly 
formal analysis. However although the training session did not lead to 
a significant net increase in correct response the training session 
did influence response given on session 4 by increasing the number of 
MAYBE responses used. However the significant increase found in 
correct response on invalid argument forms was accompanied by a 
corresponding decrease in correct response on all valid argument forms 
except the affirmative version of Modus Ponens indicating that 
although the training task was effective in promoting the use of the 
MAYBE response it was not effective in promoting an understanding of 
the appropriateness of the MAYBE response. The significant effect of 
session at all grades except fourth year secondary reflected a 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































increase in inconsistent response but also by an increase in 
conditional response. This indicated that the intervening training had 
made the subjects aware of the inadequacy of the matching 
(biconditional) response pattern but, although there was an increase 
in conditional response patterns at most grades, the 
overgeneralisation of the MAYBE response to valid argument forms 
indicated that the training had not led to a better understanding 
of the inferential properties of the implication relationship and the 
asymmetry of the inclusion /implication relationship still caused 
difficulty. The unexpectedly poor performance by the fourth year 
secondary subjects was particularly difficult to explain but it seems 
likely that the results stemmed from the fact that the sample of 
fourth year secondary subjects contained a disproportionate number of 
non -certificate pupils. 
The results can either be interpreted as evidence that adolescents and 
young adults do not have the formal competence to benefit from 
training or simply as evidence that the training task selected was 
ineffective as a training task. It is possible that the subjects were 
simply too young to benefit from the training. In O'Brien and 
Overton's studies (1980, 1982) only the subjects who were presumably 
well into the formal operational stage (mean ages 21 years 5 months 
and 18 years 2 months) respectively benefited from the contradiction 
training. 
Studies using the selection task have shown a similar lack of transfer 
of ability to solve a concrete version of the selection task to the 
solution of an abstract task (Johnson- Laird, Legrenzi and Le,jrenzi, 
1972; Van Duyne, 1974, 1976) although the selection task is 
intrinsically more difficult than the syllogistic reasoning task. 
The non -significant effect of linguistic form in the session 2 
analysis suggests one reason why the training was not effective in 
promoting an understanding of the distinction between valid and 
invalid argument forms. It was mentioned in the discussion of session 
2 that the concrete task of session 2 could be answered in the absence 
of the major premise or at least without any consideration of the 
relationship between. the major premise and the picture. Although at 
the beginning of the concrete task subjects agreed that the major 
premise was true of the picture the subjects probably did not 
appreciate the significance of the relationship between the picture 
and the inclusion /implication statement. 
Since previous training tasks which have been successful in improving 
performance on conditional reasoning have demonstrated to the subject 
the contradiction between his initial inference and the correct 
inference the "concrete" training used in experiment 7 could probably 
be made more effective by emphasising the contradiction between the 
incorrect inferences made in the standard task and the correct 
inferences made in the concrete task. This could be achieved by having 
the subject respond to a particular argument form in the standard 
linguistic task and then having the subject respond to that argument 
form again immediately in the context of the concrete picture. If the 
subject's initial response was incorrect the contradiction between the 
incorrect response and the (presumably correct!) concrete response 
would possibly alert the subject to the structure of the 
inclusion /implication rule and consequently to correct response based 
upon an understanding of the formal properties of implication. 
SUMARY 
In Chapter 7 an attempt was made to train subjects from 9 years to 
17.5 years to respond correctly on the invalid argument forms D.A. and 
A.C. It was felt that a demonstration of the invalidity of DA and AC 
in a "concrete" version of a syllogistic reasoning task would alert 
the formally competent subject to the fact that some argument forms 
are indeterminate. In the training task subjects were required to 
respond to the syllogistic argument forms with the aid of a pictorial 
representation of the implication /class inclusion relation of the 
major premise. Performance on the eight forms of the standard 
categorical and conditional syllogistic reasoning tasks after training 
was compared with performance prior to training. The results showed 
significant increases in correct response overall at all grades on 
problems with similar content to the initial problem but no 
significant increase in overall correct response at any grade with 
problems of a different content. Performance on invalid forms did show 
a significant improvement but the indeterminate response was 
overgeneralised to the valid argument forms and a significant decrease 
in correct response was found on valid arguments. In conjunction with 
the response pattern analysis these results indicated that while the 
intervening training had made the subjects aware of the inadequacy of 
the matching (biccnditional) response pattern which they had 
previously used, it had not promoted a better understanding of the 
inferential properties of the implication relationship. The lack of 
transfer from concrete to abstract problems is, however, consistent 
with results of similar studies using the selection task. 
LOS 
CHAPTER 8 
SUMMARY AND DISCUSSION 
This thesis has examined the development of reasoning abilities with 
class and conditional logic statements. According to Piaget's theory 
the acquisition of operational classification enables the concrete 
operational subject to understand quantified statements like "All A 
are B ". In experiment 1 the verification paradigm was used to look at 
how subjects interpret universally quantified statements in an 
extensional context. A specific prediction of Bucci's (1977) structure 
neutral hypothesis that young subjects should perform better on a 
verification task with false than with true universally quantified 
propositions was also tested. The results supported Piaget's theory in 
showing good performance by 6 year olds on this task but the similar 
error rates found on true and false statements did not support Bucci's 
hypothesis. 
Propositionally based models of verification which propose that 
verification is a function of propositional structure would predict 
that, since the general conditional "If x is an A then x is a B" also 
expresses universal quantification and is logically equivalent to the 
class statement "All A are B ", concrete operational subjects should 
also perform well on a conditional verification task. Kuhn (1977) 
however claimed that conditional verification is a formal operational 
ability depending upon the subject's ability to interpret empirical 
evidence in terms of a propositional relationship. 
In experiments 2 and 3 the class verification experiment was extended 
to include all possible class inclusion relations which can be made by 
4(6 
combining positive and negative values of two binary attributes p and 
q and performance in verifying class statements was compared with 
performance in verifying conditional statements. Even the youngest 
subjects (primary 2) performed well on class verification although 
subjects still made some errors with certain types of class statement. 
Performance on conditional verification was significantly worse than 
performance on class verification for subjects up to first year 
secondary. Primary school children had difficulty in verifying 
specific types of conditional statement but significant increases in 
correct response occurred at first year secondary. The pattern of 
errors on different statement types found for the young subjects 
indicated that they apparently understood the conditional as a 
conjunction. These results replicated Kuhn's results and were 
compatible with Kuhn's claim that conditional verification requires 
formal operational thinking. 
Propositionally based models of verification could not account for the 
difference in response patterns on the different linguistic forms for 
the primary subjects. This differentiation in response on class and 
conditional verification was apparently compatible with Piaget's 
theory in showing that concrete operational subjects can understand 
class inclusion statements but not until formal operations are 
propositional logic statements understood. It seems that the young 
subjects can understand the class statements in the verification task 
because they map in an intuitively obvious way onto the underlying 
operations of class logic but the conditional statements do not and, 
in order to interpret conditional statements, the combinatorial 
structure of propositional logic is required. 
Although the conditional verification task showed that the conditional 
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interpretation of empirical information is apparently a formal 
operational ability it is possible that the difficulty that the young 
subjects is 'e with the general conditional is caused by their 
inability to understand the general conditional as corresponding to 
the universal quantifier. It was predicted that if this was the source 
of the young subjects' difficulty in conditional verification, 
performance on the conditional verification task should be improved by 
presentation of the general conditional along with other universal 
quantifiers in a within subjects design. The results of experiment 4 
showed that performance on conditional verification could be 
significantly improved by highlighting the interpretation of the 
general conditional as a universal quantifier in this way. However 
performance on conditional verification was still significantly poorer 
than performance on class verification indicating that there was still 
difficulty in mapping the general conditional onto the appropriate 
concrete operational classification operations. 
Although these results were regarded as compatible with _ certain 
interpretation of Piaget's theory difficulties were found in making 
clear predictions from Piaget's theory about performance on specific 
deductive reasoning tasks. It is not clear for instance from Piaget's 
use of the logic of classes and relations and propositional logic as 
models of concrete and formal operational intelligence respectively 
exactly what the distinction is between the logical abilities of 
subjects at these levels. Frainerd, for instance argued that it does 
not make sense to use the more sophisticated logical system of classes 
and relations as a model of a less mature cognitive stage while Ennis 
argued that Piaget's "propositional" lógic is really propositional 
functional logic which in modern systems of logic is not distinguished 
from class logic. From Ennis's interpretation of Piaget's logical 
systems no difference in performance on class and conditional logic 
problems would be predicted. 
If the distinction in performance found on class and conditional 
verification problems is attributable to the use of different 
underlying cognitive operations in their solution this distinction in 
performance would also be expected on other logical reasoning tasks 
and it has been suggested for instance that correct response on class 
syllogistic reasoning problems should precede that on analogous 
conditional syllogisms (Roberge and Paulus, 1972). Subjects at the 
stage of concrete operations who can understand that "All A are B" is 
true even although there are not-as which are h and not-as which are 
not-h, as in the verification task, would be expected to understand 
that -a-h elements and -ab elements are compatible with the truth of a 
universally quantified statement. Although the ability of primary 
school subjects to verify class statements was attributed to their 
comprehension of the logic of inclusion it is likeJy that it was 
mediated simply by an understanding of the empirical inclusion 
relation. The ability to evaluate the truth of a contingent empirical 
relationship does not guarantee that the subject will understand the 
logical consequences of the inclusion relationship in the absence of 
appropriate concrete support. Indeed Piaet's use of a class inclusion 
example to exemplify implication, which caused problems for Ennis in 
trying to distinguish between the logical abilities of concrete and 
formal operational subjects, indicates that knowledge of the formal 
properties of inclusion requires formal operational thinking and 
inference tasks using inclusion statements will require knowledge of 
the logic of inclusion. Since "implication corresponds with inclusion" 
knowledge of the logic of inclusion presumably involves knowledge that 
inclusion corresponds with the combination (p.q)(-p.q)(-p.-q). It 
4IO 
seems likely that it is not the kind of logic, class or propositional, 
but the depth of logical analysis required in the solution of a task 
which determines whether a subject can solve an inference task. 
In experiments 5 and 6 performance on two inference tasks - an 
evaluation task and a syllogistic reasoning task - with class and 
conditional premises was examined. A modified version of the 
evaluation task including both class and conditional statements 
(rules), which was designed so that young children would be able to 
understand the task requirements showed that there was no significant 
effect of linguistic form and primary school subjects performed poorly 
on the evaluation task with both class and conditional rules. The 
results of the evaluation task showed that when the 
inclusion implication statement has no semantic or empirical support 
young subjects (under 12 -13 years) were not able to use the logical 
structure of the rule to work out that different possible situations 
chli y 
are compatible with the rule: those who did not acceptipq 
elements as compatible with the rule were just as likely to accept p -q 
elements as compatible with the rule as -pq and -p -q elements. 
Significant changes in the patterns of exemplars accepted were found 
between primary and secondary school withtsubject_s realising that -p -q 
y 
elements were compatible with the rule although f sub jects still had 
difficulty with the asymmetry of the rule, particularly with the 
conditional. The changes in the pattern of exemplars accepted as 
compatible with the rule at adolescence were regarded as consistent 
with Piaket's proposal that a qualitative change in the child's 
thinking occurs at adolescence with a "reversal in the direction 
between reality and possibility ". 
In experiment 6 subjects from 6 to 17 years were required to say 
whether conclusions to the four standard class or conditional 
syllogistic argument forms followed from the premises. As with the 
evaluation task there was no difference in correct response on class 
and conditional problems indicating that understanding the logical 
consequences of both class statements and conditional statements 
requires formal operational thinking. 
As in other studies the poor performance of younger subjects on the 
invalid argument forms DA and AC in experiment 6 contrasted with the 
good performance on the valid argument forms Pip and NT. It was argued 
that the results of the syllogistic reasoning task, when considered in 
conjunction with the results of the evaluation task, indicated that 
the biconditional responses of the younger subjects were not logical 
biconditional responses since a logical biconditional response would 
be generated from an understanding that -p. -q elements are compatible 
with the major premise, but instead reflected a less mature 
"transductive" or "matching" response pattern. The increase in correct 
response on the evaluation task at adolescence was accompanied by an 
increase in correct response on the invalid arguments on the 
syllogistic reasoning task due to the realisation that the matching 
strategy was inadequate. Rappoport (Ennis, 1976), Staudenmayer and 
Bourne (1977) and others have suggested that correct response on the 
invalid argument forms is a critical test of a formal approach to 
reasoning problems and the increase in correct response on the invalid 
arguments indicated that the subjects were beginning to adopt a 
strategy which took cognisance of the formal properties of 
inclusion /implication. The decrease in correct response on ,IT at the 
same age also suggests a change in strategy albeit a change to a 
strategy which is not as successful on that argument form. 
22_ 
correct, it had not promoted a better understanding of the inferential 
properties of the inclusion /implication relationship since it had not 
enabled the subjects to establish the appropriateness of the MAYBE 
response. The results can be interpreted either as evidence that 
adolescents and adults do not have the formal competence to benefit 
from training or simply as showing the ineffectiveness of the training 
task. It seems likely that the training task did not bring out clearly 
enough the contradiction between the subjects' initial incorrect 
inferences and the correct inference. 
The errors made by subjects even up to the age of 17 -18 years on the 
syllogistic reasoning tasks and in the evaluation and conditional 
verification task indicated that adolescents and young adult's¡ Isionpiy s1O(- 
as good at interpreting implication as a propositional relationship 
within the context of an integrated system of propositional 
relationships, differentiating it from other propositional 
relationships, testing the conditions under which it is true and 
establishing the logical consequences of implication as Piaget's 
theory would suggest. 
It is useful to consider Falmagne's perspective on the development of 
reasoning ability with linguistic premises which was described in 
Chapter 1. Falmagne argued that there are two different methods of 
solving reasoning problems - those based on concrete representations 
of problems and those based on representations of the formal 
properties of the problem. However Falmagne proposed a less dramatic 
transition in reasoning ability from concrete--based to formal 
approaches to problems41uN that advocated by Piaget, arguing tha ¡t one 
aspect of logical development is the change in predominance of 
different representational modes with age and particularly an increase 
y23 
in the availability of the formal mode of reasoning for solving 
problems with increasing age. Falmagne emphasises however that the 
availability of the formal representational mode does not guarantee 
its use since it may for example be more expedient to rely on concrete 
based modes of reasoning which have previously proved to be effective. 
Falmagne regards the acquisition of logical competence as semantically 
based. Initially inferences are bound to a specific content but 
gradually, with repeated exposure to examples of these arguments in 
his "linguistic environment" and feedback about their validity, the 
subject comes to abstract the logical forms of arguments. Falmagne 
claims that the obvious implication of this is that problems with a 
familiar content will be dealt with at an earlier age than those with 
an unfamiliar content and indeed this is a consistent result in the 
literature. However whether such inferences with familiar content 
nAA 
should be called deductive or whether the7» really inductive is rather 
unclear. One prediction of Falmagne's accountof the development of 
reasoning ability would be that problems which can be solved only by 
formal means will be particularly difficult to solve and the ability 
to solve such problems will appear relatively late. The content of the 
problems considered in this thesis was specifically chosen as 
expressing plausible contingent relationships. Indeed the results of 
the experiments reported in this thesis, which used problems 
expressing plausible, contingent relationships, and many other studies 
show that problems which can only be solved by formal methods alone 
still cause difficulty for older subjects. 
Even Piaget (1972) did acknowledge that the subject is more likely to 
demonstrate his logical competence in a subject area with which he is 
familiar than in one with which he is not familiar. Although it was 
claimed earlier on that it seemed rather paradoxical to attempt to 
demonstrate formal competence by showing that a subject can reason 
formally with familiar content, Johnson -Laird (1983) points out, the 
early logicians proceeded in exactly that way in formulating the 
principles of valid inference i.e. by abstracting the principles of 
valid logical argument from consideration of semantically different 
instances of argument forms. This view of the development of formal 
competence suggests a specific view of the role of logic in 
explanations of reasoning ability i.e. that the principles of logic 
are normative with respect to reasoning, that they are derived as 
Cohen (1981) suggests from a sytematisation of intuitions about 
logical validity. 
Although Johnson -Laird's mental model theory could account for the 
increasingly correct response patterns on the evaluation and 
syllogistic reasoning tasks in terms of the construction of 
increasingly accurate models of the premises it would not have 
predicted that the qualitative changes in reasoning would occur at 
adolesence and a Piagetian component would need to be invoked to 
account for this. 
The general conclusion to the thesis is that the significant changes 
in patterns of response on reasoning tasks at adolesence supported 
Piaget's contention that there are qualitative changes in reasoning at 
adolescence although, as in other studies, errors in reasoning by 
adolescent suggested that Piaget overestimated the logical abilities 
of the formal subject. It is envisaged that further research would be 
addressed to further investigation of, the nature of the changes in 
linguistic reasoning ability at adoleic nce and possibly to exploring 





The error in the denominator is read from the ANOVA table. 
Footnote 3.2 
The pooled error term is calculated by dividing the pooled sum of 
squares by the pooled error term: 
pooled SS(ERROR) /pooled df(ERROR) 
Degrees of freedom associated with the pooled error term are 
calculated by the Satterthwaite approximation given in Winer, 1971, 
p.529: 
f = (u+\7/(/f) + (Inf ) 
where u = p(n- 1)MS(subj. within groups) 
v = p(n- 1)(q- 1)NS(B X subj. within groups) 
f = p(n -1) 
f = p(n- 1)(q -1) 
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Appendix A 
Instructions for the shape content problem in experiment 2 
"Tim has a game which he and his friends play with lots of different 
coloured shapes. The idea of the gane is to collect as many as you can 
of three different kinds of coloured shape. These are the shapes Tim 
was collecting the last time he played...(PICTURE OF SHAPES)...Which 
of the following sentences that Tim might say about the shapes he was 
collecting are true and which are false ?" 
Appendix B 
Instructions for the shape content problem in experiment 3 
"Tim has a game which he and his friends play with lots of different 
coloured shapes. The idea of the game is to collect as many as you can 
of three different kinds of coloured shape. Tim said this about the 
shapes he was collecting..(Of the shapes that I am collecting all the 
red shapes are square)..Is this sentence true for these shapes ?... 
these shapes ?.." 
Appendix C 
Instructions for the insect content problem in experiment 4 
"Mr. Jones was on holiday in Bugland and while he was there he noticed 
lots of insects. These are the insects that he saw...(PICTURE).. There 
were big black insects, big striped insects and small striped insects. 
When Mr. Jones came hone he was telling his friends about the insects 
he had seen in Bugland. Some of the things Mr. Jones said about the 
insects were true and some were not true. Can you help by saying which 
46 
of the following sentences about the insects are true and which are 
false? 
Appendix D 
Instructions for the shape content problem in experiment S 
"Tim has a game which he and his friends play with lots of different 
coloured shapes. The idea of the game is to collect as many as you can 
of three different kinds of coloured shape. 17e don't have a picture of 
the shapes that Tim was collecting the last time he played but we do 
know that Tim said this about the shapes he wqs collecting .. (CLASS 
OR CONDITIONAL RULE)....and we know that this is true. Remember Tim 
was collecting three different kinds of shape and he said about his 
shapes...(CLASS OR CONDITIONAL RULE). Could this be one of the shapes 
that Tim was collecting, YES or NO ?..How about this one .. ?..etc." 
Ap endix E 
Story for the shape content problem in experiment 6 
"Tim has a game which he and his friends play with lots of different 
coloured shapes. The idea of the game is to collect as many as you can 
of three different kinds of coloured shape. We don't have a picture of 
the shapes that Tim was collecting the last time he played but we do 
know that Tim said this about the shapes he wqs collecting .. (MAJOR 
PREIIISE)....and we know that this sentence is true. Tim collected 
three different kind) of coloured shape and as he said (MAJOR 
PREMISE) he picked up one of his shapes and said (MINOR PREMISE) 

























































ra2La.2.LaL11:21:21 in ierimellataA 
areas 
(p) Book Content 
In Professor Smart's bookcase all the books on the top shelf are 
history books. 
Given that you know the rule and you know that: 
(A) Book A is on the top shelf. 
Is this true? Book A is not a history book. 
(A)(1)YE3 (2)NO (3)MAYBE 
(B) Book B is a history book. 
Is this true? Book B is on the top shelf. 
(A)(1)YES (2)NO (3)MAYBE 
etc. 
00Fish content 
In John's fishtank, if a fish is red it has stripes. 
Given that you know the rule and you know that 
(A) Fish A is not striped. 
Is this true? Fish A is not red. 
(A)(l)YES (2)NO (3)MAYBE 
(B) Fish B is striped. 
Is this true? Fish B is not red. 
(A)(1)YES (2)NO (3)NAYBE 
etc. 
cc) Clock content 
In Fred's shop if a clock has a 117,13.04 face it is at Si' o'clock. 
(A) Clock A is not at Sik' , o'clock. 
Is this true? (A) Clock A has a VOILAvv( face. 
(B) Clock B has a 09utind face. 
Is this true? -(B) Clock B is at 564 o'clock. 














Appendix F cont. 
(0 Tins content 
In Mrs. Smith's 
labels. 
Is this true? 
Is this true? 
larder all the tins which contain have 
(A)Tin A does not contain fet-L:t,ti.7, 
(A)Tin A has a red label. 
(A)(l)YES (2)NO (3)AYBE 
(B)Tin B does not have a red label. 
(B)Tin B contains WA; 
- (A)(1)YES (2)NO1AYBE 
tn Ñ15. 5rtett4 ictAier ctt 'rtns- tleek.5 
\AAve- red iCttel5 
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